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I. INTRODUCTION
International extradition is the process by which a person found in one country
is surrendered to another country for trial or punishment The process is formal,
regulated by treaty, and conducted between the federal government of the United
States and the government of a foreign country, in this case, Mexico.
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The Rio Grande border has represented the point across which a variety of do-
mestic law enforcement activities have become internationalized: the recovery of
fugitive criminals and escaped slaves; the suppression of outlaw gangs and Indian
marauders; the hunting of cattle rustlers and train robbers; the maintenance of or-
der in border towns; and in modern times the suppression and prosecution of nar-
cotraffickers, alien smugglers, and money launderers. The border also signals the
dividing line between two sovereign jurisdictions with distinct economic regula-
tions, cultures, law enforcement systems, political interests, constituencies, up-
heavals, and moral values.
While criminals sometimes cross the border with indifference to its jurisdic-
tional consequences, they often regarded the easily crossed border as providing
them advantages that offer lucrative profits to smugglers, safe havens to bandits,
fugitives, and freebooters, and economic opportunities to illegal migrants. By
contrast, law enforcement officials typically have regarded the border as a serious
impediment to their tasks. The border often has presented the limits of their police
powers, a line across which they have no control and are typically dependent on
authorities of the other country or state.1
This discussion chronicles United States-Mexico extradition to show historical
patterns and continuity in many current extradition issues. The extradition re-
quirements and practices of the United States and Mexico are then highlighted.
Extradition requirements and practices in both Mexico and the United States un-
der the existing (e.g., 1978) extradition treaty are considered. The contemporary
extradition issues, such as drug trafficking and the Alvarez-Machain, Garcia
Abrego, and Ruiz Massieu cases are discussed. The more informal and sometimes
more cooperative approaches of the border states are contrasted with the more
formal extradition. The policy debate during the ratification of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") and the special procedures developed in
Mexico to prosecute nationals who commit serious crimes are outlined.
This article discusses the problems with current extradition mechanisms be-
tween the United States and Mexico. Potential solutions to these problems in-
cluding a renegotiated extradition treaty and some alternative substantive provi-
sions are highlighted. Extradition issues and prospects for handling them are
considered in the context of other United States-Mexico policies and relations, as
well as in the context of criminal cooperation and criminal justice in the region.
II. HISTORY OF EXTRADITION
An understanding of the evolution of the current extradition practice and pol-
icy between the United States and Mexico requires a review of its history. While
the specific cases, judges, political leaders, and prosecutors change, many juris-
prudential trends and themes continue. One of the continuing trends has been the
use of treaty provisions to refuse either to extradite or prosecute some individuals,
1. ETHAN A. NADELMANN, Cops ACRoss BoRDESm: THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF
UNITED STATES CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 62 (1993).
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resulting in impunity for such individuals. Similarly, the use of kidnapping and/or
irregular rendition are employed simultaneously or alternatively to extradition.
Another continuing theme is the emphasis by the United States or Mexico, in re-
sponse to domestic political needs, of extradition for crimes de jour: fugitive
slaves and smugglers of alcohol and cattle followed by the enactment and en-
forcement of neutrality laws; and in the 20th century the smuggling of drugs and
aliens, transborder abductions, and the early practice of extradition of nationals.
A. PROBLEMS OVER UNrrED STATES FUGnVE SLAvE TRADE
The predominant power of the United States has always directed extradition
relations. In the 19th century the most important extradition issue derived from
fugitive slaves from the United States. The institution of slavery depended on the
capacity of slave owners in the United States to deter their slaves from escaping
and to recover and punish them when they did escape.'
In Mexico the fugitive slave issue resulted in: frequent diplomatic overtures, as
well as efforts to negotiate extradition treaties; private and state-sponsored expa-
ditions across the border to recover runaway slaves; efforts by foreign citizens and
officials to lure slaves across the border, refusal by the Mexican Government to
return escaped slaves; discreet complicity by foreign officials near the border in
United States initiatives to recover slaves; differences of opinion within Mexico
regarding the desirability of inviting thousands of fugitive slaves into Mexican
territory, and discussions of the issue of fugitive slaves and annexationist plots,
filibustering expeditions, and the variety of transational criminal activities en-
gaged in by free whites from the United States?
Mexico's independence in 1810, her prohibition of the slave trade in 1824, and
her abolition of slavery in 1829 turned the flight of slaves from the United States
to Mexico into a source of great tension. Many Mexicans perceived the prohibi-
tion of slavery not just as a humanitarian imperative, but also as a mechanism that
could be used to repel the growing influence of North Americans in Texas, many
of whom arrived with their slaves.
In 1825, the United States initiated in the conclusion of a Treaty of Amity,
Commerce, and Navigation with Mexico a provision for the "regular apprehen-
sion and surrender. . . of any fugitive slaves.'" Opposition to the inclusion of the
clause by the Mexican Chamber of Deputies delayed the ratification of the treaty
until 1832 and resulted in the removal of the provision from the treaty.6
2. Id. at 33-45.
3. Id. at 42-43 (citing Rosalie Schwvartz, Across the Rio to Freedom: United States
Negroes in Mexico, Sw. STUD. MONOGaHNO. 44 (El Paso, Texas Western Press, 1975)).
4. NADEuLAN, supra note 1, at 42 (citing Alleine Hoxwen, Causes and Origin of
the Decree ofApril 6, 1830, 16 SW. HIsT. Q. 387-90 (1913)).
5. NAiEuL MAN, supra note 1, at 42 (citing Schwartz, supra note 3, at 9).
6. JoHN BAssa-r MooRE, A TaTisE ON EXrRADTor0N A2aD IqNmTERATE REDamoN
95-97 (1891).
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During the Texas republic's period of independence between 1836 and 1845,
the number of fugitive slaves seeking refuge in Mexico rose considerably. Slave
owners advertised in newspapers for the return of their slaves, offering lucrative
rewards, and employed agents to collect their escapees in Mexico. Mexican offi-
cials arrested and then released two Texas Rangers sent to Matamoros to appre-
hend runaway slaves. While slave owners' pleas to the United States to negotiate
an extradition treaty or otherwise obtain assistance from Mexico to cooperate in
the problem of apprehending fugitive slaves resulted in diplomatic activity, the
Mexican Government adamantly refused. In 1857 Mexico enacted a law protect-
ing fugitive Negro slaves from extradition and included the law in the new Mexi-
can constitution.7
In 1857, the state of Texas enacted an "Act to Encourage the Reclamation of
Slaves, Escaping Beyond the Limits of the Slave Territories of the United States."
It provided for the state treasury to reward those returning runaway slaves to their
owners.
In the 1850s, Texas slave owners frequently contacted Mexican military offi-
cials in the Mexican states of Nuevo Le6n and Coahuila to seek their assistance in
slowing the flight of slaves across the border. Many Texan slave owners supported
the unsuccessful efforts of Josd Carvajal, a Mexican promising assistance to Texas
slave owners in recovering their fugitives. Carvajal also sought to transform the
northeastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas into the Sierra Madre Republic.'
In 1861, Mexico and the United States concluded an extradition treaty prohib-
iting the return of fugitive slaves. It went into effect the following year In the
early 1860s, a secret agreement between Texas slave owners and Albino L6pez,
the governor of Tamaulipas, provided for the exchange of fugitive slaves for
Mexican peons fleeing north. The provision in the Mexican Constitution protect-
ing fugitive slaves and then the end of the Civil War finally ceased efforts to con-
clude a formal agreement with Mexico or its states and relieved the tension over
the return of fugitive slaves.
While the Mexican Government resisted the efforts of United States law en-
forcement to enter Mexico to capture and reclaim fugitive slaves, it responded on
nationalistic and moralistic grounds rather than resorting to legalistic technicali-
ties as Canada and Britain had, in rejecting United States requests for the return
of fugitive slaves. The United States efforts, however, were especially aggressive
in Mexico, partly because Mexico bordered on a slave state. The different norms
south of the border to capture and return persons continued to shape United States
actions in modern times."
In 1861 the United States and Mexico concluded the first extradition treaty. It
contains eight articles. Article III provides for extradition for twelve listed extra-
7. NADELMANN, supra note 1, at 42-43.
8. Id. at 44.
9. MooRn, supra note 6, at 1118-21.
10. NADELMANN, supra note l, at 45.
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ditable crimes. Article VI of the treaty provides that neither signatory is bound to
deliver up its own citizens or subjects." A United States District Court in Texas
interpreted these provisions to mean that the United States could not surrender a
United States citizen. 2 The provisions of Article VI do not apply to political of-
fenses or the return of fugitive slaves or persons who were slaves when their ex-
tradition offense was committed. Article VI also does not apply to crimes com-
mitted before the date of the exchange of the treaty's ratifications."
B. 1865-1914
From the 1860s to the 1880s, the principal United States law enforcement con-
cerns were smuggling and cattle rustling, both of which evolved into significant
organized criminal activities. 4 Legal objections to the extradition of nationals
prevented cooperation in extraditing fugitives. Both Mexican and United States
law enforcement officials regularly complained about the lack of cooperation from
counterparts across the border and periodically accused one another of complicity
in cross-border criminality. To facilitate capturing a notorious gang kmown as
"the Cowboys" that raided both American and Mexican towns and homes near
Tombstone, Arizona, United States President Chester Arthur issued a proclama-
tion against "the Cowboys." President Arthur declared the area in a state of rebel-
lion, and circumvented the prohibitions on military involvement in civilian law
enforcement imposed by the 1877 Posse Comitatus Act.'"
From 1836-76, the routine response of United States law enforcers, whether
they were cavalry, posses organized by United States Marshals, or Texas Rangers,
to transnational criminality was to pursue bandits into Mexico. As a rule permis-
sion was requested for such crossings. Normally, however, Mexican public opin-
ion would not allow the Mexican Government to consent. Crossings, hence, were
carried out without permission, generally confined to the Indian country along the
upper Rio Grande, the Arizona and New Mexico boundaries.
As the number and severity of both Indian and non-Indian raids from Mexico
increased in 1877, United States border, political and military officials sought
both to regularize and to extend past practices. On June 1, 1877, Secretary of War
McCrary issued an order to General Sherman officially sanctioning the border
crossings instigated by the military commander along the Texas border, causing a
11. Extradition Treaty, Dec. 11, 1861, U. S.-Mex., art. VI 12 Stat. 1199, 1202; 1
Wmum M MAuoY, TREATIS, CoNvE oro's, Inm ETIOI. AcTs, PaorOccoLs Aim
AGRoamrns 1127 (1910).
12. GREEN HAYWOOD HAcKWORTH, 4 DiG. INT'L L. 57 (1942) (discussing Ex parte
McCabe, 46 Fed. 363 (W. D. Tex. 1891).
13. Id.
14. NADEmANN, supra note 1, at 64 (citing RoBERT D. GREG, THE f l*iuE oF
BoRDER TROUBiES ON RELATIONs BEI' VN Tm UNrrm STATES A MnExaco, 1876-1910,
12-13 (1937)).
15. Id. at 65 (citing LARRY D. BALL, TRm UNrrE- STATES MARSHALS OF NEw Ltmsco
ANDARmoATERRrrORms 1846-1912, 126 (1978)).
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fierce nationalist backlash against the order in Mexico City.'6
In 1882, the United States and Mexico concluded an agreement, after years of
tense negotiations, authorizing the troops of either state to cross the border, albeit
only in desert or unpopulated regions "when they are in close pursuit of a band of
savage Indians."'7
With the violence occurring during Mexico's political unrest and civil war,
battles began across the border. Eventually, the Mexican revolution spawned a
series of raids into United States territory by Mexicans and Mexican-Americans
under the Plan of San Diego. This campaign resulted from a document prepared
in the small southern Texas town of San Diego. It called for a Mexican-American
rebellion, the killing of all Anglo males over the age of sixteen, and the creation
of an independent republic in the southwest. 8
On February 22, 1899, following the decision by the United States District
Court in the case of Ex parte McCabe,"' the United States and Mexico concluded
another extradition treaty."' Article IV provided, as in the earlier treaty, that nei-
ther party "shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens," but a new provision
stated that "the executive authority of each shall have the power to deliver them
up, if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so."2
Among the provisions of the 1899 treaty was Article IX, which provided
in part as follows:
In the case of crimes or offenses committed or charged to have been committed
in the frontier states or territories of the two contracting parties, requisitions may
be made either, through their respective diplomatic or consular agents as afore-
said, or through the chief civil authority of the respective state or territory, or
through such chief civil or judicial authority of the districts or countries border-
ing on the frontier as may for this purpose be duly authorized by the said chief
civil authority of the said frontier states or territories, or when, from any cause,
the civil authority of such state or territory shall be suspended, through the chief
military officer in command and of such state or territory, and such respective
competent authority shall thereupon cause the apprehension of the fugitive, in
order that he may be brought before the proper judicial authority.
The provisions of the Mexico-United States 1899 treaty were, for some time,
interpreted such that once the judicial authority determined a fugitive extraditable,
16. Id. at 66-67.
17. Id. (quoting GREGG, supra note 13, at 152).
18. Id. at 73-74; see also Louis R. Sadler, The Plan of San Diego and the Mecan-
United States War Crisis of 1916: A Reexamination, 58 HISPANIcAM. HIST. REv. 381-408
(1978), reprinted in CHALEs H. HARRis III AND Louis R. SADLER, Tim BoRDER AND THE
REVOLUrON 71-100 (1988).
19. 46 Fed. 363 (1891).
20. Extradition Treaty, Feb. 22, 1899, U.S.-Mex., 31 Stat. 1818, 1824, reprinted in
HAcKwoR~a, supra note 12, § 318, at 59 [hereinafter 1899 Extradition Treaty].
21. Id. at 1822, reprinted in HAcKwoRiTH, supra note 12, at 59-60.
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the decision of extraditability was forwarded to the executive of the state (e.g.,
governor of Texas) for surrender.Y
A difficulty under the earlier Mexico-United States extradition treaties was the
need for extradition requests to be directed to the United States Department of
State and the Mexican Department of Foreign Affairs before transmission to the
Ministries of Justice/Attomeys General.23
In 1916, President Wilson ordered General John "Black Jack" Pershing to
lead a "punitive expedition" into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa and his forces
following numerous raids and the killing of Americans in New Mexico. General
Pershing failed to capture Villa, but secretly commissioned two Japanese-Mexican
agents to assassinate Villa with poison tablets. In 1917, with Villa's forces still at
large in Mexico, but no longer operational near the border, Pershing's units were
withdrawn from Mexico. 4
C. ENFORCEMENT OFNEuTRAITY LAWS
Although United States neutrality laws were initially enacted in 1794, actual
enforcement of the laws varied substantially, depending on popular attitudes, the
relations between the United States and the targeted nation, and varied motives of
the Administration occupying the White House.
After 1905, increased opposition to the Porfirio Diaz regime in Mexico re-
sulted in the first significant neutrality law enforcement. In March 1907, Mexican
ambassador to the United States Enrique Creel, complaining of the machinations
of the Mexican Liberal Party and its leader, Ricardo Flores Mag6n, within the
United States, requested that the United States Government enforce its neutrality
laws. Secretary of State Elihu Root, at the request of the Mexican ambassador,
asked Attorney General Charles Bonapart to take the appropriate actions.
The United States Government thereafter developed a network of agents from
multiple law enforcement agencies to supervise neutrality work, including lending
a top Secret Service agent, Joe Priest, to the State Department and then placing
him under Justice Department supervision. Similarly, Texas law enforcement of-
22. Letter from State Department to S.T. Foster, Esq., U.S. Commissioner and Extra-
dition Agent (Oct. 24, 1900), reprinted in HACmaORTH, supra note 12, at 7-8.
23. For instance in 1907, a wire from the District Attorney of El Centro, California to
the Mexican Department of Foreign Affairs requested the detention at Mexicali of
Praxedis Moreno, charged with the murder of his wife at Calexico. The Mexican Depart-
ment responded that the orders were issued to keep the fugitive under surveillance, but his
detention could not be ordered because, according to the treaty, the request should come
through the diplomatic channels. HACKWORTH, supra note 12, at 9 (citing the Mexican
Minister of Foreign Affairs (Mariscal) to the American Ambassador (Thompson), Dec. 30,
1907, MS. Dep't St., file 11142).
24. NADELmAN, supra note 1, at 75-76. For an account of the demise of Pancho Villa,
see CLARmECE C. CLmEmmDEN, THm UNtro= STATES A PANcuo Vmza A STUDY In
UNCONVENTIONALDipLOMACY 305-13 (1961).
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ficials occasionally helped enforce federal neutrality work. The Mexican Govern-
ment sent its own agents and hired employees of the United States private detec-
tive agencies to assist in tracking down and even arresting rebels and plotters. On
United States territory the "subversives" were followed, harassed, and arrested by
agents of both governments; prosecuted in United States courts; deported or ex-
tradited to Mexico; and occasionally kidnapped in the United States and taken
across the border to Mexico.'
The prosecution for violation of United States neutrality laws arose out of the
inability to extradite Mexican "revoltosos," or political rebels successfully under
the 1899 extradition treaty, as supplemented by the agreement of June 25, 1902.
Two provisions of the treaty were especially important. Article 111(2) excluded
individuals from extradition "when the crime or offense charged shall be of a
purely political character." While the term "political" was not defined, all extra-
ditable crimes, with the exception of an attempt against the life of a head of state,
could legally be declared political offenses (depending on the temperament and
"politics" of the magistrate, the motivation of the defendant, and the circum-
stances of the crime). If and when this occurred, the accused could avoid extradi-
tion.'
A method sometimes used in lieu of extradition was to lure Mexicans back into
Mexico where they would be arrested. On October 24, 1906, the Diaz Admini-
stration sought from the Texas Governor the provisional arrest of Juan Josd Ar-
rendondo and sixty-five others for their roles in the Villa Jim~nez uprising of
September 26 and 27, 1906. They were charged with robbery, assault, and murder
in connection with the disturbances at Villa Jim6nez.
In spite of having a former judge and other high-powered counsel, the Mexican
Government was unable to obtain the fugitives' extradition. After extradition pro-
ceedings in San Antonio at the end of December 1906 until January 5, 1907, the
court held that the acts complained of were of a "purely political character" and
excluded under Article I of the extradition treaty. The defendants were then dis-
charged. Arrendondo was, however, immediately served with a warrant by an
immigration inspector and taken into custody as an alien in the United States en-
tering without inspection.' Although the board of inquiry recommended Arren-
dondo's deportation, it was denied on appeal. Arrendondo and sixty-five others
were eventually withdrawn.'
Eventually, Mexican Ambassador Creel induced Elihu Root to request from the
Secretary of War the stationing of troops at Del Rio and Eagle Pass and the as-
signment of a special military investigator for the frontier. Meanwhile, Arren-
dondo was lured into Mexico on the promise of immunity. Arrendondo was ar-
25. W. Dmxz RAAT. REvoLTosos: baico's REBELS IN Thm UNrED STATEs, 1902-23, at
124-48 (1981), cited in NADEmANN, supra note 1, at 78-79.
26. Id. at 125.
27. Id. at 130 (citing articles from the San Antonio Daily Gazette and Daily Light).
28. Id.
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rested and taken to Belem, where later he "conveniently" died."
At the insistence of the Mexican Government, Captain William S. Scott, a cav-
alry officer was assigned to special army intelligence duty to investigate the op-
erations of Mexican emigrados on the United States side of the boundary. In-
creasingly a binational espionage structure was established and United States
prosecutors started prosecuting Mexican nationals for neutrality law violations."
D. ENFORCING UNITED STATES PROHIBITION AND DRUG LAWs
INTHE 1920s AND 1930s
During the 1920s, the efforts of the Commissioner of Prohibition, Harry J.
Anslinger, to enforce the United States prohibition laws, especially smuggling
liquor into the United States, led to his appointment as head of the Prohibition
Bureau's Narcotics Division. His efforts further led to the awareness of the inter-
national dimension of narcotics traffic with the end of prohibition in the 1930s.'1
Throughout the 1930s, drug enforcement agents, Treasury agents, customs of-
ficials from border stations, and United States consular officials engaged in covert
law enforcement work in Mexico, primarily collected information and conducted
investigations on the smuggling of drugs across the border. While negotiations
occurred between the United States and Mexico over the role of these agents, the
United States rejected a formal accord, believing it might curtail their freedom to
operate.3
2
The United States law enforcement officials encountered numerous problems
enforcing prohibition and drug laws. The range of problems included: high and
low-level corruption, economic incentives to undertake drug production and traf-
ficking, the impossibility of adequately policing the border, the special role played
by law enforcement agents based along the border, and the sensitivity of both gov-
ernments and the United States Embassy concerning the operations of freewheel-
ing United States drug enforcement agents south of the border. These problems
remain much the same sixty or seventy years later.' The problems and trends col-
ored the ways in which both governments and especially law enforcement agents
deal with problems of arresting and gaining custody of fugitives and transgressors
of the law.
E. EARLY PRACTICE ON EXTRADITION REQUESTS FOR NATIONALS
Subsequent to the decision of Ex parte McCabe in 1891, the United States and
Mexico concluded a new extradition treaty, in which Article IV provided, as in
29. Id. at 131.
30. Id.
31. NADEudANN, supra note 1, at 93-94 (citing DAviD F. MTuso, TIE A l.s uc
DisEnsn: ORIGINs oFNARCOTIC CONTROL 211 (1973)).
32. Id. at 95-97 (citing WaLn 0. WALkix a Duo CONTROL IN THE A. wlcAs 164
(1981)).
33. Id. at 97-98.
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the prior extradition treaty, that neither of the signatories "shall be bound to de-
liver up its own citizens." A new provision, however, was added that "the execu-
tive authority shall have the power to deliver them up, if, in its discretion, it be
deemed proper to do so."'
The practice under the provisions of Article IV was for a United States district
court to determine whether the person was otherwise extraditable, and, if so, to
certify the matter to the Secretary of State for a decision on the discretion to ex-
tradite nationals."
On December 1, 1926, the United States Ambassador to Mexico confronted the
Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the President of Mexico's apparent
policy to decline to surrender to the United States fugitives who are Mexican citi-
zens, notwithstanding the power to surrender in such cases under Article IV of the
1899 treaty. This is a result of the Juan Adams and other recent cases. The Mexi-
can Minister of Foreign Affairs, however, assured the U.S. lAmbassador that the
Mexican Government considered each case only after a careful study of the cir-
cumstances. 6
Notwithstanding the assurances of the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs,
the de facto practice of not extraditing nationals evolved as illustrated by the case
of Henry Phillips Ames, alias Enrique Tames, whose provisional arrest and de-
tention, with a view to extradition to Mexico, was requested for robbery and em-
bezzlement charges. On May 21, 1928, the United States Commissioner for the
Southern District of California found him extraditable, noting that the relator was
a United States citizen and that extradition should be denied due to his citizen-
ship, unless it could be affirmatively shown that the accused will receive a fair
trial and political considerations would not taint the proceeding. Hence, the deci-
sion was a mixture of concern about the potential unfairness of the proceedings in
Mexico, notwithstanding the rule of non-inquiry, and concern for non-reciprocity.
In a note dated June 4, 1928, the Secretary of State informed the Mexican ambas-
sador that Ames would not be extradited due to Mexico's consistent practice since
1923 in refusing to surrender Mexican citizens to the United States."
After the receipt of assurances that the Mexican Government did not have the
"deliberate intention of refusing the extradition of Mexicans to the United States,
simply because of their nationality," Secretary of State Kellogg informed the
Charg6 d'Affaires of Mexico that the State Department "in the future will be gov-
erned by the special circumstances in each case, in the same manner as your Em-
bassy states your Government deals with the reversed situation."38
34. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 12, at 1186, 31 stat. 1818, 1822.
35. In re Lucke, 20 F. Supp. 658, 659 (N.D. Tex. 1937).
36. HACKWORTH, supra note 12, at 60 (citing Under Secretary Olds to Ambassador
Sheffield, Dec. 1, 1926, MS. Dep't St., file 212.11Adl/18; the Mexican Minister of For-
eign Affairs (Saenz) to Mr. Sheffield, Jan. 13, 1927, file 212.11 Adl/21).
37. Id. at 61.
38. Id. (citing Ambassador Tellez to Secretary of State Kellogg, Jan. 7, 1928, MS.
Dep't St., file 211.12Am3/1; commissioner's certificate, May 21, 1928, MS. Dep't of St.,
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On June 27, 1939, the Department of State denied an extradition request for
Severiano Riojas on the basis of the Mexican Government's practice of declining
to extradite its citizens and the need for reciprocity of action under extradition
treaties.39 On December 12, 1939, the State Department, granted a Mexican ex-
tradition request for Juan Delgado Ortiz, a United States national, thereby show-
ing that the refusal to extradite nationals is not an established practice.!
The above-mentioned cases and diplomatic notes indicate that the issue of ex-
tradition of nationals has loomed as a major controversial issue between 1861 and
1980 and indicates the environment and context in which the two governments
are grappling with the issue in the modem period.
F. RECENT ExTRADIoTIO TRENDs
Statistics indicate that extradition between the United States and Mexico has
increased significantly over the last ten years.
1. Extradition from the United States to Mexico
According to Mexican sources, since 1984, Mexico submitted 416 extradition
requests to the United States. This number resulted in: thirty-seven persons
handed over to Mexican authorities; seven petitions denied; fourteen deportations;
and eighteen persons facing extradition proceedings. '
Between 1980 and 1992, the United States extradited twenty-one persons to
Mexico. The crimes for which these persons were extradited include the follow-
ing, homicide, nine; abuse of functions (ejercicio abusivo), two; kddnapping, one;
purchasing arms, one; drug crimes, one; fraud, one; and abuse of confidence, one.
No crimes were listed for five of the cases. In terms of the methods of delivering
the fugitive, five fugitives were delivered without Mexican requests. Fourteen
were delivered; one was waived; and one acquiesced and returned without under-
going the extradition process.
Since 1993, when Mexico established the General Division of International
Legal Affairs, the United States delivered thirty-nine persons for the following
crimes: homicide, twenty-five; violation of Article 91, Frac. II of the banking law,
file 211.12 Am 3/16; Mr. Kellogg to Seflor T611ez, June 4, 1928, file 211.12 Am 3/19; Mr.
Kellogg to the Mexican Charge d'Affaires (Padilla-Nervo), Dec. 13, 1928, MS. Dep't of
St., file 211.12 Am3/27).
39. HAcxvoanr, supra note 12, at 61 (citing The Secretary of State (Hull) to the
Mexican Charg& d'Affaires (Quintanilla), June 27, 1939, MS. Dep't St., file 211.12 Rio-
jas, Severiano/40.
40. Id. at 61-62 (citing a Letter from Counselor of the Department of State (Moore) to
Mexican Ambassador (Nijera), Dec. 12, 1939, MS. Dep't St., file 211.12 Ortlz, Juan Del-
gado/16.
41. Statistics can be found in Mexico's Anti-Narcotics Policy, (undated and unclassi-
fled policy paper issued by Mexican Embassy and circulated in U.S. Congress in Feb.
1996) [hereinafterMexico's Anti-Narcotics Policy] (on file with the author).
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one; sex offenses, one; bribery, two; tax fraud, one; improper harm to property
and assault and battery, one; carrying of fire arms exclusively reserved for the
Mexican Army, one; drug crimes, two; trafficking in minors and persons inca-
pacitated, one; murder of a parent, one; and fraudulent administration, one.
In terms of the means for the extradition or alternative mode to delivery of the
persons requested by Mexico, the methods are as follows: extradited, eighteen;
acquiesced, six; deported, thirteen; and delayed consent, one."2
2. Extradition from Mexico to the United States
Mexican sources report that, since 1984, the United States requested the extra-
dition of 151 fugitives from Mexican territory. These requests resulted in: sixty-
eight detentions; twenty persons surrendered; two suspects expelled; five escapees;
fourteen facing extradition proceedings; five requests denied; and eight requests
approved but delayed. Mexican authorities are processing the remaining re-
quests.
43
Most recently, the Mexican government indicated that, as of July 1996, ninety-
one United States extradition requests were pending in the hands of Mexican
authorities. Of this number, fifty-two are drug trafficking-related."
Since 1988, Mexico extradited thirty-nine persons to the United States for the
following crimes: drugs, seventeen (includes one case that also included conspir-
acy to commit drug offenses); fraud and false declarations, one; falsification of
documents and false declarations, one; sexual conduct against minors, one; postal
fraud and arson, one; fraud, three; arms trafficking, one; tax evasion, one; sexual
offenses, two; homicide, one; assault, wounding and unlawful transportation of
prohibited arms, one; and robbery, two."'
According to Johnathan Winer, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau for Inter-
national Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, "more than twice as many fugi-
tives-13 in all-were extradited to the United States in 1996 as in 1995. Among
the 1996 extraditees were two Mexican nationals, an unprecedented step given
Mexican legal strictures on extradition of nationals." According to Deputy As-
sistant Secretary Winer, the return of such criminals represents real progress, and
he anticipates "additional Mexican extraditions in the near future" despite the
"large backlog of pending United States extradition requests."' ' Moreover, ac-
42. Statistics can be found in a document prepared by the Office of the Mexican At-
torney General. Office of the Mexican Attorney General (undated and unclassified docu-
ment obtained from the Commission on Justice at Mexico's Chamber of Deputies (Co-
misi6n de Justicia de la Cdmara de Diputados) in the Spring of 1996 [hereinafter Mex.
A.G.'s Document] (on file with the author).
43. See Mexico's Anti-Narcotics Policy, supra note 41.
44. Mexican Extraditions to the United States (undated and unclassified update pre-
pared in Summer 1996 and issued by the Mexican Embassy, Washington, D.C.).
45. See Mex. A.G.'s Document, supra note 42.
46. Hearing on Mexico: Measures to Combat Money Laundering Before the Comm.
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cording to United States Ambassador James Jones, "about 200 suspects, including
drug traffickers, are on Washington's extradition wish list." Of this number,
about thirteen names make the United States' top priority list."
m. MEXICAN LAW AND REQUIREMENTS
In looking at Mexico's judicial system, one must keep in mind some of the ba-
sic features that distinguish civil and common traditions. One of these features is
that the legal principle of stare decisis, elevated to a position of supreme promi-
nence in common law countries,48 such as the United States, carries little weight,
if any, in the Mexican legal system.49 Judicial decisions in Mexico are generally
made by judges interpreting and applying blackletter law (mainly developed by
legal scholars) and not case law, as in the United States.
As a general rule, therefore, court decisions in Mexico have only persuasive
value even though certain types of cases may be interpreted as binding." In the
end, the judge must interpret the law and not court rulings in similar cases. In
fact, the creativity enjoyed by judges and lawyers in the common law tradition-
and this includes their ability to use precedent to influence court decisions-is
significantly curtailed in the Mexican context.
This section summarizes Mexican domestic law within which substantive and
procedural extradition law is implemented. The constitutional and legal aspects of
Mexican extradition combined with its distinctive legal culture explain the differ-
ences in the implementation of the extradition treaty between the two govern-
ments.
A. SUBSTANTImVE REQUIREMENTS
Mexico's international extradition is governed by federal law and is regulated
by various sources: 2 the Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos
on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Johnathan Winer,
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Dep't of State).
47. Washington to Increase Drug Pressure on Mexico, SIuiART NEWS, Pr. ST. Lucm
NEws (STUART, FL.), Apr. 17, 1997, at A14.
48. J.Ams G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, FEmERAL JuDIcIAL CENER, A Pan.1a o:
TkE CrviL-LAw SYSTm 37 (1995) (contrasting how civil and common systems create, de-
velop, and implement their laws).
49. FRAmisco A. AVALOS, TBE MEXIcAN LEcAL SysTmr 16 (1992) (explaining Mex-
ico's adoption of its civil law system in a historical context).
50. Id. A case may be interpreted as binding on lower courts if followed by five con-
secutive and consistent decisions from either the Supreme Court or (appellate) circuit
courts. Id. These types of cases establish Nvaat is kmouai as 'Jurisprudence" (case law) and
have the most persuasive weight any case can have in the Mexican context. Id.
51. APPLE & DEYtnmnc, supra note 48, at 37 (noting the different roles and responsi-
bilities ofjudges and lawyers in civil and common law systems).
52. GutILLEo COLfr SkcHEZ, PROCED aNTrOS PAR A EXTtc6.i 69 (11xico:
Editorial Porrha, 1993) (providing a comprehensive work on Mexico's extradition proce-
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(Mexican Constitution), the Ley de Extradici6n Intemacional (Law on Interna-
tional Extradition), the C6digo Penal Para el Distrito Federal en Material de
Fuero Comin y para toda la Reptdblica en Materia de Fuero Federal ("C.P.D.F.,"
or Federal Penal Code) and the C6digo Federal de Procedimientos Penales
("C.F.P.P.," or Federal Code of Criminal Procedures). If there is an extradition
treaty, as with the United States," the treaty governs extradition procedures.'
Mexico's Law on International Extradition governs in the absence of an extradi-
tion treaty." The law also supplements gaps in the treaty.
International treaties must "be in accord" with the Constitution. 6 Some of the
articles from the Constitution most frequently invoked in international extradition
procedures are:
Article 14 - guarantees the non-retroactivity of the law; protection of life, lib-
erty, property, and the precise application of the law;
Article 15 - prohibits extradition for political offenses or when the defendant
has been subject to slavery in the country where the offense has been committed;
Article 16 - limits unreasonable searches and seizures;
Article 18 - permits custody only for offenses punishable by imprisonment;
Article 19 - stipulates that no detention can exceed 72 hours, unless justified
with a judicial resolution or order (sufficient evidence must show the elements of
the crime and the probable cause imputed to the accused);
Article 20 - grants the accused numerous rights in a criminal process: right to
bail, freedom from self-incrimination, right of information in a public hearing
within 48 hours after being turned over to the judicial authorities of the name of
his accuser and the nature and cause for the accusation; right to a trial, a defense
and counsel;
Article 33 - entitles foreigners to the constitutional guarantees enjoyed by
Mexican nationals set forth in the first 29 articles of the Constitution. It allows
the Executive Branch, however, the exclusive power to compel any foreigner,
whose presence may be deemed inexpedient, to abandon Mexican territory with-
out prior trial.
dures). SAnchez, a Mexican legal scholar of Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mdxico,
in Mexico City, identifies these as the main sources of extradition: Constituci6n Poll tica de
los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Const.); "Ley de Extradici6n Internacional", D.O., Dec.
29, 1975 (entered into force Dec. 30, 1975) [hereinafter Mexico's International Extradition
Law]; amendments, D.O., Dec. 4, 1984 and Jan. 10, 1994 (entered into force Jan. 11,
1994); "C6digo Penal Para el Distrito Federal en Material de Fuero Comfin y para toda la
Reptiblica en Materia de Fuero Federal", D.O., Aug. 14, 1931; and "C6digo Federal de
Procedimientos Penales", D.O., Aug. 30, 1934, amended, D.O., Jan. 10, 1994.
53. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S-Mex., entered into force Jan. 225, 1980, art.
1, 31 U.S. 5059 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty].
54. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 3.
55. Id. arts. 1, 3.
56. Max. CONST. art. 133 (stating that the Constitution, laws from Congress, and trea-
ties in accordance with them combine to form the "Supreme Law of all the Union").
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Article 104 - dictates that extradition matters are within the competence of fed-
eral district judges; and
Article 119 - decrees that international extradition procedures are mainly han-
dled by the Federal Executive, with the intervention of the Judiciary, and that in
international extradition cases the suspect may be detained up to two months?"
Reciprocity is a fundamental principle of Mexico's extradition practices. Both
Mexico's Law on International Extradition makes reciprocity a condition to con-
sider an extradition request from a foreign State." The Extradition Treaty between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States (hereinafter United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty) makes reciprocity an obligation."
1. Jurisdiction and Extraterritoriality
Mexico's Federal Penal Code provides for jurisdiction over and prosecution of
criminal suspects residing in Mexico and in other countries, regardless of the fact
that they may or may not be subject to the sovereignty of a specific country." The
Penal Code allows prosecution:
(a) For crimes initiated, prepared and committed in another country, when they
produce or attempt to produce an effect in the (Mexican) Republic;"
(b) For the crimes committed in Mexican consulates or against its personnel
when they are not judged in the country where committed;'
(c) For crimes that are committed continuously in another country, and con-
tinue to be committed later in the (Mexican) Republic. These crimes will be
prosecuted under Mexican law, for both Mexican and foreign nationals;14
(d) For crimes committed by a Mexican in a foreign country against a Mexican
or against foreigners, or by a foreigner against a Mexican. These crimes will be
punished in the (Mexican) Republic, and according to federal law, if: (i) the ac-
cused is in the Republic; (ii) the criminal has not been tried in the country where
the crime was committed; and (iii) the crime must be of a type that exists in both
57. See id.; see also Telephone Interview by Julia Padiema Peralta vith Miguel A.
M~ndez, Office of Mexican Attorney General, Mexican Embassy to the United States
(Aug. 28, 1996) (noting that Article 119 the Mexican Constitution does not contradict or
supersede Article 19 since a judicial order or arrest warrant must still be issued to justify
the detention of the person) [hereinafter Mdndez Interview of Aug. 28].
58. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 10(1).
59. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 1(1) (requiring that "[t]he
Contracting Parties agree to mutually extradite, subject to the provisions of this
Treaty...").
60. C.P.DYF. (Mexico's Federal Penal Code) art.2 - 4.
61. Id. art. 2(I).
62. Id. art. 2(11).
63. Id. art. 3.
64. Id.
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countries.'
The Penal Code permits the extradition of individuals charged with a crime or
whose arrest is sought to serve a sentence in the requesting State." The United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty reaffirms extradition of such individuals. '7 It
allows the extradition of persons charged with an offense, found guilty or wanted
for an offense committed within the territory of the requesting State.' When the
offense has been committed outside the territory of the requesting State, extradi-
tion shall be granted if. (a) the offense is punishable by the laws of the requested
State; or (b) the suspect is a national of the requesting State, which has jurisdic-
tion to try that person."'
Although the law allows Mexico to enjoy broad jurisdictional-prosecutorial
powers over fugitives, this is not the case when it comes to the actual delivery of
fugitives. The Law on International Extradition limits the delivery of Mexican
nationals to a foreign state except in "exceptional circumstances" and at the dis-
cretion of the Executive. 0 This principle, reaffirmed in the United States-Mexico
Extradition Treaty,"1 served well for Mexico to justify its historical reluctance to
extradite its own nationals.
2. Extraditable Offenses
There are three basic conditions that make an offense extraditable in Mexico:
1) the criminal act or behavior must be intentional; 2) the conduct charged must
be a crime in the laws of both countries, thereby meeting the double criminality
standard; and 3) the crime must be punishable with imprisonment of no less than
a year.72 In the case of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, the offense
does not necessarily have to fall within any of the clauses of the Appendix to be
extraditable-as long as the three above mentioned requirements are met.73 Mex-
ico's Law on International Extradition is more explicit on this point, as it speci-
fies that serious or negligent crimes (delitos culposos) can also give rise to extra-
dition.7' Also, one would expect the type of crime not to fall within the exceptions
65. Id. art. 4.
66. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 5.
67. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 1.
68. Id. art. 1(1).
69. Id. art. 1(2).
70. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 14.
71. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 9(1) ("Neither Contracting
Party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of the re-
quested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver
them up if, in its discretion, it be deemed proper to do so.").
72. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 6; U.S.-Mexico Extra-
dition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 2 (stating the criteria required for an offense to be extra-
ditable).
73. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 2(3).
74. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 6.
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to extradition spelled out in statutory law and the bilateral treaty.
The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty spells out thirty-one extraditable
offenses in its Appendix, ranging from murder to accepting bribes.7' The Treaty
covers and punishes acts of attempt, conspiracy and participation in the commis-
sion of an offense." Offenses involving the transportation of persons or property,
use of mail or other means of carrying out interstate or foreign commerce are also
extraditable."
Often, defense lawyers argue that their clients are improperly charged with
felonies that are neither extraditable, nor part of an extradition treaty.' For in-
stance, Daniel James Fowlie, a powerful marijuana-trafficker convicted in the
United States and arrested in Mexico in 1987, argued that nine out of twenty-six
counts, including operating a continuing criminal enterprise and making illegal
money transfers, did not have an equivalent in Mexican law. His lavyers argued
that Fowlie could not face charges in the United States. Assistant United States
Attorney Elana S. Artson contended, however, that Fowlie's extradition from a
prison in La Paz, Baja California was for all twenty-six counts which she said
were part of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty.' Eventualy, the United
States district court extradited and sentenced Fowlie to thirty years in prison and
fined him $1 million.'
B. NON-EXTRADmON AND BARs TO PROSECUTION
This section analyzes several grounds to non-extradition and bars to prosecu-
tion in Mexican constitutional and statutory law and in the United States-Mexico
extradition treaty.
1. Political or Military Crimes
Mexican law bars extradition when the offense is of a political or military na-
ture. The Mexican Constitution prohibits the negotiation of extradition treaties
regarding political crimes."' Both Mexico's Law on International Extradition and
the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty bar extradition for "political of-
fenses." ' Mexico's Federal Penal Code includes in this category, the crimes of
75. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, app.
76. Id. art. 2(4)(a).
77. Id. art. 2(4)(b).
78. See, e.g., Dan Weikel Foylie La, yers Say 9 Drug-Case Charges Im'alid, LA
TuIEms, Nov. 27, 1990, at 5 (relating that attorneys for Daniel James Fowlie argued that
their client was extradited for Mexican charges with no equivalent in U.S. law).
79. Id.
80. Jerry -icks, Drug Kingpin Fowlie Gets 30-Year Term, LA TnI4Es, June 11, 1991,
at Al.
81. MEx. CoNsT. art 15.
82. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 8; U.S.-Mexico Extra-
dition Treaty, supra note 53, art.5(l).
1997]
AM. U J INT'L L. & POL T
rebellion, sedition, mutiny, and conspiracy.' The United States-Mexico Extradi-
tion Treaty excludes from this category murder and willful crimes against the life
and physical integrity of heads of government, attempts to commit such offenses,
and specific offenses which countries agree to prosecute by agreement.
The Mexican Government invoked the political offense exception occasionally
to the detriment of criminal investigations involving the United States govern-
ment.1 For instance, in August 1987, a Honduran citizen exploded a bomb in a
Honduran restaurant wounding five United States servicemen. 6 Alfonso Guerrero
sought and received asylum in the Embassy of Mexico in Honduras." Although
Mr. Guerrero was formally charged with the crime and the Government of Hon-
duras requested that Mexico turn him over so that he could be prosecuted, the
Mexican Government refused to release Guerrero to the Honduran authorities. 8
Furthermore, Mexico's Law on International Extradition and the United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty also preclude extradition for military crimes."
The C6digo de Justicia Militar (Mexican Code of Military Justice) spells out the
list of what are officially considered military offenses-ranging from treason to
insubordination and sedition." Mexican jurisprudence defines a military crime as
"one that perturbs, diminishes, or puts at risk the military service, when military
duties are breached or the acts or omissions are committed during military serv-
ice."'91 Mexico's Code of Military Justice, totaling 927 articles, gives exclusive
jurisdiction to Tribunales Militares (Mexican Military Tribunals) to discipline and
punish military misconduct.'
2. Slavery
Mexico historically denied extradition in cases of slavery. The Mexican Con-
stitution prohibits slavery in Mexican territory" and the negotiation of extradition
treaties applicable to criminals subject to a state of slavery in the requesting
83. C.P.D.F. art. 144.
84. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art.5(2)(a) and (b).
85. U.S. SENATE Comm. ON FOREIGN REL., MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE COOPERATION
TREATY wrrH MEXICO, S. ExEc. REP. No. 101-9, 101st Cong. 38 (1989) (discussing in-
stances where American law enforcement has been thwarted by terrorists and other serious
criminals fleeing to Mexico where they do not face serious sanctions).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 9; U.S.-Mexico Extra-
dition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 5(3).
90. C6digo de Justicia Militar (Mexican Code of Military Justice), promulgated Aug.
28, 1933, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1934).
91. RAL CARRANCA Y TRUJLLO, DaaRcHo PENAL MExICANo 174 (1980) (citing 14
S.J.F. 178).
92. Id. at 173 (citing 14 S.J.F. 178).
93. MF.X CONST. art. 2.
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State.' Mexico's Law on International Extradition reaffirms this principle."
3. Capital Punishment
Capital punishment can also bar extradition. The Mexican Constitution
allows for the death penalty only for the crimes of "treason to the State during in-
ternational war, parricide, homicide, arson, plagiarism, car jacking, piracy and
severe military crimes."' The Constitution, however, explicitly prohibits capital
punishment for "political crimes."' In cases of extradition, Mexico's Law on In-
ternational Extradition states a preference for severe incarceration rather than the
death penalty, when feasible." The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty,
however, clearly prohibits the extradition of criminals when the fugitive awaits
capital punishment in the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do
not permit capital punishment for the specific offense." The Treaty permits extra-
dition if the death penalty is not imposed, or, if imposed, not executed.' 2 Other
bars to extradition include non-compliance with the following: the statute of
limitations, the principle of specialty, and double criminality.
4. Statute of Limitations
Extradition is barred when the statute of limitations for the prosecution or the
enforcement of the extraditable offense expires in either country."' Articles 100
through 115 of Mexico's Federal Penal Code delineate the provisions regarding
the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations starts to run:
1. From the day of the conclusion of the crime, if this is an instantaneous
one;
II. From the last day the act is committed or omitted, in the case of an at-
tempted crime;
Ill. From the day of the last act, when the crime has been a continuous crime;
IV. From the last day of the criminal act, if this is a permanent crime."-
The length of the statute of limitations is generally one year for crimes punish-
able with a fine' and two years when the offense is punishable by dismissal from
office, suspension of a right or disqualification, unless otherwise provided by
94. Id. art. 15.
95. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 8.
96. Mkx CONST. art. 22.
97. Id.
98. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 10(V).
99. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 8.
100. Id.
101. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 7(M).
102. C.P.D.F. art. 102.
103. Id. art. 104.
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law.' For crimes punishable by incarceration, the lapse of the statute equals the
average time the person serves in prison, and not less than three years."' Upon
request from the prosecution, judges often allow the statute of limitations to toll
(or expand its life span) when the individual sought is not on Mexican territory.' 6
5. Speciality
Mexican law adheres to the principle of "speciality," whereby the requesting
state cannot prosecute the relator either for crimes committed prior to extradition
or those omitted or unrelated to the complaint" ' The principle of specialty,
therefore, requires the requesting party to specify the type of crime and time of
commission of the crime. Similarly, the requested state must specify with as
much detail as possible in the extradition order the offenses for which the relator
is being extradited."8 The requesting state must interpret the order if the relator
raises the principle of specialty.
6. Non Bis In Idem
The Mexican Constitution prohibits double jeopardy,"'9 which is also a bar to
extradition. ' Under the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, a fugitive
prosecuted, tried, convicted, or acquitted for the crime for which extradition is re-
quested in the asylum State will not be extradited."' Similarly, the Law on Inter-
national Extradition states that extradition will not proceed when the individual
received absolution, pardon, amnesty, or served a sentence for the offense for
which extradition is sought."' This policy aims at avoiding the prosecution and
trial of the fugitive for the same offense twice and in two different jurisdictions,
which obviously could be complicated and unfair. Extradition occurs, however, if
the person has been convicted or has not completed the sentence."' This is known
as "delayed" or "deferred" surrender.""
C. PROCEDURAL LAW
The Supreme Court of Mexico characterized Mexico's extradition proceedings
as a "mixed system," with various actors playing a role at three main stages: (1)
104. Id. art. 106.
105. Id. art. 105.
106. M~ndez Interview of Aug. 28, supra note 57.
107. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 10(11); U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 17(1).
108, Mx. CONST. art. 10(2).
109. Id. art. 23.
110. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 6.
111. Id.
112. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 7.
113. Id. art. 11; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 15.
114. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 15.
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the arrest of the accused ordered by the executive; (2) the judicial determination
as to whether extradition should be granted or not; and (3) the final decision of
the executive on the extradition request, which may or may not follow the judicial
determination."' For example, in the Paul Edmond Flato case, the United States
requested the provisional arrest of Paul Edmond Flato, a United States citizen
charged with forgery and robbery. Mr. Flato was detained soon after the United
States Embassy in Mexico City presented the formal extradition patition. The
Mexican Attorney General assigned a local prosecutor to initiate proceedings and
bring the case before a federal district court. The court found Flato extraditable
and issued an order for his extradition. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed
with the court's opinion and granted the extradition request."6
1. Intention to Present a Formal Petition to Request Extradition
Under the Mexican Constitution, the extradition process involves actions by
both the Executive and the Judiciary." Extradition procedures can start with a
requesting State's formal petition or intention to submit an extradition request. A
requesting State, when expressing its intention to present an extradition request,
may also request the provisional arrest of the fugitive."" Such a request must be
made through diplomatic channels"" and must be accompanied by documents
supporting the detention of the person.lz
Under the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty a petition for provisional
arrest must include a description of the offense for which extradition is requested,
a description of the person sought and his whereabouts, an undertaling to for-
malize the request for extradition, and a declaration of the existence of a warrant
of arrest issued by a competent judicial authority, or a judgment of conviction is-
sued against the individual" Upon receipt of a petition for provisional arrest, the
requested State takes the necessary steps according to domestic law to arrest the
sought person."
115. Henry P. de Vries & Jos6 Rodriguez Novas, Territorial Asylum in The Americas, 5
ITER-AM. L. RPv. 61, 86 (1963) (citing Samuel Dobine case, 53 S.J.F. 2563, Sept. 3,
1937).
116. MEMORIADELAPROCURADURfAGmERADELAREPBLICAI 1955-1956 (miAoms OF
TEATroRNEY GENERAL OFFICE) 150 (1956).
117. MEX. CoNsT. art. 119. International extradition requests Nvill be "processed by the
Federal Executive with the intervention of the federal judicial authorities..." Id.
118. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 17.
119. Id. art. 3. It specifies that the petition be "processed" before the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and through the actions of the Office of the Attorney General. Article 10(1) of
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty only states that the request be made through "the dip-
lomatic channel." U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 10(1).
120. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 11(1). Mexico's International
Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 17.
121. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 11(1).
122. Id. art. 11(2).
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If detained, pursuant to the petition for provisional arrest, the detainee remains
under the supervision of the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which notifies
the requesting State of the detention." The individual is then placed in a special
penitentiary for preventive detention."4 According to the Extradition Treaty,
Mexico's Law on International Extradition, and the Mexican Constitution, provi-
sional arrest is terminated if a formal request for extradition is not presented
within a period of sixty days after the apprehension of the person.'" Release of the
suspect after sixty days will not prevent subsequent extradition if the petition is
properly presented at a later date."
2. A Formal Extradition Request
A formal extradition request must also be presented through the diplo-
matic channel,127 and must be accompanied by supporting documents justifying
the arrest of the fugitive and the need for an extradition hearing.2 The United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty requires the request to be accompanied by a
statement of the facts of the case, the text of the legal provisions describing the
essential elements of the offense, the text of the legal provisions describing the
punishment for the offense, the text of the legal provisions relating to the time
limit on the prosecution or the execution of the punishment of the offense, and the
facts and personal information permitting identification of the individual sought
and, when possible, information concerning the fugitive's location.'"
Under the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, if the person sought has
not yet been convicted, the request must be accompanied by, a certified copy of the
arrest warrant, and evidence which justifies the individual's apprehension and
commitment for trial in accordance with the laws of the requested Party. 0 If the
person sought has been sentenced, a certified copy of the sentence should be in-
cluded, accompanied by a statement indicating which part of the sentence remains
to be served.'
All documents requesting extradition must be accompanied by a translation in
123. Rafil Melgoza Figueroa, Mexican Circuit Court Magistrate, Extradicifn 21 (paper
presented at a conference at the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas, Universidad Na-
cional Aut6noma de Mdxico, Mexico City, June 7, 1996) (on file with author).
124. Id. at 20.
125. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 11(3); Mexico's International
Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 18. The Constitution provides that fugitives from
justice must be delivered without delay to other countries. MEX. CONST. art. 119.
126. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 11(4).
127. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 3; U.S.-Mexico Extra-
dition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 10(1).
128. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 10(2).
129. Id.
130. Id. art. 10(3).
131. Id. art. 10(4).
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the language of the requested State."' Documents from the United States must be
authenticated by the State Department and legalized as prescribed by Mexican
law.' Documents submitted by Mexico must be certified by the principal Mexi-
can diplomatic or consular officer in the United States. m
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs examines a request by the United States to de-
termine whether it meets the requirements delineated in Mexico's Law on Inter-
national Extradition or the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty."' The Office
of Judicial Affairs (Direcci6n General de Asuntos Juridicos) in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs handles extradition matters."' If the petition is admissible, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs transmits it together with the fugitive's file to the
Mexican Attorney General."' The Office of International Affairs (Direcci6n Gen-
eral de Asuntos Intemacionales) (OIA, PGR) in the Mexican Attorney General's
Office also handles extradition matters.' The OIA, PGR transmits the extradition
petition to the corresponding district judge issuing an arrest vurrantY' The judge
may also order the seizure of objects and evidence related to the crime, if peti-
tioned by the requesting State. 4'
If the request does not meet the above mentioned requirements, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs communicates this to the requesting State, which can proceed to
cure the defects and, if necessary, submit additional evidence."4 Opportunity to
cure the defects in a petition is not accorded to Mexico when the United States is
the requested state.42 Mexican officials at the Attorney General's Office criticize
132. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 16MVly, U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 10(5).
133. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art.L10(6)(a).
134. Id. artlO(6)(b).
135. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 19.
136. "Reglamento Interior de la Secretaria de Relaciones Exteriores," art. 16(iv), D.O.,
Mar. 3, 1993.
137. Id. art. 21.
138. Interview with Miguel A. Mndez, Office of the Mexican Attorney General, Mexi-
can Embassy to the United States in Washington, D.C. (July 18, 1996).
139. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 22. According to this
article, the district court where the fugitive remains has jurisdiction to hear the extradition
case. When the whereabouts of the fugitive are unkno\u, however, the case is referred to a
district judge in the federal district (Mexico's capital).
140. Id. art. 21.
141. Id. art. 20; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 12.
142. Jos6 Ignaio Rodriguez Garcia, La Extradici6n en las Relaciones Bilaterales
Mexico-Estados Unidos de Amirica (Extradition in U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Relations) 9
(undated, but prepared in Spring 1996) The official position, however, of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice, OIA, is that it does ensure that procedural requirements are met before
it sends a request to a U.S. Attorney. OIA, Cmi. Div., U.S. DEP'T oF Jus., REa, -simG
FoRmN GovmuETS irs ERxADImoN PROCEEDGS BEFORE UNrmD STATES CourTs: A
MAN AL FoR UNxv STATES ATroRNEYS, viii (Jan. 1991) [hereinafter RsErnmro
FOREIGN GovErm s].
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this asymmetrical treatment.4
Extradition proceedings are conducted according to principles of domestic law.
The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty explicitly provides that "the request
for extradition shall be processed in accordance with the legislation of the re-
quested Party."'" The Treaty, therefore, allows the requested State to apply its
domestic criminal procedures-such as evidentiary and court proceedings-to
extradition proceedings.
Evidence is a critical aspect of extradition proceedings. According to the
United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, extradition is granted only when evi-
dence is found to be sufficient according to the laws of the requested Party."'
Mexico's Federal Code of Criminal Procedures and corresponding provisions
contained in the Code of Criminal Procedures for the Federal District establish
two evidentiary prerequisites that must be met before a suspect is arrested or
prosecuted.' Evidence must be sufficient to demonstrate all the elements of the
crime (typification) and the existence of facts showing the "probable responsibil-
ity," the equivalent of probable cause in United States extradition jurisprudence,
that the suspect committed the crime charged in the extradition request.'47 The
United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty allows both States to furnish additional
evidence in support of the request, if necessary.'"
3. Extradition Hearing
The constitutional guarantees granted to suspects in all domestic criminal pro-
ceedings also apply to suspects in extradition hearings. These guarantees include
the right to be heard, the right to counsel, and the right to a defense.' 9 Mexico's
Law on International Extradition also emphasizes these guarantees."'
After being detained, the relator will be brought promptly before the district
judge.' The defendant has the following rights:
1) the right to be informed of the content of the extradition petition and ac-
companying documents;
2) the right to counsel of choice-generally a private lawyer or a public de-
fender. The accused may hire a defense lawyer or choose a public defender from a
list provided by the court. 3 The judge may designate a defense lawyer, if the ac-
143. Id. at 9-10.
144. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 13(1).
145. Id. art. 3.
146. Figueroa, supra note 123, at 12.
147. Id.
148. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 12.
149. Mx. CONST. art. 20.
150. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 24(II)-(IV).
151. Id. art. 24.
152. Id.
153. Id.
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cused does not make a determination.'1 However, in the absence of a defense
counsel, the accused has the right to present a defense sua sponte.11
3) the right to present relevant evidence.155
According to the Mexican Constitution tW"and the Federal Code of Criminal
Procedures,' the accused will be informed of the charges in a public hearing."'
The detained can request the judge to delay the hearing until defense counsel is
present and accepts the assignment." Once the hearing starts, the defendant will
have up to three days to raise the following two types of "exceptions" to extradi-
tion: (1) that the extradition petition does not meet the requirements of the appli-
cable treaty or law, and/or (2) that the individual is not the one sought.,
The defendant has twenty days to prove the exceptions." This period can be
extended at the discretion of the judge."t If the defendant raises any of these ex-
ceptions, the judge has up to five days to deliberate and transmit the court's opin-
ion to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.' " If the relator does not raise either of
these exceptions or consciously accepts extradition, the judge must issue an opin-
ion within the next three days.'" In fact, the judge acts as if the defendant had
presented the exceptions."6
154. Id.
155. Id. art. 25.
156. Max. CoNsT. art. 20.
157. Id.
158. C.F.P.P. (Mexico's Federal Code of Criminal Procedures) art. 86.
159. Telephone conversation between Julia Padiema Peralta and Miguel A. MWndw,
Office of the Mexican Attorney General, Mexican Embassy to the United States (Aug. 28,
1996). The concept of a "public hearing" in Mexico differs from the one in the United
States. Court proceedings in Mexico are generally not open to the public. Court rooms tend
to be very small and generally only the interested parties and the judge are present. In very
important cases the media is allowed to enter. Mexican lawyers seem to interpret the word
"public hearing" to mean that the judicial proceedings occur in the presence of others and
not "secretly" between the judge and the accused. Id.
160. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 24.
161. Id. art. 25.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. art 27.
165. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 28.
166. Id. art. 27. The two permissible exceptions are broad enough to allow the defen-
dant to conceivably argue anything that contradicts the Constitution, Mexico's Law on In-
ternational Extradition or any specific extradition treaty. The defendant could argue, for
example, that 1) the crime is not part of the Treaty, 2) the crime is of a political or mili-
tary nature; 3) that s/he has already been tried or pardoned in the requesting State for the
crime for which extradition is sought, 4) the statute of limitations regarding the penal ac-
tion has elapsed; 5) the accompanying documents are not properly legalized; and/or 6) the
evidence is not sufficient to conform to the laws of the requested State to justify apprehen-
sion and the committal for trial.
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4. Fugitive's Relief
a. Bail
Release on bail is a right under the Mexican Constitution, which can be re-
quested by a defendant in any criminal proceedings. 67 Constitutionally, the judge
can grant bail only when: 1) the accused posts enough bail to guarantee the repa-
ration of the harm and potential pecuniary damages; and 2) the alleged crime is
not of such a serious nature as to rule out bail by law'6
Mexico's Law on International Extradition provides that a judge may re-
lease the individual on bail following review of the extradition request, the per-
sonal circumstances of the accused, and the seriousness of the crime.' The judge
makes this decision based on the conditions a suspect encounters if committing
the crime in Mexican territory.7" The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty is
silent on bail, which apparently is not often granted by Mexican judges in extra-
dition cases. 7'
b. Amparo
The relator may challenge the judge's extradition decision through an amparo
demand. Amparo is an extraordinary recourse in the Mexican justice system,
with no equivalent in the common law tradition. The word "amparo" literally
means protection, favor, or aid." 3 The amparo is designed as a summary and
speedy remedy, though it does not have a similar preferred position on court
dockets. Legally, the action can be used as a writ of habeas corpus, injunction, er-
ror, declaratory, judgment, or appeal. 74
Amparo relief finds its sources in Articles 103 and 107 of the Mexican Con-
stitution.'" The Ley de Anparo (hereinafter Amparo Law), is the regulatory law
of Articles 103 and 107 of the Mexican Constitution and governs the application
of amparo relief.7 1 Under Amparo law, a defendant obtains an entirely new
167. MEX. CONST. art. 20(I).
168. Id.
169. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 26.
170. Id.
171. Interview by Bruce Zagaris with Miguel Angel Mdndez, P.G.R. Office, Embassy
of Mexico to the United States in Washington, D.C. (July 31, 1996).
172. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 33.
173. KENNETH L. KARST & KarrH S. ROSENN, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
128 (1975).
174. Id. at 130.
175. MEX. CONST. arts. 103, 107.
176. "Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los Articulos 103 y 107 de la Constituci6n
Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos (Regulatory Law of Art. 103 and 107 of the
Mexican Constitution)" D.O., Jan. 10, 1936 [hereinafter Amparo Law].
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trial." Some of the most relevant provisions of the Amparo Law applicable to
extradition proceedings are as follows:
An amparo trial aims at resolving all controversies originated by:
i. The laws or acts of authority that violate individual guarantees; '"
ii. By laws or acts of federal authority that violate or limit the sovereignty of
the states;" and
iii. By laws or acts of the states that invade the sphere of federal authority."
Amparo relief can only be initiated by the party injured by the law, an interna-
tional treaty, or the rule of any other act.' It can be requested sua sponte, by de-
fense counsel or by any representative in criminal proceedings." Amparo relief
must be raised within fifteen days, after the defendant is notified or gains lmowl-
edge of a specific resolution or agreement contrary to his or her interests.'8 ' The
fifteen day period also applies to extradition proceedings, according to Amparo
Law"1 and Mexico's Law on International Extradition.",
The accused loses the right to amparo if not raised within fifteen days after the
notification of extradition." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs communicates the
granting of the extradition request to the requesting State in the event the accused
does not raise the right to amparo or the amparo demand is rejected.'
Amparo relief can either be direct or indirect.' Direct amparo relief is initi-
ated in either the Supreme Court, or the (appellate) circuit courts."v Indirect am-
paro relief is initiated in a district court, but the decision may be appealed to a
higher court."' Indirect amparo is generally brought to compel or prevent actions
of norjudicial government agents, such as prosecutors, police, or public adminis-
trators, though an indirect amparo may be brought against a judge to challenge an
unconstitutional or unlawful act committed apart from the trial, such as the issu-
ance of an arrest warrant"' In extradition proceedings, the defendant may seek
amparo relief against final findings, judicial or administrative decisions that ar-
177. Both the Mexican Constitution and the Amparo Law use the term "Juicio de Am-
paro" (Amparo Trial) to describe amparo proceedings. See MEX. CoNS. art. 107(1, Am-
paro Law, supra note 176, art. 1.
178. Amparo Law, supra note 176, art. 1(1).
179. Id. art. II).
180. Id. art. 1(1).
181. Id. art 4.
182. Id.
183. Id. art. 21.
184. Id. art. 22(1).
185. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 33.
186. Amparo Law, supra note 176, art. 22(11).
187. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art 33.
188. KAsT & RosENN, supra note 173, at 131.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 133.
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guably violated the proceedings, constitutional guarantees, and the language of a
law or a treaty."' Amparo cannot be sought during an extradition hearing, but
only after there has been a final decision from the Ministry of Foreign Affhirs re-
garding extradition, If amparo relief is not sought or granted, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs proceeds to surrender and order the delivery of the fugitive."'
Amparo opinions are reported in a very summary way. Many are only one
paragraph providing merely a statement of a rule of law and perhaps a sentence
giving the facts of the case." For example, in the Chong Bing J. Domingo case,
Mr. Domingo's amparo request was denied. A Chinese national, Domingo sought
amparo against his arrest, detention, and expulsion from Mexico. Respondent al-
leged violations of Articles 15, 16, and 19 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court
of Mexico denied the amparo, holding that under Article 33 of the Constitution
the President has the exclusive power to expel any alien, whose stay is deemed
inexpedient, from the national territory without previous judicial proceedings.""
Mixed systems conferring final dispositive determinations on extradition to the
executive also exist in other Latin American nations."6
5. Final Administrative Procedures
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, upon receipt of the court's opinion, has
twenty days to either grant or deny the extradition request." Its decision is gener-
ally made based upon the defendant's file, the judge's opinion, and evidentiary
objects seized." Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not obliged to follow the
district judge's opinion. In reaching its decision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
resolves any issues concerning the delivery of papers, money, or any other objects
seized as evidence during the process."'
If the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rejects extradition, the defendant may be re-
leased." If the defendant is a Mexican national and, for that reason only, extradi-
tion was denied, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notifies the defendant and the
Attorney General of its decision not to extradite."' The Attorney General would,
in turn, transmit the defendant's file to the local prosecutor, commencing the case
before a competent Mexican tribunal."
192. Amparo Law, supra note 176, arts. 114, 158.
193. KARSTANDROSENN, supra note 173, at 132.
194. Id. at 133.
195. Henry P. de Vries, Territorial Asylum in The Americas, 5 INTER-AM. L. REv. 61,
86 (1963) (citing "Domingo, Chong J.," 16 S.J.F. 59 (1925)).
196. Id. at 83-86.
197. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 30.
198. SANcHEz, supra note 52, at 124.
199. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 30; U.S.-Mexico Ex-
tradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 19.
200. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 31.
201. Id. art. 32.
202. Id.; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 9.
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a. Surrender and Delivery of the Fugitive
The requested State must promptly communicate to the requesting State its fi-
nal decision on the request for extradition.,3 If the requested State decides to ex-
tradite the relator, the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty provides that the
surrender of the individual shall take place within such time as prescribed by the
laws of the requested Party.' The delivery must be carried out by the authorized
personnel of the requesting State through the Attorney General and previous no-
tification to the Interior Ministry.'
According to Mexico's Law on International Extradition, delivery of the fugi-
tive can take place at a border port or on board an aircrafL The bilateral Treaty
simply provides for the contracting parties to agree on the date and place of the
surrender of the fugitive2°' It is expected that the authorities of the requesting
party remove the fugitive from the territory of the requested party.' Upon grant-
ing extradition, the Treaty also provides for the surrender of objects and other in-
struments of the crime, if any, that the requested State obtained during the ar-
rest.'
Mexico's Law on International Extradition requires that the fugitive be re-
moved from Mexico's territory no later than two months (sixty days) after the ap-
proval of the extradition request" 0 Otherwise, as in the case of United States-
Mexico extradition, the fugitive may be freed and Mexico may subsequently ref-
use hislher extradition for the same offense.u
b. "Delayed" or "Deferred" Ectradition
After granting a request for extradition, the Mexican government may post-
pone surrender of the person. This occurs when the person has pending charges or
has been convicted in Mexico for a crime other than the one motivating the peti-
tion for extradition. 2 If the accused is acquitted in Mexico, he or she must be ex-
tradited. , however, the accused is convicted and sentenced, sfhe could be extra-
dited only after serving the sentence." Only recently, the Mexican government
exhibited an increased propensity to grant the extradition of its own nationals
(cases discussed in Section VII.D below). In March of 1996, for example, Mexico
203. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 14(1).
204. Id. art. 14(3).
205. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 34.
206. Id.
207. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 14(3).
208. Id. art. 14(4).
209. Id. art. 19.(1).
210. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 35.
211. Id.; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 14(4).
212. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 11; U.S.-Mexico Ex-
tradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 15.
213. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 15.
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announced the approval of the extradition request of Juan Emilio Rivera Pifi6n, a
Mexican lieutenant of the reputed Mexican drug kingpin Juan Garcfa Abrego. Pi-
fi6n was sought for drug-related crimes in the United States."" Rivera Pifi6n's ex-
tradition will be deferred, however, until his sentence in Mexico concludes-not
before the year 2001.2"'
c. Waiver
The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty contemplates the possibility that
the defendant may freely accept extradition, in which case extradition may be
granted without further proceedings." 6 The Treaty allows the requested State to
take all measures permitted under its laws to expedite this process." 7 A decision to
forego additional proceedings must be made knowingly and voluntarily. In order
for the consent to be voluntary, the defendant may be no less than 18 years old-
as in the case of a confession." 8 In cases of summary extradition the rule of speci-
ality does not apply."
d. Costs
Mexico's Law on International Extradition requires that expenses incurred in
the extradition process be covered and eventually charged to the requesting
State.' The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty is more specific on this
point and provides that the requested State cover the costs involving internal judi-
cial procedures (spelled out in Article 13 of the Treaty), but not expenses incurred
for the translation of documents and the transportation of the fugitive."
IV. UNITED STATES LAW AND REQUIREMENTS
The discussion of United States law and requirements for extradition is divided
into two main parts: procedures to request extradition from Mexico to the United
States; and those relating to extradition from the United States to Mexico.
214. Stephen Power, More Extraditions Viewed as Unlikely; Texas Law Officials Doubt
Mexico will Continue Unprecedented Help, DALLAS MoRmo NEws, Mar. 30, 1996, at
33A.
215. Telephone interview by Julia Padiema Peralta with Mexican Embassy official in
Washington, D.C. (asked not be identified) (Apr. 22, 1996).
216. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 18.
217. Id.
218. C.F.P.P. art. 207.
219. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 18.
220. Mexico's International Extradition Law, supra note 52, art. 37.
221. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 21.
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A. PROCEDURE FOR REQUESTING ExRADmON FROM iMEXCO
TO THE UNITED STATES
The United States Department of Justice must approve every request for inter-
national extradition. The United States Department of State must present formally
such requests to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs through diplomatic
channels. The Department of State, or persons authorized by it, may invoke the
terms of an extradition treaty. Prosecutors, police officers, or investigators gener-
ally may communicate directly with their counterparts in Mexico for the purpose
of giving or receiving information on law enforcement matters, but they may not
request the arrest of a fugitive for extradition." Unauthorized requests for foreign
arrests cause serious diplomatic difficulties and can subject the requesting party to
heavy financial liability or other sanctions.2
1. Determining Whether Extradlition Is Possible
A prosecutor or investigator, in a federal or state agency, interested in arrang-
ing a suspect for extradition from Mexico should first contact the Office of Inter-
national Affairs ("OIA"), Criminal Division, Department of Justice, in Washing-
ton, D.C.. Attorneys specializing in extradition in OIA determine whether the
extradition request may succeed, taking into account the facts of the particular
case, the language of the applicable treaties, and the law of the foreign country
involved. For OIA to assess the request, the inquirer should provide the following
information: (a) the country in which the fugitive is believed to be located (e.g.,
Mexico if the request is to Mexico), his address or location there, and his or her
status (ie., at large, incarcerated for offense, etc.); (b) the citizenship of the fugi-
tive; (c) the precise crime for which the fugitive has been charged or convicted,
including citation to the specific statute involved, the full title of the court in
which criminal proceedings are pending, the name of the judge, the date on which
the indictment or conviction was obtained, and the docket number of the pro-
ceedings; (e) a brief description of the specific acts committed in connection with
the offense, i.e., who did what to whom, when, where, and why, and (f) a brief
description of how the prosecutor intends to prove the violation (e.g., witness tes-
timony, documentary evidence, undercover agents, codefendants who agreed to
cooperate with the government).
On the basis of this information, OIA determines whether an extradition re-
quest may be made, taking into account the following factors: whether there is an
extradition treaty in force with the country in which the fugitive is located (the
222. JoHm E. HARMiS, Senior Trial Attorney (now Deputy Director), Office of Interma-
tional Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, PROCEDuRE FOR REQuES'mG1 I TiOr L
ExTRADmoN9-15.100 (undated) (on file with author).
223. Cf. Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing plaintiff's
claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, and several constitutional claims
arising from plaintiffs wrongful detention by German officials as a result of communica-
tions with the United States National Control Bureau).
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United States and Mexico have a 1978 Extradition Treaty); whether the treaty
provides extradition for the crime in question;' whether the offense in question is
punishable under the laws of the requested country; whether there exists sufficient
evidence to justify extradition in accordance with the terms of the treaty; whether
the fugitive is a national of the requested country, especially since Mexico does
not extradite its own citizens; and whether extradition is in the interests of justice
in light of all the circumstances.'
The main responsibility to coordinate the Department of State's role in extra-
dition matters lies with the Office of Legal Adviser, who in turn delegates the
main operational tasks for extradition matters to the Assistant Legal Adviser for
Law Enforcement and Intelligence ("L/LEr'). The latter coordinates the Depart-
ment of State's position on potential extradition requests to foreign countries, in-
cluding Mexico, with OIA and the Department of State's political desk for the
affected country. If a disagreement occurs between Justice and State on whether
the United States should make a particular extradition request, L/LEI is responsi-
ble for obtaining the views of the respective governmental entities and for making
an initial recommendation to resolve the disagreement."
2. Jurisdiction
An issue that must be considered before the United States makes an extra-
dition request is whether it has jurisdiction over the crime. The United States as-
serts extraterritorial jurisdiction in criminal law on five traditional bases of juris-
diction: territorial, protective, nationality, universal, and passive personality.2 ' A
sixth theory ofjurisdiction, sometimes called the floating territorial principle, rec-
ognizes the "flagship" state as having jurisdiction over any offense committed on
one of its craft or vessels.=
224. In reviewing an inquiry from State of Utah authorities as to the possibility of ex-
traditing from Mexico the former husband and former mother-in-law of a woman in Utah
taking the woman's infant son to Mexico in violation of a court decree awarding custody of
the child to the woman, the Department of State responded that the only offense listed in
the extradition treaty that might fit the facts of the case would be the offense of kidnapping
and that the offense of contempt of court, such as acting in violation of a court decree
awarding custody of the child to one parent, is not, as such, an extraditable offense. 6 Dio.
INT'L L. 784-85 (M. Whiteman ed., 1968) [hereinafter Whiteman].
225. HARRIS, supra note 222, at 9-15.110; MICHAEL ABBEuL & BRuNo A. RISTAU, 4
InmRNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: CRIMINAL § 13-4-1 (1995).
226. ABBELL & RIsTAU, supra note 225, App. C § 9-15.220 (Supp. 1995).
227. HARvARD RESEARCH IN IhnRNATIONAL LAW, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 A.J.IL. Spec. Supp. 435, 439-442 (1935) [hereinafter HARVARD RESEARCH].
228. See generally Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (holding that the law of
the flag governed liability in suit brought by Danish seaman against Danish owner of
Danish vessel for injuries suffered aboard ship in Havana harbor); see also Bruce Baren-
blat, Note, Jurisdiction, 15 Tnx. INT'L L. J. 379, 404 n.3 (1980); Paul D. Empson, The Ap-
plication of Criminal Law to Acts Committed Outside the Jurisdiction, 6 AM. Cium. L. 32,
36-37 (1967); B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH.
[12:4
97 MICO-U.S. EXTRADITIONAND ALTERNATIVFS
The principal basis ofjurisdiction over crime in the United States is the territo-
rial principle, permitting a state in control of a territory to prescribe, adjudicate,
and enforce its laws in that territory.' A crime is deemed committed wholly
within a state's territory when every essential constituent element is consummated
within the territory." A crime is committed partly within a state's territory when
any essential constituent element is consummated there.' The United States also
recognizes and utilizes subjective territoriality when a constituent element of the
crime occurs within the United States. Additionally, United States jurisprudence
sanctions the assertion of jurisdiction over offenses when the conduct giving rise
to the offense occurs extraterritorially, provided the harmful effects or results oc-
curred within United States territory.2 In recent years, the objective territorial
principle received an expansive interpretation in the United States. Assertion of
jurisdiction will be enforced as proper in either state and extradition will be ap-
proved pursuant to either state's theory of jurisdiction, so long as the offense it-
self, its result or effects, or any of its constituent or material elements actually oc-
cur within the sovereign territory of the requesting party.23 Difficulties ensue,
however, when a claim of jurisdiction is asserted on some theory other than terri-
toriality, or when the claimed "territorial basis" is strained beyond that believed
proper by the other statel
The protective theory of jurisdiction provides a basis for jurisdiction over an
extraterritorial offense when that offense has an adverse effect on, or is a danger
to, a state's security, integrity, sovereignty, or governmental function. The focus
of the jurisdictional principle is the nature of the interest that may be injured,
rather than the place of the harm, the place of the conduct causing the harm, or
the nationality of the perpetrator. This conduct includes lying to a consular offi-
cer. Even though the conduct happens abroad, it may be considered as consti-
tuting a danger to the sovereignty of the United States and as having a deleterious
impact on valid governmental interests. 6
Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the perpetrator is a generally accepted
L. REv. 609, 613 (1966).
229. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, II tcr'L CPZI. L. PRco.
8 (1986).
230. HARvARDPEsEARC , supra note 227, at 495.
231. Id.
232. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
233. Id. at 285.
234. Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Crime,
73 1 Cnc L. & CmMIOLOGY 1109, 1132-1229 (1982).
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968) (regarding an
alien convicted of knowingly making false statements under oath in a visa application to a
U.S. consular officer in Canada). The court noted that the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546
occurred entirely in Canada Id. at 9-10. The accused's entry into the United States ,w not
an element of the offense. Id. See BLtmLEY, supra note 229, at 1136, for additional dis-
cussion and authority.
1997]
AM. U J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
principle of international law.'" Under international law, nationals of a state re-
main under the state's sovereignty and owe their allegiance to it, even though
traveling or residing outside its territory. The state has the right, based on this al-
legiance, to assert criminal jurisdiction over actions of one of its nationals deemed
criminal by that state's laws."' The United States Congress never drafted a gen-
eral rule relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction. The application of any law to ex-
traterritorial offenses is an exception to the territorial principle and must be done
on a case-by-case basis. United States case law approved jurisdiction over nation-
als committing crimes abroad even though the appropriate statute did not ex-
pressly provide that it applied extraterritorially. 2 -
United States law generally does not favor the passive personality theory ofju-
risdiction. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
provides that a state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching
a legal consequence to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the basis
that the conduct affects one of its nationals. The United States protested the asser-
tion of this jurisdiction by Mexico and other countries and major incidents oc-
curred as the result of cases in which United States nationals have been arrested
and prosecuted on the basis of the passive personality theory.20
Under universal jurisdiction2' international law allows any of the "community"
of nationals to prosecute a perpetrator allegedly committing a universally con-
demned heinous offense 4 Universal jurisdiction recognizes piracy, slave trade,
war crimes, hijacking, and sabotage in civil aircraft, and genocide as heinous of-
fenses. A trend exists to include terrorism and trafficking of narcotic drugs."
237. HARVARDREsEARCH, supra note 209, at 1155-57.
238. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932) (holding that U.S. citizens
abroad are subject to punishment in the United States when their conduct abroad violates
U.S. laws).
239. See, e.g., Steel v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952) (applying U.S. antitrust
laws extraterritorially to activities of U.S. nationals); Ramirez & Feraud Chile Co. v. Las
Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding that comity would not pre-
clude U.S. district court from applying injunction under the Lanham Trade-Mark Act to
company outside its territorial jurisdiction), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958); cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234
F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (holding that the Lanham Act did not apply to a Canadian corpo-
ration although harm occurred in the U.S. as a result of offenses committed by that corpo-
ration).
240. Cutting Case, 187 For. Re. 751 (1888), reported in JoHN BASSETT MooRE, 2
INTERNATIONAL L. DIGEST 232-40 (1906).
241. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) FoREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF Tim UNnIED STATES § 402
(1981) (establishing the basis for universal jurisdiction and recognizing the state's interest
in protecting its territory and nationals) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT].
242. See id. § 404 (recognizing a state's jurisdiction in certain offenses and defining
universally recognized crimes).
243. For a useful discussion of universal jurisdiction, see id. and Christopher L.
Blakesley, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW PRocEDuRE 3,
31-33 (M.CherifBassiouni ed., 1986).
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3. Provisional Arrest
If OIA believes that extradition is required, the immediate arrest of the fugitive
can be arranged in many cases in order to prevent further flight while the proce-
dure of "provisional arrest" to secure documents and evidence in support of a
formal request for extradition is prepared. Provisional arrest should only be con-
sidered in emergency circumstances, as opposed to the ordinary method of initi-
ating extradition, where there exists a real danger of the fugitive fleeing before the
extradition documents can be completed. All requests for provisional arrest should
be made to OIA and should be supported by the information called for on the
form. The request should be in writing, but in urgent cases it can be made by
phone with written confirmation immediately thereafter.
Since provisional arrest is reserved for exceptional cases, OIA requires that if
the fugitive is wanted for federal charges, the section within the Criminal Divi-
sion of the Department of Justice possessing oversight responsibility for the case
must also agree that provisional arrest is appropriate before further action is
taken. For instance, the Narcotics and Dangerous Drug Section must approve the
provisional arrest of a wanted narcotics trafficker. If the fugitive is wanted on
state or local charges, the state extradition officer must support the request by at-
testing that the necessary documentation wil be submitted on time and that all of
the expenses of the extradition request will be covered.
When provisional arrest is affected, the time available to prepare, review,
authenticate, translate and transmit the documents in support of the extradition
request is significantly reduced. The maximum period for provisional arrest under
the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty is sixty days. With other countries
the maximum period of provisional arrest under extradition treaties varies from
forty days to three months"
In most countries, including Mexico, the fugitive will be released from custody
if the documents do not arrive within the sixty day period, and cannot be surren-
dered or extradited thereafter. OIA requests that, when provisional arrest is in-
volved, the documents must be completed and sent to the OIA within fourteen
days.-4S
4. Documents Required for Extradition
In general, the federal or state authorities responsible for prosecuting the
charges for which extradition is requested prepare the extradition documents. The
Department of Justice has prepared a manual to assist prosecutors in this en-
deavor. " The authority that prepares the papers must also pay all the expenses
244. HAPRms, supra note 222, at 9-15.120.
245. Id. The same document contained in the OIA manual and the Harris discussion
contains the form by OIA used to compile the information. For the form, see also ABan.
& RisTAU, supra note 225, app. C § 9-15.231 (Supp. 1995).
246. See ABBELL & RISTAU, smpra note 225, app. C (Supp. 1995) (providing the text of
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incurred in connection with the request. Expenses include: the cost of document
translation, any cost of legal representation in the foreign country, any charges
levied by Mexico for boarding the fugitive pending extradition, the transportation
and other expenses of the escort officers handling the fugitive's physical return to
the United States, and the cost of the fugitive's transportation to the United States.
In federal cases, the United States Attorney or Strike Force office should resolve
any questions regarding costs with the Executive Office for United States Attor-
neys in Washington, D.C.
The documents required for extradition are: an affidavit from the prosecutor
describing the case; authenticated copies of the indictment and arrest warrant; and
evidence establishing the crime or proving that the fugitive was convicted, in-
cluding sufficient evidence to identify the fugitive. 7
5. Prosecutor's Affidavits
An affidavit describing the state or federal laws applicable to the case, includ-
ing the statute of limitations, must accompany every extradition request. The affi-
ant, usually the prosecutor assigned to the case, should provide enough back-
ground to assure Mexican authorities that s/he is familiar with the case and with
United States criminal law. The afflant should accomplish three major objectives:
First, the afflant must identify and attest to the authenticity of any court papers,
depositions, or other documents submitted in support of the extradition request.
Second, s/he should clearly identify the charged offenses, and the penalties
prescribed for the offenses. S/he should also indicate that the statutes involved
were in force when the offenses occurred and are currently in full force and effect.
If the laws are not still in effect, an explanation should be given. S/he must also
specifically state that the applicable statute of limitations has not expired. The af-
fiant should provide the text of each statute involved, including the applicable
statute of limitations. If the statutes are relatively short, their texts can be revealed
in the affidavit itself. If the statutes are lengthy, the text should be typed (not
photocopied from an annotation) and attached as an exhibit to the affidavit.
Third, the afflant should briefly describe the facts underlying the charges, indi-
cating in general who is accused and what the offenses are. The description of the
crime should not simply track the language of the indictment, the applicable stat-
ute, or the treaty.
The prosecutor's affidavit can be executed before any person lawfully author-
ized to administer oaths, although it is preferred that the affidavit be executed
before a judge or magistrate. 8
the Manual).
247. HARRis, supra note 222, at 9-15.130.
248. Id. at 9-15.131.
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6. Indictment and Warrant
Since a fugitive can only be extradited on the basis of a formal criminal charge
and a person extradited can be prosecuted or punished only for the specific charge
for which he was surrendered, even if there are other charges that could otherwise
have been brought against him, the extradition documents should include a copy
of the outstanding indictment or complaint concerning all charges on which the
fugitive will be tried or punished after his surrender. The package should also
contain copies of the outstanding warrant of arrest for each offense for which the
fugitive is sought If the fugitive is merely accused of a crime, the outstanding
warrant will usually show that it was unexecuted and any contrary indictment
should be explained.
If the fugitive has already been convicted, it is the outstanding warrant for
bond jumping, jail break, etc., not the executed warrant for the offense underlying
the conviction that must be submitted. Since the original indictment or complaint
and warrant usually remains among the records of the court, the copies of those
documents included in the extradition packet should show that they are true cop-
ies of the original. This can often be done by having the clerk of the court apply a
stamp or seal to the document itself authenticating it as an original court record.'
7. Evidence Establishing the Case
The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty conditions the extradition of an
accused person on the presentation of evidence sufficient to justify committal for
trial under the law of the requested country. As a matter of policy, OIA does not
submit an extradition request to any country unless it is persuaded that a prima
facie case for extradition has been established. "- :1
The best method to show the Mexican Government that this requirement has
been met is for the prosecutor to attach to the affidavit enough sworn statements
from investigating agents, witnesses, co-conspirators, or experts to indicate that
each crime in question was committed and that the fugitive committed it. The af-
fidavits, read together, should contain evidence on each charge for seeking extra-
dition.
Extradition affidavits should contain formal captions showing the title of the
case and the court in which the prosecution is pending. Each afflant should
clearly and concisely indicate the facts which she knows, avoiding hearsay, if
possible. The affidavits can be executed before any person authorized to adminis-
ter an oath, including a notary public.
The other method of documenting the case is for the prosecutor to forward ex-
249. Id. at 9-15.132.
250. For a discussion of this standard, see IvoR STANBRo0K & Ctrva STArmRCO., TmE
LAw A.D PRAcICE oF xRmITON 28 (1980) (citing Schtraks v. Israel (1964) (AC 556)
(setting forth the test of whether the evidence alone at trial would support a guilty verdict
by a properly directed, reasonable jury).
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cerpts from the grand jury transcripts establishing that the fugitive committed the
offense. The United States tries, however, to avoid using grand jury transcriptions
unless it is impossible to obtain affidavits, because the authorities in Mexico
sometimes do not understand the purpose or function of a grand jury, and tend to
accord grand jury transcripts less weight than affidavits or sworn statements con-
taining the same information.
When the fugitive has already been convicted in the United States, the extradi-
tion packet generally need not contain evidence of a prima facie case. Instead, it
should contain proof that the fugitive was convicted after having been present at
trial and is unlawfully at large without having fully served his sentence. In federal
cases, the Judgment and Committal Order (CR Form 25) is the best proof of con-
viction and sentence. A copy of that document should be authenticated like the
indictment and arrest warrant and included as an attachment to the affidavit by
the prosecutor. A similar judicial document proving conviction is available in
state proceedings and should be submitted in state cases.
Proof that a convicted and sentenced person is unlawfully at large can gener-
ally be presented in the form of an affidavit from the warden of the prison from
which he escaped or from his probation officer. Some extradition treaties provide
that a convicted person need not be surrendered unless a specified minimum pe-
riod of imprisonment remains to be served; the affidavit should also indicate the
remaining portion of the sentence to be served and how the prisoner came to be at
large.
The affidavits or grand jury transcripts must clearly show the identity of the
fugitive. "Mistaken identity" is an accepted defense to extradition. The documents
should therefore establish: (1) that the accused or convicted person did indeed
commit the crime; and (2) that the person whose extradition is sought is the per-
son accused or convicted. Normally, this happens by having the witnesses identify
a photograph of the accused, which the foreign authorities can compare to the
person arrested for extradition. Fingerprint cards, photocopies of passports or
other evidence of identity can be used, provided they accompany sufficient proof
to tie them to the accused.251
8. Transmission of the Completed Documents to Washington
In cases prepared by federal prosecutors, the original and four copies of the
documents should be sent directly to OIA, which reviews them for sufficiency and
arranges for the seal of the Department of Justice to be affixed to them.
In cases prepared by state or local prosecutors, in most jurisdictions, the origi-
nal and four copies of the papers are first sent to the extradition officer for the
state. The extradition officer reviews the documents, attaches a requisition bearing
the state seal to them, and sends them to OIA for review. Alternatively, the origi-
nal and four copies of the prosecutor's affidavit and its attachments can be sent
251. HARIms, supra note 222, at 9-15.133.
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directly to OIA for review, with a copy sent to the state extradition officer. OIA
will then affix the Department of Justice seal to the papers (instead of the state
seal) before forwarding them to the State Department.
When OIA believes that the documents are in order, it sends them to the De-
partment of State for final screening and action. The Department of State affixes
its seal to the documents, and, if necessary, arranges for translation of the docu-
ments or for authentication of the documents at the Mexican Embassy in Wash-
ington. The State Department then sends the documents to the United States Em-
bassy in Mexico City or the Consulate where the fugitive is located, along with
instructions for formally requesting extraditiomY
9. Presentation of the Extradition Request
United States diplomatic agents in Mexico present the documents to the Mexi-
can Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As mentioned in section m.C above, the manner
in which Mexico's diplomats forward the case to the Ministry of Justice, which
directs the appropriate authorities to make arrangements for the fugitive's arrest,
is discussed.1
10. Arrangements for Taking Custody After Extradition
Once Mexican authorities indicate they are ready to surrender the fugitive,
OIA notifies the prosecutor and coordinates the logistics of the formal surrender.
The law in Mexico provides that a fugitive found extraditable is freed if he is not
removed within sixty days. Hence, the steps should be accomplished as quickly as
possible.
First, agents in the United States Marshals Service must be selected to go to
Mexico, take custody of the fugitive, and return with him to the United States.
Federal law authorizes the President of the United States to take all necessary
measures for the transportation and safekeeping of a relator whose extradition has
been granted to the United States.' OIA generally arranges for the Enforcement
Operations Division of the United States Marshals service headquarters in Wash-
ington to designate the agents. At least two escort agents are usually sent for each
federal or state fugitive. In exceptional circumstances, the prosecutor handling the
case may request that a state or federal law enforcement officer, familiar with the
case, be allowed to assist the Marshals in the transfer.
Once OIA receives notice of the names of the escort agents, it arranges for the
Department of State to issue a President's Warrant, the special authorization law
enforcement officers require to accept custody of the fugitive on behalf of the
United States and to convey him to his place of trial. The Secretary of State issues
252. Id. at 9-15.140.
253. Id. at 9-15.150.
254. 18 U.S.C. § 3192 (1994).
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the warrant pursuant to Executive Order 11,517?" After the warrant has been
signed, arrangements are made for its delivery to the escort agents before their
departure.
When all the arrangements are completed, OIA is informed of the agents'
travel plans so that it can transmit this information to the Mexican Government
and the relevant United States Embassy or Consulate Offices in Mexico. The no-
tification assures that the agents obtain the assistance and cooperation of United
States officials in Mexico upon their arrival.
Someone from the United States Embassy in Mexico normally meets the escort
agents at the airport, sees them through customs, and introduces them to the ap-
propriate authorities in Mexico's Attorney General's Office. Custody of the fugi-
tive is usually handed over at the airport just before the escort agents and their
prisoner leave to return to the United States. Federal law permits the United
States Marshals Service or its agent to bring the relator directly to the United
States district for which the extradition pertains, so that the United States Marshal
or agent, if necessary, can obtain assistance from other law enforcement agents
when transporting the relator."
The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty provides that evidence or fruits
of the offense seized in the course of the fugitive's arrest should be surrendered
when extradition is granted. The agents may be asked to accept custody of such
articles at the time the extraditee is surrendered. Frequently, however, the re-
questing country makes other arrangements, especially if the articles are of sig-
nificant value.
11. Alternatives To Extradition
If extradition is not possible, or if the two governments prefer to use another
method, such as deportation,"7 the Mexican and United States governments ar-
range for this alternative. The United States also used more informal and even
extralegal methods to gain custody of fugitives in Mexico, including abduction,
often with the cooperation of some Mexican law enforcement officials acting out-
side of their official responsibilities." 8 If the fugitive is a Mexican citizen, OIA
can sometimes persuade Mexico to prosecute him there on the charges developed
in the United States assuming that Mexico has jurisdiction.
255. Exec. Order No. 11,517, 3 C.F.R. 90, 907 (1966-1970). The Secretary has since
redelegated this authority to the Deputy Secretary and the Legal Adviser although no for-
mal redelegation has been published in the Federal Register.
256. See 18 U.S.C. § 3193 (1994) (setting forth the guidelines prior to extradition).
The section states that any United States justice, judge, or magistrate may issue warrants
and commence extradition proceeding so that a criminal charged with a universally recog-
nized crime may be brought for a hearing before the court issuing the warrant. Id. See also
ABBELL & RISTAU, supra note 225, § 13-4-2.
257. See, e.g., discussion infra Part VI.D (discussing the Garcia Abrego case).
258. See discussion infra Part VA.A (discussing the Alvarez-Machain case).
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B. EXTRADITION FROM THE UNITED STATES TO MEXICO
The three stages of extradition requests initiated by Mexico to the United States
include: judicial determination of extraditability; judicial and administrative re-
view, and decision and surrender. The first stage of an extradition proceeding is
the determination of facts that 18 U.S.C. § 3184 requires under this section. Facts
are presented to a judge or magistrate deciding whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person before the court is extraditable. The judicial officer's deci-
sion is directed to the Secretary of State, deciding whether the fugitive should be
extradited. The certificate of extraditable is non-final and thus cannot be ap-
pealed.
In the next stage, the decision is reviewed. Although the certification is not di-
rectly appealable, the fugitive may obtain collateral review by applying to the
District Court for a writ of habeas corpus. The decision on the writ may be ap-
pealed. If the judicial decision is sustained, the Secretary of State reviews the
matter administratively. This is the final action required for the fugitive's surren-
der.
Once the Secretary of State signs a surrender warrant, the litigation is at an
end, unless the fugitive obtains a stay. The United States Marshals Service han-
dles transfer arrangements, but the prosecutor may be called on for advice during
this phase as well."
1. Procedure Before the Extradition Magistrte
a. Representation of the Mexican Government
Extradition treaties generally, and the provisions of Article 1 of the United
States-Mexico Extradition Treaty in particular, impose an obligation on the
United States to transfer fugitives for trial or punishment to Mexico as the re-
questing state when the conditions specified in the treaty have been met. The
Mexican Government generally makes a request for extradition or provisional ar-
rest through the diplomatic channel (from its Embassy in Washington to the De-
partment of State). The Department of State reviews the request to ensure con-
formity with the treaty and prepares a declaration authenticating the request and
the treaty.
Since the 1970s, the Department of Justice ("DOr') represented foreign gov-
ernments in extradition cases before federal courts. The purpose of representing
foreign governments in extradition cases is to ensure that the cases will be liti-
gated under the high standards of the United States Attorney's offices supported
by a corps of DOJ attorneys with special expertise in this area. They thereby
259. REPREsEmN GFoREIGNGovam.EBNTs, supra note 142, at x.
260. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (authorizing "any judge of the United States, or any magis-
trate authorized to do so by a court of the United States," to conduct extradition proceed-
ings, including receiving complaints, issuing ,trrants and determining extraditability).
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achieve two goals: 1) assuring that every extraditable criminal is removed from
the United States, and 2) encouraging reciprocal treatment from United States
treaty partners."' In 1996, however, the Mexican Attorney General's Office issued
a memorandum disputing the efficacy of the representation by the United States
Government in extradition cases.262
b. Complaint
Every extradition case begins with the filing of a complaint under oath seeking
the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the fugitive.2 13 The complaint may be
executed before a magistrate or a district judge, either one of whom may issue a
warrant in an extradition case. A magistrate can conduct the extradition hearing
only if the local rules so authorize. The Assistant United States Attorney assigned
to the case is the complainant. The form of the complaint depends on whether the
request seeks extradition in the first instance or provisional arrest with a hearing
on extradition to follow.1
United States law does not preclude the filing of a second or amended extradi-
tion complaint regardless of whether the first or original complaint is withdrawn
voluntarily by the requesting State or dismissed by the extradition magistrate for
failure to make out a proper case for extradition or to warrant the arrest of the ac-
cused for an extradition hearing. Similarly, the requesting State can proceed again
where the second or subsequent request is based on additional evidence or where
the discharge of the accused resulted from a technicality."3
c. The Provisional Arrest
The legal basis for provisional arrest in United States extradition cases is con-
tained in Article 11 of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty and in Section
3184 of Title 18 of the United States Code. A sworn affidavit establishes the facts
required for provisional arrest, after which the magistrate issues a warrant and the
fugitive may be detained for sixty days. The Mexican Government must present
its formal demand for extradition, together with the supporting documents speci-
fied in the treaty, within the time specified in Article 11(3) of the Treaty. The ap-
plication must contain a description of the offense for which the extradition is re-
261. Id. at 1.
262. Lic. Josd Ignacio Rodriguez Garcia, La Extradici6n en las Relaclones Bilaterales
Mixico-Estados Unidos de Amdrica (Extradition in Mexico-U.S. Bilateral Relations) 9-10
(undated, but prepared in the spring of 1996) (on file with author).
263. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
264. RFPRESENTING FoREiGN GovmE NTs, supra note 142, at 2.
265. For a discussion of the RuizMassieu case, see Sec. VI. F below, Collins v. Loisel,
262 U.S. 426 (1923), Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1927), and Whitenan,
supra note 224, § 27, at 939, 942 (citing Acting Secretary of State Herter to the Anmbassa-
dor of Mexico (Antonio Carrillo Flores), note, May 18, 1960, MS. Dep't St., file 211.1215
Arias, Genaro/5-1760).
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quested, a description of the person sought, including his whereabouts, an under-
taking to formalize the request for extradition, and a declaration of the existence
of a warrant of arrest issued by a competent judicial authority or a judgment of
conviction issued against the person sought. The extradition hearing required un-
der Section 3184 occurs after the formal request is made. The fugitive remains in
custody during the interim.
A request for provisional arrest identifies the fugitive by name and physical de-
scription if available, states that the person has been charged in Mexico with the
commission of a crime (or convicted of a crime), identifies the charging document
(or judgment of conviction), describes the facts underlying the charges or the cir-
cumstances of conviction, and confirms that a formal request for extradition fol-
lows. The standard for the minimum information required to secure provisional
arrest is found in the United States Constitution, not the treaty.'
In connection with a request from the Mexican Government for a 1907 provi-
sional arrest relating to Eduardo Ramirez for forgery committed at Nogales, So-
nora, Mexico, the United States Attorney at Nogales requested from the Attorney
General immediate details of forgery and copies of papers to frame a new com-
plaint against the fugitive[s]; the facts in the Attorney General's letter were not
sufficient for the basis of a complaint.' The Acting Secretary of State informed
the Attorney General that, under Article 10 of the 1899 Extradition Treaty, re-
quests for provisional arrest need only provide information that warrants issued in
Mexico charged an extraditable crime, together with assurances that formal pa-
pers will follow.m The letter further informed the United States Attorney General
that the Mexican Government fulfilled its obligations under the provisions of Ar-
ticle 10.1 In addition, the letter noted that the same practice had been followed
for years by United States district attorneys in New Mexico and TexasY
While probable cause to issue a provisional arrest warrant is less than the
probable cause required to extradite, courts have not explained the difference.' n
The complaint contains the available information bearing on probable cause. The
requirement of probable cause is met if the complaint sets forth sufficient facts on
which to conclude that: (1) there exists an extradition treaty in force between the
United States and Mexico, (2) a request for provisional arrest has been made, (3)
the request pertains to a crime covered by the treaty, (4) a crime was committed,
(5) the fugitive committed it, (6) a formal request will be submitted within the
266. Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that provisional
arrest and extradition proceedings require a showing of probable cause).
267. See HAcKwoRnri, supra note 12, at 103-04 (citing Letter from Ambassador Creel
to Secretary Root regarding the sufficiency of extradition documents (Feb. 1, 1907)).
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See, e.g., Matter of Extradition of Russell, 805 F.2d 1215, 1217 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stating that evidence for a provisional arrest may be based on belief instead of personal
knowledge).
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time specified in the treaty or within a reasonable time, and (7) the fugitive is
within the jurisdiction of the court.
Most treaties, and the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty in particular,
authorize the use of the procedure "in urgent cases." Fugitives often challenged
their provisional arrests by claiming that the complaint failed to allege the ur-
gency of the matter. The United States Government contends that the parties to
the treaty must decide whether the situation is urgent. Once made, the United
States Government argues that the executive branch's decision is not subject to
judicial review. Courts have sustained this view.2
Challenges to provisional arrest that occur before the hearing assume the form
of applications for habeas corpus or other extraordinary writs. The only matter
that can be examined pursuant to such an application is the lawfulness of the fu-
gitive's detention, which in turn depends on the existence of the threat, the
authority of the magistrate, and the showing of the minimal probable case men-
tioned in Russell."
d. Formal Extradition Request
When Mexico has made a formal request for extradition, supported by the
documents specified in the treaty, they are filed together with the complaint. A
warrant is issued as in the case of a provisional arrest. The fugitive is arrested and
brought before the magistrate for an initial appearance. The procedure thereafter
differs only in that the hearing occurs as soon as the fugitive is prepared to pro-
ceed. If a case has been started with a complaint for provisional arrest, no need
exists to file a second complaint when the formal request for extradition arrives.
2. Arrest Warrant
a. Execution of Warrant
The Marshals Service executes warrants for the arrest of fugitives unless an-
other law enforcement agency has already been involved in the case and has ex-
pended its resources in locating the fugitive."' Once issued, the warrant is valid
throughout the United States and may remain outstanding even if the fugitive is
not found in the location where he or she was thought to be."" If the fugitive is
272. See e.g., id. at 1216; United States v. Leitner, 784 F.2d 159, 160-61 (2d Cir.
1986) (acknowledging the practice that deference is given to the extraditing government's
and the U.S. Government's determination of urgency).
273. For background on provisional arrest, see REPRESENTING FOREIGN GovERNMENTs,
supra note 142, at 2-3.
274. Id. at 5 (citing U.S. Attorney General, Policy on Fugitive Apprehension, Aug. 11,
1988) (on file with author).
275. See Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 899 (2d Cir. 1973) (establishing that a
complaint and warrant in one district may be enforced in another based on the govern-
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arrested outside the district in which the warrant was issued, a new complaint
should be filed in the district of arrest and the hearing should be held there. The
original complaint may be dismissedY5
b. Notification of the Mexican Government
When a Mexican national is arrested, an independent obligation arises from
the United States-Mexican consular convention to notify the nearest consular rep-
resentative of the person's country of nationality. 2" The arresting agent normally
handles this notification, but the Assistant United States Attorney should follow
up because not every agency is aware of the potential obligation.
c. Initial Appearance
The purpose of the fugitive's first appearance before the magistrate is similar
to that in Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The rules, however,
do not apply in extradition cases. At the initial appearance, the magistrate should
inform the fugitive of the following seven points:
d. Reason for Arrest
The reason for the fugitive's arrest, i.e. the foreign request for provisional ar-
rest or extradition based on a charge or conviction in the requesting state, will ap-
pear in the complaint that may be recited to the fugitive by the court.
e. Possibility of Waiver or Simplified Extradition
The provisions of Article 18 of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty
permits a fugitive to waive extradition or elect simplified extradition. Waiver is
also possible without an express treaty provision. The fugitive should be informed
of the options at this stage of the proceeding. In seeking provisional arrest, Mex-
ico may sometimes include only one of several charges outstanding against a fu-
gitive. Since the fugitive's waiver or election of simplified extradition may limit
Mexico to trying the fugitive on the count specified in the request, the Assistant
United States Attorney should notify OIA before the fugitive waives or chooses
simplified extradition so that OIA can be sure that no other charges are outstand-
ing. As soon as the election is made, the Assistant United States Attorney informs
OIA so that OIA can instruct the Mexican Government to send escorts.
In waiving extradition, a fugitive does not admit anything about the crime. He
or she simply agrees to return to the requesting state as soon as the escorting
agents can arrange for transport. In a simple waiver, the fugitive may lose the
benefit of the "rule of specialty," meaning that he or she could be tried in the re-
ment's reasonable and good faith belief regarding the fugitive's location).
276. REPREsENzrNFoRiGNGovERiMNTs, supra note 142, at 4-5.
277. Id. at 6.
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questing state for any crime, not just the one mentioned in the request. Alterna-
tively, the fugitive may consent to extradition. The magistrate will then enter a
certification of extraditability to be transmitted to the Secretary of State. In such
cases, the fugitive receives the benefit of the rule."'8
f Appointment of Counsel
Magistrates routinely appoint counsel for indigents in civil"' extradition cases,
even though the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to counsel to the accused
only in criminal prosecutions. The Criminal Justice Acts" does not list fugitives in
extradition cases among the classes of persons entitled to appointed counsel. Rule
44 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure limits appointment of counsel to
defendants in criminal cases. The United States Government does not oppose such
appointments.
g. Date for Bail Hearing
In extradition cases a presumption exists against release on bail. The fugitive,
however, can apply for bail, and the magistrate should set an early date for a
hearing on such bail motion. The United States Government opposes release on
bail in extradition cases."
h. Timing of Extradition Hearing
A fugitive taken into custody pursuant to a request for provisional arrest can
expect to remain in custody until after the extradition documents are received be-
cause bail is generally not granted. The United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty
permits sixty days for completion of the formal request.' In such cases, the fugi-
tive will want to schedule the hearing for the day the documents are due, but such
requests are impossible to accommodate because of the language of the treaty and
the multiple steps involved in transmitting the documents to the court.
Provisional arrest clauses require only that Mexico as the requesting state pres-
ent its formal request and supporting documents through the diplomatic channel
within the deadline. They do not specify that the documents be delivered to the
court by that date.'
The Office of Legal Advisor at the Department of State reviews the extradition
request to ensure procedural regularity and conformity with the treaty. A certified
copy of the request together with the original supporting documents is sent to
278. Id. at 6-7.
279. See infra Part IV.i.1.
280. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A.
281. REPRESENTiNGFoREiGN GOvERNMENTS, supra note 142, at 8.
282. Mexico-U.S. Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 11(3).
283. See United States v. Clark, 470 F. Supp. 976, 978 (D. Vt. 1979) (establishing that
the respondent did not suffer any legal wrong due to the government's twelve day delay).
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OIA, which transmits them to the United States Attorney's Office. The Assistant
United States Attorney responsible for the case files the original with the court
and serves a copy on counsel for the accused.
To permit time for delivery of the papers from Washington, D.C., or from
Mexico to the court, the hearing should be scheduled at least ten days after the
due date for the documents. The Assistant United States Attorney should under-
take to inform the court and counsel on the day of the deadline whether the re-
quest and supporting documents have been received, with the understanding that
the fugitive will move for his release if the documents have not been received.
Although treaties are the supreme law of the land, in some cases magistrates
ignored the Constitution and purported to rewrite the treaty's deadline for sub-
mitting formal documents by setting an early hearing date or threatening to grant
the fugitive's bond motion. Direct review of such decisions may not be available
in time to avert the potential harm.
Under the prior extradition treaty of 1899 between Mexico and the United
States, the United States Attorney General opined that the forty days during
which a prisoner may be detained under the terms of Article X of that treaty to
await document production, sustaining extradition meant forty days prior to the
production of the documents to the State Department in the United States or to the
corresponding branch of the Mexican Government If such documents were pro-
duced within the forty days, the suspected criminal had no absolute right of re-
lease under the treaty, but might be detained for a reasonable additional period to
afford time for an investigation into probable guilt or innocence.
i. Bail
Fugitives requesting bail will claim a "constitutional right to bail," and base
their request on statutory' and case law concerning pre-trial release. The Eighth
Amendment requires only that bail, if granted, not be excessive.' While bail in
extradition and deportation proceedings involves similar considerations as in or-
dinary criminal considerations, the potential for fugitives to flee and the interna-
tional implications are often overriding.'
United States prosecutors remind courts of the potential adverse impact on
United States foreign relations if bail is given to a fugitive who thereafter flees,
284. REPREsENTGFoREiGNGOVEmmNTS, supra note 142, at 8-9.
285. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 20.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1994).
287. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
288. An asserted due process right to bail by aliens in deportation cases has been re-
jected. See Doherty v. Thomburgh, 750 F. Supp. 131, 139-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (discussing
the Circuit Court's view on allowing bail in extradition cases). The court emphasizes that
the risk of flight outweighs the fugitive's due process rights. Id. See discussion infra Part
VI-I (describing the situation in which a fugitive received bail after the first four extradi-
tion requests and deportation requests were rejected).
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thereby preventing the United States from fulfilling its treaty obligations. Many
courts will not grant bail to fugitives absent special circumstances. 8 Some courts
characterize this reluctance as a presumption against bail for fugitives." °
j. Discovery
The United States Government vigorously opposes discovery on the basis that
the United States case requires an inquiry of extremely limited scope by the mag-
istrate in determining extraditability."' Due to the narrow focus of the proceeding,
and the lack of factual issues in some cases, the accused has no right to discov-
ery-M
k. Extradition Request and Support Documents
(1) Description
The documents submitted to the court in support of an extradition request
normally include: the formal request for extradition, supporting documents, and a
certificate from the principal United States diplomatic or consular officer in
Mexico. Once the documents are received at the Department of State, the Legal
Adviser's office attaches a covering declaration to the documents and forwards
the package to the Department of Justice.
The treaty requires that the formal request for extradition, supported by the
documents specified in the treaty, be submitted through diplomatic channels. The
formal request is made in the diplomatic note from the Embassy of Mexico in
Washington to the United States Department of State, or alternatively in a diplo-
matic note from Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United States Em-
bassy in Mexico City. The note also transmits the supporting documents required
under the treaty. The original note remains at the Department of State, which sub-
stitutes a copy for the original.
The Department of State prepares a declaration executed by an attorney in the
Office of the Legal Adviser. The declaration attests to the existence of the treaty (a
copy of which is attached to the declaration), its existence in force, and its cover-
age of the offenses for which extradition is requested. The declarant also certifies
that the copies of the diplomatic note and the treaty are true and accurate and
authenticates the certification of the supporting documents by the principal United
289. See United States v. Williams, 611 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1979) (limiting special
circumstances to instances where the justification is both plain and pressing).
290. See, e.g., United States v. Messina, 566 F. Supp. 740, 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stat-
ing that a presumption against bail exists in extradition proceedings because of the na-
tion's interest in returning fugitives to requesting countries); Matter of Extradition of
Nacif-Borge, 829 F. Supp. 1210, 1214 (D. Nev. 1993) (same).
291. REPRBSENTiNGFoRBIGNGovERNMENTS, supra note 142, at 10-11.
292. See In re Extradition of Singh, 123 F.R.D. 108, 111 n.5 (D.N.J. 1987) (stating that
there is no constitutional right to discovery), certification vacated on other grounds sub
nom Gill v. Imundi, No. 88-1530 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 1990).
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States diplomatic or consular officer in Mexico. The declaration is itself authenti-
cated by the seal of the Department of State. The diplomatic note, supporting
documents and authenticated declaration with their attachments are referred to as
the extradition package.29
(2) Certification under 18 U.S.C. § 3190
The supporting documents submitted by Mexico should be accompanied by a
certificate from the principal United States diplomatic or consular officer resident
in or accredited to Mexico to the effect that the documents are "properly and le-
gally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the
tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have es-
caped." 1 Normally the certificate is submitted on a standard form used by the
Department of State. Documents certified in accordance with the statute "shall be
received and admitted into evidence."'
Fugitives sometimes challenge the sufficiency of the certification. They do this
through experts in the law of Mexico who testify that the documents were not
"properly and legally authenticated" as required by the statute. They also chal-
lenge the certificate as not coming from the "principal diplomatic or consular of-
ficer." 5
The diplomatic or consular officer's certificate is conclusive on the propriety
and legality of the underlying authentications.2 Hence, issues concerning
authentication should be rare. When a fugitive's counsel receives a photocopy of
the request that fails to reproduce a seal visible only on the original, claims are
sometimes made that the authentication is defective. Also, documents are some-
times authenticated on the reverse, which is frequently not photocopied."
(3) Copies; Filing; Service
The Department of State requests that Mexico submit the original and three
copies of extradition packages. The State Department generally keeps one copy
and forwards the original and the remaining copies to OIA. The latter keeps a
copy and forwards the original and a copy to the United States Attorney's Of-
fice.3
The State Department marks the original and files it with the court with rib-
bons and seals intact, or in the form received. Before filing it, the prosecutor
should compare the original with the copy received from the Mexican Govern-
ment to ensure that they correspond because any additional copies (e.g., for serv-
ice on the fugitive's attorney or working copies for the prosecutor and the court)
will be made from that copy, which will be easier to reproduce than the ribboned
293. REP sENT'GFo.iGN GovERnm S, supra note 142, at 12.
294. 18 U.S.C. § 3190.
295. Id.
296. REPREsm GFoREIGNGovERms, supra note 142, at 13.
297. Galdnis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1977).
298. REPREsEmNT.FoREiGN Govsma mms, supra note 142, at 12-14.
299. Id. at 14.
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original. If the copy is also fastened with ribbon, it may be disassembled. The rib-
bons, however, should not be removed from the original without the permission of
the court. Then they should be removed only if no copies were received with the
request, and the original must then be photocopied."
(4) Translations
Extradition requests submitted in Spanish from the Mexican Government will
be accompanied by an English translation. The extradition statute does not specify
the form of the translation, and the United States-Mexican extradition treaty is
likewise silent on the formal requisites. Courts generally presume that the trans-
lations are correct, thereby putting the burden on the fugitive to show that they are
incorrect in some material respect."'
1. Extradition Proceedings
(1) Purpose of Extradition Hearing
The extradition hearing has the purpose of requiring the magistrate to hear and
consider the evidence of criminality presented by the Mexican Government and to
determine whether it suffices to sustain the charge under the treaty.3" In particu-
lar, the extradition hearing determines if there is probable cause to believe that a
crime was committed and that the person whose extradition is requested commit-
ted the crime.3
(2) Burden of Proof
The Mexican Government, as the complainant, bears the burden of establish-
ing that the conditions for extradition set forth in the treaty and the essential ele-
ments identified in United States case law have been met. °
(3) Standard of Proof
Under applicable case law the complainant must show probable cause, which
signifies evidence sufficient to cause a person of ordinary prudence and caution to
conscientiously entertain a reasonable belief of the accused's guilt."0 While a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard is required in most preliminary matters such
as probable cause determinations, a reviewing court will sustain the finding of
probable cause in an extradition case if there exists "any evidence" to support it."
(4) Necessary Elements
For a person to be extraditable, the court must find the following elements: ju-
300. Id. at 16.
301. See In re David, 395 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
302. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
303. REPRESENTNGFoREIrNGovERNOENTs, supra note 142, at 16.
304. United States v. Barr, 619 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D.Pa. 1985); In re Locatelli, 468 F.
Supp. 568 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
305. Barr, 619 F. Supp. at 1071; Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980).
306. Mirchandani v. United States, 836 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988).
[12:4
7 MECO-U.S. EXJRADITIONAND ALTERNATIVES
risdiction (personal and subject matter); existence of an extradition treaty cur-
rently in force; existence of charges; extraditable offense and satisfaction of the
dual criminality requirement; and probable cause (including identity of the fugi-
tive).3 07
(5) Nature of Proceeding andApplicable Rules
Because the extradition hearing is not a criminal trial or an adjudication of the
merits of the charges underlying the request for extradition,3 " the constitutional
guarantees pertaining to criminal prosecutions do not apply."
Statutes and case law that control the conduct of criminal trials do not apply in
extradition cases. For instance, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence specifically exclude extradition proceedings from their
operation.3
10
(6) Evidentiary Rules
The courts allow broad latitude in receiving evidence in extradition hearings."'
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in extradition proceedings, but some rules
of evidence apply uniquely in extradition.
(7) Hearsay IsAdmissible
The Mexican Government, in making extradition requests, must present "evi-
dence sufficient to sustain the charge."' The magistrate must receive in evidence
depositions, warrants, and other papers if they are certified by the principal dip-
lomatic or consular officer of the United States resident in Mexico as being legally
authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by the tribu-
nals of Mexico.1 Documents certified in accordance with Section 3190 are con-
clusively admissible . 31
(8) Contradictory Evidence Is Inadmissible
In extradition proceedings the court decides only probable cause. The fugitive,
therefore, cannot offer evidence tending to establish innocence, i.e., slhe may not
introduce evidence of an alibi or any other affirmative defense because such mat-
ters are irrelevant to the issue before the court. Extradition magistrates are not ex-
pected to decide conflicting factual claims made by Mexico as the requesting state
on the one hand and the fugitive on the other. Courts often refuse to hear evidence
from the accused bearing on the credibility of the witnesses."' The accused may,
307. REPREsENmGFoREIGN GovsmENms, supra note 142, at 17.
308. Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457,463 (1888).
309. See, e.g., Glucksman v. Henkel, 221 U.S. 508, 512 (1911); Caltagirone v. Grant,
629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980); Matter of Sindona, 584 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
310. FED. R. CaRa P. 54(b)(5); FED. R. EviD. 1101(d)(3).
311. Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1970).
312. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
313. Id. § 3190.
314. Cucuzzela v. KeHikoa, 638 F.2d 105, 106-07 (9th Cir. 1981).
315. REPSENTmIGFoREiGN GovEmsNs, supra note 142, at 18.
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however, introduce evidence that clarifies or explains Mexico's evidence in such a
way as to "obliterate probable cause" because the question of probable cause is
relevant. '6
m. Available Defenses
(1) Core Defenses
The fugitive may claim that one of the essential elements listed in Part I.(4),
supra, is lacking. The majority of serious challenges to the completeness of an
extradition request focus on either identity or the extraditability of the offense.,"
(2) Jurisdiction
Extradition treaties, including the Mexico-United States extradition treaty, re-
quire the extradition of persons charged with, or convicted of, any of the crimes
and offenses covered by the treaty committed within the jurisdiction of one of the
signatories, found within the territory of the other. The United States extradition
statute also provides for extradition whenever a treaty or convention for extradi-
tion exists between the United States and a foreign government for offenses
"committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government." '
The United States denied two extradition requests from Mexico in cases
charging defendants with embezzling funds from Mexico outside of Mexico. In
1924, Mexico requested extradition of Ignacio Monin, who during his service as
Mexican Consul at Berlin, allegedly embezzled funds of the Mexican Government
which were later found in New Orleans. The Mexican Government based its ex-
tradition on its alleged jurisdiction since the offense was committed in the dis-
charge of the official duties of a Mexican Consul."9 The Secretary of State denied
extradition because jurisdiction in the treaty referred to places under the sovereign
power of the signatories.32
In 1926, the Acting Secretary of State denied the Mexican Government's ex-
tradition request for Alfonso Casola, charged with embezzlement during his ten-
ure at the Mexican Consul at Nogales, Arizona. The money was said to have been
taken from the consular funds. The government argued that the crime was not
committed within the jurisdiction of Mexico."'
316. See discussion infra Part VIE (discussing the admission of such evidence in the
cases of Contreras, Collins v. Lisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922), and Petrushansky v. Marasco,
325 F.2d 562 (1964)).
317. REPRESENING FoREIGN GovERas NTs, supra note 142, at 19.
318. 18 U.S.C. § 3184.
319. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 20.
320. See HAcKwoRTam, supra note 12, at 70 (citing letter from Mexican Charg6
d'Affaires T61lez to Secretary of State Hughes, Mar. 7, 1924, MS. Dep't St., file
211.12M791/1; Mr. Hughes to the Mexican Charge d'Affaires (Benltez), May 5, 1924).
321. Id. (citing note from Ambassador Tdllez to Secretary Kellogg, Feb. 23, 1926, and
the Acting Secretary of State (Grew) to Sefior T6llez, Mar. 6, 1926, MS. Dep't St., file
211.12C26/-).
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The existence of concurrent jurisdiction is not a sufficient basis to deny an ex-
tradition request. For instance, in the case of Millard K. Davis, Mexico requested
Davis' extradition for stabbing his victim in Mexico, although the death of the
victim occurred in California. The defendant raised concurrent if not exclusive
jurisdiction of California as the reason the United States, as a requested State, was
bound to deny the extradition request. The district and appellate courts, however,
concluded the offense completed at the time the fatal blow was struck, and hence
the crime was committed "within Mexico's jurisdiction, thereby requiring his sur-
render notwithstanding the possibility that he might also be tried for murder in
California 2 
2
(3) Dual Criminality
Challenges to the extraditability of an offense usually assert that the offense for
which extradition is requested is not a crime in the United States (i.e., that dual
criminality is lacking) or that the offense is not included among those for which
extradition will be granted.'"
Article 2 of the Mexico-United States Extradition Treaty supplements the lists
of extradition offenses in favor of a general dual criminality requirement. It re-
quires extradition for willful acts that, even though not within the appendix of
listed offenses, are punishable by deprivation of liberty the maximum of which
will not be less than one year.2 4 The court still requires the complainant to estab-
lish what the corresponding offense would be if the crime had been committed in
the United States. The prosecutor may analogize to federal law, the law of the
state in which the fugitive was arrested, or the law of the majority of the states.",
The court looks at the elements of the offense and the evidence on which the
prosecutor relies to show criminal conduct under the pertinent statute.
Under former Section 651, which is now 18 U.S.C. § 3184, and under the for-
mer treaty with Mexico, providing $25 as the minimum amount stolen authoriz-
ing extradition, a United States court in Texas ruled that Mexico was not entitled
to extradite a party allegedly stealing property valued less than $25. The party did
not intend to convert the property to his own use and benefit, but turned the prop-
erty over to United States officers in the United States."
Mexico's extradition request was refused when a court ruled that funds of a
private corporation were not "public moneys" within the meaning of the extradi-
tion treaty between Mexico and the United States, which provided for extradition
for the offense of embezzling public moneys."
322. Ex parte Davis, 54 F.2d 723, 727 (1932).
323. RPRsENmnGFoRExNGOVERMnES, supra note 142, at 19-21.
324. Mexico-U.S. Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 2(1).
325. Cucuzzella v. Keliikoa, 638 F.2d 105, 107-08(9th Cir. 1981).
326. In re Lucke, 20 F. Supp. 658 (D. Tex. 1937). See also HAckxWoR', supra note 12,
at 42 (discussing the case of Gustave Lelevier in 1907 wherein Mexico's request for provi-
sional arrest and detention was denied because evidence at the hearing shoved the amount
taken did not exceed $25).
327. Blandford's Case, 10 Tex. App. 627 (Tex. Ct. App. 1881).
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In another incident involving the crime of embezzlement or speculation of
public funds by an officer of Mexico, the United States Supreme Court ruled it
was covered as an extraditable crime within the treaty."'
In an important case involving the sensitive subject of kidnapping, a United
States court ruled that persons effecting the forcible seizure and abduction of an
escaped bond defaulter from Mexico to Texas, in order to obtain a reward, were
guilty of the extraditable offense of "kidnapping" under the laws of Texas and
Mexico and the prior extradition treaty between Mexico and the United States.2
A request by Mexico under the prior extradition treaty for certain offenses in-
cluding the obtaining of money, valuables, or other personal property by threats or
false devices, a complaint seeking issuance of a warrant for extradition of a de-
fendant charged with the commission of a "crime of fraud" said to be more spe-
cifically referred to in the treaty was denied because the court ruled it did not
charge an offense covered by the treaty and did not sufficiently apprise the defen-
dant as to the charge. While the treaty made the obtainment of money, valuables
or other personal property by threats or false devices an extraditable offense,
drawing a check without sufficient funds in settlement of a profit-sharing contract
between defendant and an association of collective farmers was not an extradit-
able offense under the treaty. 3°
In 1960, in the case of Alejandro Lezoni D'Almagro, Mexico requested
D'Almagro's extradition for the crimes of breach of trust and fraud for defrauding
a government slaughterhouse in four contracts for the purchase and sale of cattle.
Although these crimes are not listed in the treaty, obtaining money by false de-
vices is listed. In determining that the crimes of fraud and breach of trust come
within the treaty, the court found that while "larceny" or "larceny by false pre-
tenses" is punishable in New York, the facts and circumstances as shown by the
evidence indicate that the essential elements required to constitute the crime of
larceny by false pretenses under the laws of New York State are lacking.33 1
In a case applying the 1861 extradition treaty, a United States court found that
a printed theater ticket in the usual form, stamped on its face with an inscription
in the style of a seal, which set out the name of the manager in printed characters
was the subject of forgery at common law. The court reasoned that under the 1861
extradition treaty, "printing" was "writing" in the legal sense of that term, so that
a signature by impression from a stamp was a valid signature."'
(4) Treaty Based Defenses
The Mexico-United States Extradition Treaty provides several defenses, in-
328. Fernandez v. Phillips, 45 S. Ct. 51 (1925).
329. Villareal v. Hammond, 74 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1934).
330. Inre Wise, 168 F. Supp. 366 (D.Tex. 1957).
331. Whiteman, supra note 224, at 778-79.
332. In re Benson, 34 F. 649 (C.C.N.Y.), Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (U.S.N.Y.
1888).
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cluding the political"' and military offenses exceptions.3 Questions arising under
the application of the political offense exception must be decided by the Executive
authority of the requested state (e.g., the United States). In addition, the political
offense exception cannot apply to the murder or other willful crimes against the
life or physical integrity of a Head of State or Head of Government or of his fam-
ily, including attempts to commit such an offense, or an offense which the United
States may have the obligation to prosecute by reason of a multilateral interna-
tional agreement (e.g., Montreal Convention on Air Hijackings or 1988 Vienna
Drug Convention).3
Extradition cannot be granted when the Mexican Government is making an
extradition request that is barred by the statute of limitations provisions in either
the United States or MexicoY.33 A defense to a Mexican Government's extradition
request theoretically could be that capital punishment could be imposed on the
fugitive. Mexico, however, does not have the death penalty, and the United States
Government does not invoke this defense. 7 A common defense to an extradition
request to the United States is the principle of non bis in idem, which precludes
extradition of a fugitive adjudicated and either acquitted or punished for the of-
fense for which extradition is requested?33
n. Procedure at the Extradition Hearing
(1) Opening Statement
The United States prosecutor in an opening statement normally recapitulates
the points in the extradition hearing memorandum, including particularly the nar-
row scope of the proceeding, the standard of proof and the elements required to
establish extraditability, and addresses any issues likely to be raised by the fugi-
tive.339
(2) Mexican Government's Case
Because the burden of proof is on the requesting state (e.g., Mexico), the
United States prosecutor on behalf of the Mexican Government goes first. Its case
in chief will consist largely or solely of the extradition package. Since reliance on
hearsay is the norm in extradition proceedings, oral testimony is rare. Important
cases with complex facts, however, such as the Contreras and Ruiz Massieu
cases,M3 involved extended oral testimony. The United States prosecutor usually
pre-marks the original extradition package filed with the court as an exhibit, de-
333. Mexico-U.S. Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art 5(l)-(2).
334. Id. art. 5(3). The treaty precludes extradition when the offense for ,;hich extradi-
tion is requested is a "purely military offense." Id.
335. Id. art. 5(2).
336. Id. art. 7.
337. Id. art. 8.
338. Mexico-U.S. Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 6.
339. REPREsEIGFoREIGN GovnmEmN's, supra note 142, at 24.
340. See discussion infra Parts VLG, IL
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scribing for the record the documents to which the tabbed exhibits refer. The
United States prosecutor then moves the package into evidence, puts on any addi-
tional evidence, and rests."
(3) Fugitive's Case
The fugitive either contests the evidence or presents an affirmative defense. In
the latter case, s/he offers supporting evidence.
(4) Rebuttal
When the fugitive presents an affirmative defense, or when s/he has been al-
lowed to present explanatory evidence that must be rebutted to establish probable
cause, the United States prosecutor introduces rebuttal evidence.
(5) Argument
At the conclusion of any rebuttal evidence and the proceeding, both the United
States prosecutor and the fugitive's counsel can make an argument. 2
o. Certification of Extraditability and Order of Commitment
(1) Separate Findings
The certification of extraditability constitutes the court's finding that the fugi-
tive is extraditable. Normally it contains an order remanding the fugitive to the
custody of the marshal pending the decision by the Secretary of State to surrender
the fugitive. In preparing a certification of extraditability for the court, the prose-
cutor tries to include findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing all the
elements required for extradition, with specific findings for each count or group of
counts for which extradition is requested."3 The separate listing facilitates the task
of the reviewing court if the fugitive seeks a writ of habeas corpus.
Some courts suggested that the adoption of verbatim proposed findings by the
extradition magistrate justifies a de novo review and revision of those findings.'"
Still, the prosecutor should prepare proposed findings to assist the court."
(2) Procedure Following Certification
If the magistrate deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the extradition
charge, s/he must certify the same together with a copy of all testimony taken be-
fore him to the Secretary of State."' A certified copy of the certification is deliv-
ered to the Secretary of State or to the Assistant United States Attorney for deliv-
ery to the Secretary by the clerk.
The Secretary of State makes the final decision concerning the surrender of the
341. R.PRESENTINGFOREIGNGOVERSMENTS, supra note 142, at 24.
342. Id. at 26.
343. Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981); Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F.
Supp. 544, 562 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
344. See generally Caplan, 649 F.2d 1336.
345. REPRESENTING FoREIGN GovERNMENTS, supra note 142, at 26.
346. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1994).
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fugitive on the basis of a memorandum prepared in the office of the Legal Adviser
for the Department of State. The memorandum contains a copy of the certification
and a sunmary of the evidence, including any defenses offered by the fugitive.
The Assistant United States Attorney orders a copy of the relevant portion of
the transcript and ensures that it reaches the Department of State within 30 days
of the entry of the order."7
The date of the certification is important because the requesting state (e.g.,
Mexico) generally must move the fugitive within two calendar months of the
commitment order." The two months commence as soon as the order is en-
tered." 9 Hence, it is essential to notify OIA upon entry of the order so that it can
inform the Department of State and the Mexican authorities. OIA normally noti-
fies the police or the prosecutor in Mexico or its representative in Washington to
ensure that the information is received in a timely manner. The Department of
State also notifies Mexico's Embassy. The two month deadline is interrupted if
the fugitive seeks judicial review of the finding of extraditability.'1 The time runs
anew from the conclusion of the proceeding in which review is sought."'
The Legal Adviser's office will not submit a case for the Secretary's decision if
the fugitive seeks review of the finding of extraditability by filing a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. The Assistant United States Attorney should notify OIA if a
petition is filed.
If the fugitive does not seek judicial review, the case proceeds administratively.
Once the Legal Adviser's office informs OIA of the Secretary's decision, OIA no-
tifies the Mexican authority?"
(3) Procedure When Court Does Not Certify
If an extradition court does not find that a proper case for extradition has been
made, the Secretary of State does not review the matter. In 1956, in connection
with the request of Mexico for the extradition of Kathleen Riggs, the extradition
magistrate, stating that insufficient evidence was found to warrant extradition,
forwarded to the Secretary of State the documentary evidence introduced at the
hearing, as well as a certified transcript of the proceedings "for your consideration
and determination as to what disposition should be made of this matter" and
stating that insufficient evidence was found to warrant extradition. The Secretary
replied that since the extradition magistrate found insufficient evidence to warrant
the surrender of the accused, the Department had no action to take in the mat-
ter." In practice, a consideration in the aftermath of a decision of non-
347. Id.
348. 18 U.S.C. § 3188.
349. Id.
350. McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F. Supp. 42,46 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
351. Id.
352. REPRSENGwrFoREGN GovEmI' m , supra note 142, at 26-27.
353. See 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1994) (describing evidence permitted in extradition hear-
ings) (citing letter from Judge C.L. Armstrong to Secretary of State Dulles (May 11, 1956)
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extraditability may be a discussion of refiling another extradition request or initi-
ating deportation proceedings.
(4) Procedure for Waiver of Extradition
When Mexico makes an extradition request, the relator may waive extradition
at any point after the arrest. In a simple waiver, the fugitive executes an affidavit
of waiver before the magistrate committing him to the custody of the marshal to
await transfer to the escorting agents. Since extradition does not occur in a simple
waiver, no finding of extraditability is made, and no certificate is sent to the Sec-
retary of State. As the rule of specialty does not apply in the case of a simple
waiver, the United States considers that the relator may be prosecuted for an of-
fense other than that mentioned in the original request and may be re-extradited
without limitation, although the domestic law or practice of the requesting state
may in some cases extend the protection of the rule to the fugitive,
The United States informs the relator at the earliest opportunity of the right to
waive extradition or to elect simplified extradition if the treaty so provides. If the
fugitive decides to waive, s/he must complete an affidavit of waiver and appear
before the magistrate, who will ascertain that the fugitive is aware of the right to a
hearing and that s/he voluntarily relinquishes it. If the magistrate is satisfied, s/he
signs an order committing the fugitive to the custody of the marshal until the arri-
val of the agents from the requesting state."
V. TIHE UNITED STATES-MEXICO EXTRADITION TREATY
A. BACKGROUND
On May 4, 1978, Mexico and the United States concluded a treaty of extradi-
tion, which entered into force on January 25, 19802" It replaces the earlier extra-
dition treaty of 1899 and the Additional Conventions on Extradition signed on
June 25, 1902, December 23, 1925, and August 16, 19392'
B. PROVISIONS
The treaty allows extradition for offenses committed outside the territory of the
requesting state where either the person sought is a national of the requesting
state or the law of the requested state provides for punishment of the same of-
fenses in similar circumstances. 3" Similar provisions are found in existing United
and letter from Mr. Dulles to Judge Armstrong (May 22, 1956), MS. Dep't St., file
211.121 Riggs, Kathleen/5-1156).
354. REPRESENINGFoREIGN GovmummNTs, supra note 142, at 27-28.
355. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53.
356. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UNITED
MEXICAN STATES, S. EXEc. REP. No. 96-21, at 3 (1979).
357. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 1(2).
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States extradition treaties5 with Spain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan,
and Norway. Such provisions are useful, inter alia, in the area of narcotics and
counterfeiting violations.5
Although the existing treaty is comparatively modern, it uses the list method
for extraditable offenses, whereby the crime, to be extraditable, must be one of the
thirty-one listed crimes in the appendix of the treaty and be punishable in accor-
dance with the federal laws of both countries.10 In addition, to be extraditable, a
crime must be punishable by deprivation of liberty for not less than one year.' '
Even if the crimes are not one of those included in the Appendix, a treaty country
must extradite or prosecute if the crimes involve willful acts which are punish-
able, in accordance with the federal laws of both countries, by a deprivation of lib-
erty for no less than one year." If extradition is requested for the execution of a
sentence, there must be not less than six months remaining in the sentence." The
treaty specifically includes attempts and conspiracies to commit an offense, as
well as the participation in the execution of an offense." Such provisions are
useful in prosecuting organized crime. The treaty also provides for granting ex-
tradition when, for the purpose of granting jurisdiction to the United States Gov-
ernment, the law or charged crime specifies transportation of persons or property,
the use of the mail or other means of carrying out interstate or foreign commerce
as an element of the offense in both countries." The latter provisions are standard
language for modem United States extradition treaties and are designed to clarify
that, notwithstanding identical or similar language in their counterpart crimes,
such counterpart crimes will not be deemed to fail the dual criminality test.
Article 3 limits extradition to cases where there exists sufficient evidence, ac-
cording to the laws of the requested state, for trial of the person sought had the
offense been committed in the requested state. Additionally, Article 3 applies to
cases where sufficient evidence exists to prove that the person sought is the person
convicted by the courts of the requesting state."
Article 4 defines the territorial application of the treaty"' and expands the
normal context of that concept to include aircraft in flight." The provision also
extends jurisdiction to acts of aircraft piracy, whether or not they occur over the
territory of either of the treaty countries."'
358. S. Exc. REP. No. 96-21, at 20.
359. Id.
360. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 2(3), app.
361. Id. art. 2(1).
362. Id. art. 2(3).
363. Id.
364. Id. art. 2(4)(a).
365. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53.
366. Id. art. 3.
367. Id. art. 4(1).
368. S. ExEc. REP. No. 96-21, at 20.
369. Id.
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Article 5 contains the political offense exception clause.70 It does, however, ex-
clude from the category of political offense (a) murder or other willful crimes
against the life or physical integrity of a Head of State or Head of Government, or
their families, as well as (b) those offenses which a treaty country is obligated to
prosecute by reason of a multilateral agreement. 7 A similar limitation is included
in the United States-German extradition treaty.3"
In June 1988, under the 1899 extradition treaty, as amended by the additional
conventions of 1902, 1925, and 1939, the Mexican Government refused to extra-
dite William Morales to the United States. William Morales was a convicted
Puerto Rican terrorist arrested in 1978 on explosives and weapons charges. '" He
was chosen as a leader of the Puerto Rican FALN, a terrorist organization alleg-
edly responsible for 100 bombings in the United States and Puerto Rico. After his
conviction by a United States district court, he was sentenced to ninety-nine
years.3
4
In 1979, while in Bellvue Hospital in New York, being fitted for a pair of arti-
ficial hands, Morales escaped by cutting through a mesh wire window and lower-
ing himself down a forty-foot rope made of artificial bandages. Two New York
police officers were killed attempting to arrest Morales. Escaping to Mexico, he
was arrested on May 28, 1983, after a shootout in the state of Puebla. lie con-
fessed to planning the bombing of the site where United States and Mexican con-
gressmen held a conference. After spending several years in a Mexican prison,
Morales was released and received safe passage to Havana, Cuba, under the pro-
tection of the DGI, the Cuban intelligence service.3
In response to Mexico's refusal to extradite Morales to the United States, the
United States recalled its Ambassador from Mexico for one week, and denounced
the action of the Mexican Government as "outrageous." It stated that such action
"undercuts the fight of international terrorism by legal means." '
Article 6 contains a prior jeopardy provision. It excludes extradition in cases
where the person requested has been prosecuted or tried and convicted or acquit-
ted in the requested state for the offense for which extradition is requested. 7 '
Article 7 prevents extradition where prosecution or enforcement of the penalty
for the offense for which extradition is requested becomes barred by lapse of time
according to the laws of the requesting or requested state.3 8
370. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 5(1).
371. Id. art. 5(2)(b).
372. S.ExEc.REP.No. 96-21,at2l.
373. SENATE FoREIGN RELAToNs COMM., MtrrutAL LEGAL AssIsTANcE COOPiRATION
TREATY wrTMEmXco, S. ExEc. REP. No. 100-27, at 34 (1988).
374. Id.
375. Id. at 34-35.
376. Id. at 35.
377. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 6; see S. Exnc. RE'. No. 96-
21, at 21.
378. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 7.
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Article 8 of the extradition treaty provides that, when the offense for which
extradition is requested is punishable by death under the laws of the requesting
state, and the laws of the requested state do not permit such punishment for that
offense, extradition may be refused unless the requesting state provides assurances
as the requested state considers it likely that the death penalty will not be im-
posed, or if imposed will not be executed.'" A similar article is included in most
recent United States extradition treaties." The problem primarily occurred when
the United States requested extradition from a requesting state that does not have
the death penalty.
Article 9 deals with the extradition of nationals and is similar to provisions
signed in other recent United States extradition treaties. It provides that neither
treaty country is required to extradite their nationals, although the executive
authority of the requested state will have the power to extradite in its discretion, if
not prevented by its laws and it deems such extradition proper."' The Article
takes into account the Mexican law prohibiting the extradition of its nationals but
permitting their prosecution in Mexico for offenses committed abroad." Mexican
law, like the laws of most countries in Latin America and countries following the
civil law system, prevents the extradition of nationals, except in "extraordinary
circumstances." This fundamental tenet becomes even more deeply enshrined be-
cause of incursions of Mexican sovereignty by United States law enforcement offi-
cials, but has contributed continuously to friction and major incidents, such as the
kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain.
The treaty provides that, if extradition is not granted, the requested state sub-
mits the case to its authorities for the purpose of prosecution, provided that the
requested state has jurisdiction over the offense' This provision worked poorly
in practice. The inability of United States law enforcement authorities to obtain
the extradition of Mexican nationals and their disappointment with either the law
concerning the prosecution of the fugitive or the slowness with which the Mexi-
can criminal process works led to discussions during the hearings over ratification
of NAFTA and the institution of a new procedure in Mexico to improve prosecu-
tion of such cases.
Articles 10-21 provide for the procedures to accomplish extradition. The treaty
allows provisional arrest in cases of urgency."' It requires, however, that such re-
quests be made through the diplomatic channel, whereas most modem extradition
379. Id. art. 8.
380. S. ExEc. REP. No. 96-21, at 21.
381. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 9(1). See supra Part ILB (dis-
cussing the case of Exparte McCabe, 46 Fed. 363 (1891), -wiich held that under the 1861
Mexico-U.S. extradition treaty the U.S. courts had no authority to exctradite U.S. nation-
als).
382. S. Exac. REP. No. 96-21, at 6.
383. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 9(2).
384. Id. art. 11(1).
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treaties allow competent authorities to communicate directly in such cases. 3  The
application for provisional arrest must only contain a description of the offense for
which the extradition is requested, a description of the person sought and his
whereabouts, an undertaking to formalize the request for extradition, and a decla-
ration that either a warrant of arrest or a judgment of conviction has been is-
sued.' " On receipt of such a request, the requested state must take the necessary
steps to secure the arrest of the person claimed."' A requested state must termi-
nate provisional arrest if, within a period of sixty days after the arrest of the per-
son claimed, the executive authority of the requested state has not received the
formal request for extradition and the supporting documents."
In practice, provisional arrest is usually requested to prevent the further flight
of a fugitive from a country in which s/he sought sanctuary, or to prevent them
from going into hiding in that country after becoming aware that another country
is attempting extradition. Provisional arrest can also be requested: if the subject's
prior criminal history and the circumstances of the offense for which extradition
is sought indicate serious danger to the public safety in the country from which
extradition is sought. Provisional arrest is especially sought in the case of most
organized criminals shown to pose a serious danger to public safety in the country
from which extradition is sought.
In the United States, the minimum period under a treaty within which a re-
questing state must submit a formal, fully documented extradition request after
the provisional arrest of a requested person, is forty days. Under some United
States treaties, the period is as low as three months. Under most of the modem
U.N. treaties, the period is sixty days.
If the Executive authority of the requested State considers the evidence fur-
nished in support of the request for extradition insufficient to fulfill the require-
ments of the treaty, the requested State requests the presentation of the necessary
additional evidence." With respect to the length of time within which such addi-
tional or supplementary documents may be produced, this is a matter within the
discretion of the extradition magistrate and to be determined by such magistrate
on the ground of reasonableness."
After the extradition documents are received, it normally takes at least two to
four weeks before counsel is prepared for the extradition hearing and the extradi-
tion magistrate can schedule it. A person provisionally arrested under a United
States extradition treaty, choosing to contest extradition, can expect to spend from
two to four months in custody before an extradition hearing, unless provisionally
released.
385. Id. art. 11.
386. Id. art. 11(1).
387. Id. art. 11(2).
388. Id. art. 11(3).
389. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 12.
390. See Whiteman, supra note 224, at 927 (citing the 1940 request by Mexico for the
extradition of Pedro Canavati).
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The period of potential incarceration in the United States-Mexico extradition
treaty for provisional arrest is longer than that normally provided in Western
Europe. For instance, the European Convention on Extradition restricts the use of
provisional arrest to cases of urgency. The period within which a formal, fully
documented request must be filed under the Convention is eighteen days. In no
event can it exceed forty days. If the relator informs the requested State the she
agrees to be extradited, the requested State may grant extradition without further
proceedings and take all measures allowed under its laws to expedite such extra-
dition.3 In such cases, the rule of speciality does not apply.
Under Article 14(1) of the treaty, the requested State must promptly communi-
cate to the requesting State its decision on the request for extradition 3 2
Under Article 14(2), in the case of complete or partial rejection of a request for
extradition, the requested State must state the reasons for rejection." ' Practically,
the notification also provides an opportunity for discussion on the possibility to
achieve the objectives of the extradition request, and, if so, how (e.g., new extra-
dition request with supplementary charges and/or new documentary support).
Under Article 14(3), if the extradition is granted, the surrender of the relator
occurs within such time as may be prescribed by the laws of the requested State.
The competent authorities agree on the date and place of the surrender of the per-
son sought
Universally, the surrender of a relator is the function of the executive branch of
the requested State. 95 In the case of the United States even when requests are
made on the border, surrender must await the action of the Secretary of State.
Only after the Secretary of State or his delegate receives the certified copy of a
United States district court can s/he issue a warrant for the surrender of the rela-
tor." ' In terms of the place of surrender, the United States and Mexico allow the
requesting State to collect the relator at the place of detention,3" at a designated
place on the border," or at a designated place in the requesting State."
Article 19 of the treaty provides that, to the extent allowed under the law of the
requested State and subject to the rights of third parties, a requested State will sur-
render articles, instruments, objects of value or documents relating to the offense,
whether or not used for execution or which in any other manner may be material
391. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 18.
392. Id. art. 14(1).
393. Id. art. 14(2).
394. Id. art. 14(3).
395. Whiteman, supra note 224, at 1044; See also 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (authorizing the
Secretary of State to order a person found extraditable to be surrendered).
396. Whiteman, supra note 224, at 1045.
397. See id. at 1072-73.
398. Id. at 1073.
399. Id. (relating that in 1961 the Mexican Government delivered Paul Flato to New
York where New York authorities requested his extradition in 1953).
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evidence for the prosecution.4' For instance, in 1960, on the extradition of Arte-
mio Molina and Francisco Quintana to Mexico on murder charges and after cer-
tain ballistics comparison tests were made by United States authorities, the United
States delivered the pistols to Mexican authorities.4 1
Article 22 provides that the treaty is retroactive in effect as to extraditable of-
fenses committed before the date of entry into force and punishable under the laws
of both treaty countries when committed.41
Article 23 provides that the treaty enters into force on the date of exchange of
the instruments of ratification."3 The treaty superseded the extradition treaty.
4
"
IV. CONTEMPORARY EXTRADITION ISSUES: DRUGS,
CAMARENA, THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN AND GARCIA ABREGO
CASES
Since the 1978 extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico went
into effect in 1980, contemporary extradition practice between Mexico and the
United States reflected both a continuation of many of the prior issues and prob-
lems, such as the use of irregular rendition and the difficulty in obtaining the ex-
tradition of nationals. Indeed, the frustration of the United States with the inabil-
ity to prosecute expeditiously and punish harshly the persons implicated in the
1985 assassination of former agent Enrique Camarena of the Drug Enforcement
Administration ("DEA") resulted in the abduction of Mexican Dr. Humberto Al-
varez Machain and later the controversial decision of the United States Supreme
Court withholding jurisdiction over him. The latter case and a series of other ex-
tradition cases resulted in diplomatic tension between Mexico and the United
States and the erosion of confidence and trust in extradition and criminal coop-
eration in the region.
In hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1988, United
States Government officials revealed that the United States Government infre-
quently utilized the extradition treaty. Specifically, officials stated that the United
States neither made many formal requests for extradition from Mexico nor ob-
tained the return of any fugitives. The United States Executive Branch reported
that Mexico did return one fugitive to the United States under the predecessor ex-
tradition treaty, Mr. Flato in 1961 for a fraud crime. The United States did have
extradition requests pending with the Mexican Government in 1988, one of which
included the request for alleged narcotrafficker Ver6nica Kiera-Wahl. The United
States Executive Branch also reported that the Mexican Government returned a
number of non-Mexican narcotic traffickers to the United States pursuant to their
domestic legal authorities and locally prosecuted a number of fugitives for violent
400. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 19.
401. Whiteman, supra note 224, at 1062-63.
402. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 22(1).
403. Id. art. 23(2).
404. Id. art. 23(3).
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crimes." In practice, the Mexican Government used deportation in lieu of extra-
dition. It is expected that extradition will be used more frequently in the near fu-
ture.
Recently, both governments used extradition more frequently. An early extra-
dition by Mexico to the United States concerned an ex-official director of the Po-
lice of the Federal District. The Mexican Attorney General's office reported a
number of extradition cases connected with narcotics trafficking:^ Inter-
governmental cooperation between the two governments increased, although at
times the United States Government tried to hold free trade issues hostage to bet-
ter progress on extradition matters.
A recent development was the conclusion in 1994 of the Treaty to Prohibit Ab-
ductions. This treaty contains an important acknowledgement of the state of in-
ternational law, even though it was not submitted for ratification.
A. THE CAmARENA AND ALVAREz-MAcRAiN CAsES
On February 7, 1985, Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA7) agent Enri-
que Camarena Salazar and his Mexican pilot, Alfred Zavala Avelar, were mur-
dered. Four gunmen kidnapped Camarena in broad daylight after he departed
from the United States consulate in Guadalajara. United States Attorney General
William French Smith and DEA chief Francis "Bud" Mullen made demands.
Even President Reagan personally communicated with President de la Madrid re-
questing assistance.
On March 6, 1985, the tortured bodies of Camarena and Zavala were found at
a remote ranch sixty miles southwest of Guadalajara. One of the persons believed
responsible was Rafael Caro Quintero, a notorious trafficker. Mexican federal and
state police intercepted Quintero two days later, led by Armando Pav6n. Quintero
bribed his way to Costa Rica. Subsequently, Pav6n admitted accepting a $275,000
bribe to allow Quintero's plane to leave Guadalajara airport. "I Pav6n was sen-
tenced to a jail term in Mexico City.
In April 1985, local authorities in Costa Rica, acting on a DEA tip, captured
Quintero, along with four heavily armed bodyguards. Sara Cristina Cosfo
Martinez, the kidnapped seventeen-year-old daughter of a wealthy Mexican busi-
nessman, who is also the brother of an official in the Partido Revolucionario In-
stitucional C'PRr' or Institutional Revolutionary Party), was found with the nar-
cotraficantes.4°
405. See MUTUAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE TREATY CONCERNING Tm CAY,,a ISiAms, S.
ExEc. REP. No. 100-26, at 103-04.
406. HIsToRIA DE LA PRocuRAzuRIA Gm-ERAL DE LA REpfBLUCA (HISORY OF THE
ATTORN Y GENERAL OF MEmco) 121 (Procuradurfa General de la Repfiblica 1987).
407. Mary Thornton, Suspect in DFA Slaking Said to Live Well in Mexico, WASH. POST,
Feb. 6, 1984, at Al.
408. For a discussion of the role of Caro Quintero in the Mexican drug trade as well as
the link with Colombia and the United States, see E.LAn SHAmON, DasPmnt Dos: LATIN
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Quintero was returned to Mexico. In 1989, a court in Guadalajara, after four
years of proceedings, convicted him, along with twenty-three persons, of various
offenses, including the murder of Camarena and Zavala. °9 The court imposed a
sentence of forty years for the murder of the two men.10 In addition, for his con-
viction on kidnapping and drug trafficking charges, he received an additional sev-
enty-six years in prison."'
Soon after Quintero's arrest, Ernesto Fonseca, a major trafficker sought in the
case, was arrested with twenty-three other persons, many of them federal en-
forcement agents."1 2
Fonseca Carrillo, while admitting to involvement in trafficking and bribes and
involvement in Camarena's killing, denied murdering Camarena and accused
Miguel Felix Gallardo, another notorious trafficker.1 Fonseca received a fifty
year sentence for the two murders and 104 more years in prison on charges of
kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and criminal association.44
Since the Mexican penal code does not permit the death penalty for capital
crimes, the sentences were among the harshest allowed in Mexico. Quintero tried
to escape in 1987. The media reported the favorable treatment afforded the two
prisoners (i.e., private suites in the jail with luxuries and the right to overnight
visits by female and other friends).4 1' Both Quintero and Fonseca could have re-
ceived harsher sentences, including the death penalty, in the United States, and
neither would have received the comparatively pleasant prison conditions experi-
enced in Mexico. The United States law enforcement community's concern about
their comparatively lenient sentences and post-conviction treatment in Mexico
illustrates the tensions and controversies that emanate from Mexico's refusal to
DRUG LORDS, U.S. LAWMEN, AND THE WARAMERICA CAN'T WIN 21-23 (1988). Caro Quin-
tero is alleged to have visited a new commandante of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police
with an expensive shirt unbuttoned to display a chest glittering with gold chains, his body-
guards surrounding him with submachine guns, and asking in a hissing voice "Qud
quieresl 0 plata, o plomol (What do you want? Silver or lead)?" Id. He was the youngest
and most audacious of the Mexican narcotrafficantes. Id.
409. Larry Rohter, Mexican Drug Leaders Guilty in the Killing of a U.S. Agent, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 13, 1989, at D1O.
410. Thornton, supra note 407, at Al.
411. Id.
412. JA~Ms Mn.Ls, THE UNDERGROUND EMPIRE: WHERE CRIME AND GovERNMENRS
EMBRAcE 1155 (1986).
413. Bruce Zagaris & Scott MacDonald, Mexico, in INTERNATiONAL HANDBOOK ON
DRuG CONTROL 174 (Scott MacDonald & Bruce Zagaris eds., 1992).
414. For background on Eresto Fonseca, who is alleged to have supervised the culti-
vation of thousands of acres of irrigated desert using commercial agricultural techniques
developed in the San Joaquin and Imperial valleys of California and sent fleets of trucks
loaded with sensemilla (an elite type of potent marijuana) to wholesale depots in the
United States, see SHANNON, supra note 408, at 3-5.
415. For background on the arrest, prosecution and sentencing of Fonseca Carrillo and
Caro Quintero, see Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Convicts Drug Leaders of Murdering
Camarena, 5 INT'LENFORCEMENT L. REP. 451 (Dec. 1989).
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extradite persons and prosecute them in Mexico.
On April 2, 1990, five or six armed men apprehended Humberto Alvarez-
Machain, a Mexican doctor, in his office in Guadalajara, drove him to the State of
Nuevo Le6n, Mexico, and flew him to El Paso, Texas. When the plane landed in
El Paso, DEA agents arrested him as he left the plane to stand trial in Los Ange-
les on the torture and murder of a United States drug agent, Enrique "Kiki"
Camarena Salazar."6 The DEA paid $20,000 in reward payments to the Mexican
individuals kidnapping Dr. Alvarez-Machan.
On June 15, 1992 in a 6-3 decision,4 1 the United States Supreme Court held
that, when an extradition treaty is silent on whether one signatory country may
utilize kidnapping as an alternative to extradition, jurisdiction sustains notwith-
standing protests by the other signatory country 18 The decision reinstated a fed-
eral case against Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a Mexican gynecologist accused of par-
ticipating in the torture and murder of an American narcotics agent outside
Guadalajara in 1985. Lower courts barred the case against the Mexican physician
on the basis of improper kidnapping to the United States!" In essence the Court
based its decision on two prongs: an interpretation of the extradition treaty and
reliance on the Executive for resolving such sensitive issues. The long and sting-
ing dissent, relying heavily on customary international law, candidly expresses
that courts throughout the civilized world will be deeply disturbed by the "mon-
strous" decision 4
1. Majority Opinion
The first inquiry of the majority was whether the kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-
Machain from Mexico violated the extradition treaty between the United States
and Mexico?' The Court found that the extradition treaty provides nothing on the
obligations of the United States and Mexico to refrain from kidnapping people
from the territory of the other country or the consequences under the treaty if such
an abduction occurs."'
In its review of the extradition treaty, the Court noted that Article 9 allowed a
requested country to refuse to extradite its own nationals if prevented by its laws
416. For additional background on the acquittal, see Lou Cannon, U.S. Judge Acquits
Mexican in DEA Agent's '85 Killing, WAsw. PosT, Dec. 15, 1992, at Al; Seth Mydans,
Mexican Doctor Freed in Agent's Killing, N.Y. Tzms, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20.
417. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 (1992), rev'd, 946 F.2d 1466
(9th Cir. 1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist Awote the majority opinion, in ;hich Justices
White, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas concurred.
418. Id. For further background on the decision, see Bruce Zagaris, U.S.. Supreme
Court Condones Kidnapping in Overturning the Dismissal of the Aharez-Machain Case, 8
INT'L EF oRCE ENT L. REP. 224-28 (June 1992).
419. Alvarez-Machain, 946 F.2d at 1467.
420. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687.
421. Id. at 659.
422. Id. at 663.
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and instead to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution. In this way, according to counsel for Dr. Alvarez-Machain, a re-
quested country preserved its rights and sovereignty. The Court rejected such an
interpretation of the treaty, stating that Article 9 does not provide the only way in
which one country may gain custody of a national of the other country for the
purposes of prosecution. In addition, the Court held that the history of negotiation
and practice under the Treaty does not show that kidnappings outside of the
Treaty constitute a violation of the Treaty. The Court noted that, according to the
Solicitor General, the United States informed Mexico as early as 1906 of the doc-
trine in Ker v. MIinois,' ' whereby the Court rejected the defendant's argunent
that he had a right under the extradition treaty to be returned to this country only
in accordance with its terms. 4" The Court therefore reasoned that the treaty's lan-
guage, in the context of the history, does not support the proposition that the
treaty precludes kidnapping outside of its terms.""
The next issue for the Court was whether the treaty should be interpreted so as
to include an implied term prohibiting prosecution where the defendant's pres-
ence is obtained by means other than those established by the treaty. The Court
noted that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's counsel argued that the treaty must be inter-
preted against the background of customary international law. Because interna-
tional kidnapping is so clearly forbidden in customary international law, no need
existed to include such a clause in the treaty itself. According to the Court, the
defendant did not argue that the sources of international law provide an independ-
ent basis for the right asserted by the defendant not to be tried in the United
States, but only that international customary law should assist in interpreting the
treaty terms.426
The Court rejected the argument that the support of customary international
law prohibits kidnapping because no customary international law relates to the
practice of nations regarding extradition treaties. It relates only to the practice of
nations with regard to international law more generally.4 7 The Court in particu-
lar, rejected the idea that it should infer from the treaty that a prohibition of all
means of gaining the presence of an individual outside of its terms goes beyond
established precedent and practice.'41
A critical element in the Court's decision was its rationale based on a similar
dispute in a case involving the United Kingdom. The Court reasoned that even if
defense counsel and the amici are correct that the kidnapping was "shocking" and
in violation of general international legal principles, the decision of whether Dr.
Alvarez-Machain should be returned to Mexico is one for the Executive Branch.
The Executive Branch resolved a similar dispute with the United Kingdom after
423. 119 U.s. 430 (1886).
424. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 665.
425. Id. at 666.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 667.
428. Id. at 668-69.
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the United States Supreme Court held that United States prohibition laws applied
to foreign merchant vessels, as well as domestic vessels, within the territorial wa-
ters of the United States. This application meant that the carrying of intoxicating
liquors by foreign passenger ships violated those laws. Thereafter, the United
States and United Kingdom successfully negotiated a treaty that provided the
United States the right to seize foreign vessels beyond the 3-mile limit, the United
States' objective, and gave British passenger ships the right to bring liquor into
United States waters so long as it was sealed while in those waters, the U.K.'s
objective.'
2. Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting opinion used treaty interpretation to infer that the treaty could
not possibly allow kidnapping. Otherwise the right of the requested state to deny
extradition and to require it to try individuals (Article 9) renders meaningless
those provisions and the provisions requiring sufficient evidence to grant extradi-
tion (Article 3), withholding extradition for political or military offenses (Article
5), and so forth. 3 ' The dissent notes that all of the safeguards against the re-
quirement to extradite are frustrated if the treaty were to silently reserve an op-
tional method of resorting to self help, including violating the territorial integrity
of the requested state whenever law enforcement authorities deem force more ex-
peditious than legal process. The Court noted that, if it thought it more expedient
to torture or simply to execute a person rather than attempt extradition, such op-
tions would be equally available because they too were not explicitly prohibited by
the extradition treaty.43' According to the dissent the Court's "failure to differenti-
ate between private abductions and official invasions of another sovereign's terri-
tory explains its erroneous application of international law, which the dissent
characterized as 'shocking' disdain for customer and conventional international
law principles ....
In focusing on the majority opinion's influence by the intense interest of the
United States Government to punish a brutal murder of an American law en-
forcement agent, the dissent warned that such motive provides no justification for
disregarding the Rule of Law. ' The dissent warned that the example set by this
decision affects other tribunals" around the globe." The dissent further ex-
429. Id. at 669-70, 675 n.16.
430. Id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 673-74.
432. Id. at 685-86.
433. Id. at 686.
434. Id. ("m[7he way that we perform that duty in a case of this kind sets an example
that other tribunals in other countries are sure to emulate.").
435. Id. at 687. The dissent referred to the recent South African case of S v. Ebrahim,
in which the court held that the prosecution of a defendant kidnapped by agents of South
Africa in another country must be dismissed. 1991 SA 8-9 (CC). The court in this case rea-
soned that an abduction violates customary rules of international lav that are part of South
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pressed its disapproval in that it suspected most courts "throughout the civilized
world-[would] be deeply disturbed by the 'monstrous' decision" of the major-
ity.4 36
3. Diplomatic Reaction
At the highest level of its government, Mexico denounced the Supreme Court
decision as "invalid and unacceptable." Many other United States allies around
the world, including Canada, Argentina, and Colombia, criticized the policy of
kidnapping. As a result, on June 15, 1992, Mexico announced that it would sus-
pend the activities of the thirty-nine American drug agents stationed in Mexico
and recall the three narcotics-control officers in the United States. Mexico, how-
ever, has not ordered the DEA agents out of the country pending the discus-
sions. 37 Most importantly, the following day Mexican and United States officials
met in Mexico City to begin discussing changes in the extradition treaty and the
DEA's Mexican charter. On November 23, 1994, the two countries concluded a
new treaty prohibiting transborder abductions. 3a Mexican officials also indicated
the intent to demand the repatriation of Dr. Alvarez for prosecution in Mexico.'
4. Decision of Acquittal
On December 14, 1992, United States District Judge Edward Rafeedie acquit-
ted Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain. The acquittal of Dr. Alvarez-Machain on all
charges precludes any further trial or holding of Dr. Alvarez-Machain. Although
the acquittal temporarily eases some of the pressure from the controversy sur-
rounding the decision by the United States Government to arrogate to itself the
right to kidnap citizens of countries in certain circunstances, the case will not end
the demands by foreign governments to renegotiate their extradition treaties with
the United States."
In explaining his acquittal, Judge Rafeedie exclaimed, "this is whole cloth, the
African law, thereby depriving the court of its competence to hear the case. Id.
436. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 687.
437. Neal A. Lewis, White House Tries to Quiet Storm Abroad Over High Court's
Right-to-Kidnap Ruling Suspects Abroad, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1992, at AS.
438. See infra Part VI.B (discussing the Treaty Prohibiting Transborder Abduction).
See also 138 CONG. REc. H6019-01 (1992) (statement of Rep. Panetta) (presenting H.R.
5565 to ban international kidnapping); 138 CoNG. REc. S8535-03 (1992) (statement of
Sen. Moynihan) (presenting S. Res. 319 which strongly discourages the unilateral abduc-
tion by U.S. agents of suspected criminals abroad).
439. Tim Golden, Treaty Talks in Mexico, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1992, atA8.
440. For additional discussion of the decision, see Bruce Zagaris, U.S. Court Acquits
Alvarez-Machain While Mexico Calls for the Extradition of Two DEA Agents for Kidnap-
ping, 8 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 469-71 (Dec. 1992). See also 139 CoNG. REc. H8430-
03 (1993) (statement of Rep. Gonzalez) (introducing legislation to prohibit the United
States from apprehending alien suspects without the permission of the nation where the
suspect is located).
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wildest speculation," of the government's contention that Alvarez injected
Camarena with drugs to revive him so his captors could torture him. In particular,
Judge Rafeedie explained that the government offered no evidence to prove that
Camarena had been injected with the drug lidocaine to keep him alive so he could
be interrogated, and furthermore, the government failed to demonstrate that a sy-
ringe found in the room containing traces of the drug belonged to Alvarez."'
Assistant United States Attorney John L. Carlton in his arguments against ac-
quittal contended that the evidence showed that Alvarez-Machain had the skill to
keep Camarena alive. The evidence showed Alvarez-Machain sitting in the
kitchen cleaning his syringes and participating in the conversation in the living
room. He was essentially there for a purpose. Carlton also explained that after his
arrest, Alvarez-Machain admitted to being present at the torture. In addition, a
syringe was found bearing traces of lydocaine, a pain reliever, and Alvarez-
Machain's fingerprints were lifted from the laundry bags at the scene.
Judge Rafeedie stated, however, that the government must offer stronger evi-
dence to show that a man is guilty of kidnapping, murder and torture; mere suspi-
cion and hunches do not provide an adequate basis for presenting cases to a
jury.z Judge Rafeedie said that although Alvarez may have done the acts alleged
by the government, the prosecution could not prove its case, as a result of the ab-
sence of evidence." 3 Additionally, Judge Rafeedie expressed his dismay that, at
the time the United States Government arrogated to itself the right to abduct Dr.
Alvarez-Machain, it had even less evidence about Alvarez' participation in the
crimes than during the trial-
Judge Rafeedie denied, the previous week, a defense motion to acquit a Mexi-
can co-defendant, Rnben Zuno Arce, the brother-in-law of a former Mexican
president Zuno is accused of conspiring to plan the kidnapping and killing of
Camarena. At an earlier trial Zuno was convicted, but Rafeedie set aside the ver-
dict because the prosecution referred to matters not in evidence in its closing ar-
gument. The continuation of the trial against Zuno still involves sensitive evi-
dence because witnesses against Zuno testified that high-ranking government,
military and police officials were involved in the plot to kill Camarena. Zuno's
counsel, without denying the accusations, insisted their client is a legitimate busi-
nessman not part of the conspiracy."
5. Mexican Officials Call for Extradition of DEA Agents
On July 20, 1990, the Mexican Government asked the United States to arrest
and extradite Hctor Berrellez, the DEA agent heading Operation Leyenda, a
nine-member unit based in Los Angeles conducting a five-year search for
441. Cannon, supra note 413, at Al.
442. See Mydans, supra note 413, at A20.
443. See Cannon, supra note 413, at Al.
444. Id.
445. Id.
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Camarena's murderers, and Antonio Gdrate, a former Mexican police official and
informer for the drug agency." 6
On December 15, 1992, the Mexican Attorney General's Office called for the
extradition of Girate and Berrellez on the allegations that they ordered the April
1990 kidnapping of Alvarez-Machain.- 7 Formal extradition procedures effectively
make it difficult for such officials to travel to most countries since many countries
allow extradition for kidnapping. Politically, refusal of the United States to meet
an extradition request for the two individuals in the wake of Judge Rafeedie's
opinion, makes it more difficult for the United States Government to push its own
agenda for extradition in cases such as the Pan Am Lockerbie bombing.
B. TRANSBORDER ABDUCTION TREATY
On November 23, 1994, the Mexican and United States governments con-
cluded a Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions."8 The proposed treaty is not
in effect and the Clinton Administration has not submitted it for ratification to the
Senate because the Administration believes the circumstances are not yet ripe.
A transborder abduction occurs when a person is removed from the territory of
one treaty country by force or threat of force and by federal, state or local govern-
ment officials of the country to whose territory the person is taken, or by private
individuals acting under the direction of such officials."' A transborder abduction
does not occur in cases involving: transfers of persons, pursuant to a treaty; de-
portations, expulsions, voluntary departures, exclusions, or other actions taken
pursuant to immigration laws; or other actions jointly agreed upon by the heads of
the Attorney General's Office or the chief deputy of such office.""
A treaty country can trigger a fact-finding procedure if it has reason to believe
that a transborder abduction may have occurred from its territory.4 ' If the re-
quested state concludes, pursuant to a fact-finding procedure, that a transborder
abduction occurred, it will promptly return the abducted individual to the re-
questing state."2 The requested state, after returning an abducted person, may
then request his extradition, and the requesting state must comply with its obliga-
tions under the 1978 Extradition Treaty to extradite the individual or submit the
446. For background on the Mexican extradition request and the supposed surprise by
the United States at the request, see Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Requests Extradition of DEA
Agent and a Former Mexican Law Enforcement Official for Kidnapping Dr. Alvarez
Machain, 8 INTL ENFoR EMENT L. REP. 261 (July 1990).
447. For additional background, see Tod Robberson, Mexico Seeks DEA Agents on
Charges of Kidnapping, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1992, at A10.
448. Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 23, 1994, 31 U.S.T.
5059, T.I.A.S. No. 9656, reprinted in ABBELL & RiSTAU, supra note 225, at A-676.3
(Supp. 1995).
449. See ABBELL& RiSTAU, supra note 225, atA.676.3, art. 3(1).
450. Id. art. 3(2).
451. Id. art. 4.
452. Id. art. 5.
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case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution.41
The treaty specifically provides for the prosecution, and any applicable admin-
istrative and civil sanctions under the laws of both treaty countries, of individuals
responsible for transborder abductions, including extradition.4" The treaty states
that its provisions are intended solely to establish the rights and obligations of the
treaty countries. Private persons, therefore, cannot bring actions alleging viola-
tions of the treaty."
C. UNrrED STATES E TRADITES TWO FOR MURDER OF CARDINALPOSADAS
On September 16, 1994, the United States District Court in San Diego issued
an extradition order for Carlos Enrique Garcia, a Mexican national in his early
twenties, and Jesfis Zamora-Salas, a twenty-one year old United States national.
The charges, homicide, attempted homicide, conspiracy, possession of firearms
reserved for the military, storing firearms reserved for the military, and damage to
Mexico's transportation and communication infrastructure, all related to the May
24, 1993 shooting at the International Airport, Guadalajara, Jalisco, Mexico."
The Mexican Government alleged that the Arellano brothers in Tijuana sent a
group of men as a "hit squad" to Guadalajara to search for and ultimately murder
rival drug lord, Joaquin Guzmn Loera (also called "El Chapo").4" Instead of
finding and killing "El Chapo," the "hit squad" became entangled in a shootout at
the Guadalajara airport that resulted in the death of Roman Catholic Cardinal Po-
sadas and at least six others.4 -3
On July 15, 1993, Magistrate Judge Louisa Porter in San Diego issued a provi-
sional arrest warrant, resulting in the arrest of Zamora on July 16 and Garcia on
July 20, 1993. The court granted the defendants' motion made on February 22,
1994 to terminate the provisional arrest warrant. Nevertheless, Mexico proceeded
with the extradition requests. 5 9 Between April 5, 1994 and June 3, 1994, the court
held five days of hearings concluding with written final arguments.
The court, in a decision issued by Magistrate Judge Leo S. Papas, found prob-
able cause that the offenses occurred: the dual criminality requirement in the
treaty covered the crimes at issue and sufficient evidence as to the identity of the
defendants existed. Presaging a problem for Mexican extradition requests to the
United States, the court stated in dicta that the only question was whether the
plethora of evidence identifying and linking defendants to the offenses acceptable
in light of respondents' arguments that the statements of four co-conspirators
were so tainted because of torture that any probable cause established by the
453. Id. art. 5(3).
454. Id. art. 6.
455. Id. art. 7.
456. In the Matter of the Extradition of Garcia, 890 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. Cal. 1994).
457. Id. at 917.
458. Id.
459. Id. at 916.
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statements was "obliterated."" 04" Despite appeals to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, a petition for an emergency stay to the United States
Supreme Court, and a request to the United States Department of State, both de-
fendants were extradited.4 ' Nevertheless, the court's concern about the potential
taint on the Mexican Government's evidence by its methods of obtaining testi-
mony foreshadowed continuing problems plaguing Mexican extradition requests
to the United States.
D. UNITED STATES EXTRADITES A SUSPECTED NARCOTRAFFICKER
ON TAX CHARGES
A successful extradition under the current extradition treaty has been the
United States extradition on February 2, 1994 to Mexico of Kamel Nacif Borge
for tax crimes. 42 The Mexican Government first brought criminal charges and
then requested the extradition of Kamel Nacif Borge in early 1993. Nacif was
living in Las Vegas and Mexico. His business was cattle exportation. Although
the Mexican authorities suspected that Nacif may have engaged in other criminal
activities, they only charged him with tax fraud for not paying taxes on roughly
$15 million in income.
Nacif vigorously, although unsuccessfully, contested the extradition request.
Once the United States extradited him on February 2, 1994, the United States
Government froze Nacif s bank accounts in the United States pursuant to Article
19 of the Mexico-United States Extradition Treaty. Nacif subsequently pled guilty
in Mexico and agreed to pay a fine of $1 million in order to avoid incarceration.
The extradition of Nacif demonstrates the growing tendency of governments to
extradite for fiscal crimes. Multilateral development banks are trying to persuade
other governments to prosecute for tax crimes as Mexico did in the Nacif case.
Mexico has been able to convict defendants of tax fraud easily." The convictions,
the use of the United States-Mexico Extradition Treaty, and the ability to freeze
and obtain large fines all constitute major victories for the Mexican and United
States Governments.
E. MATTER OF BoLAos GUiLLtN-FRAUDULENT MISUSE
OF THE EXTRADmION PROCESS
A modem case in the United States courts, In the Matter of the Extradition of
Bolaflos Guilldn,4" illustrates the problems in extradition between the United
460. Id. at 923.
461. For additional discussion, see Joe Wayne, Two Fighting Extradition to Mexico,
L.A. DAmY J., Nov. 14, 1994, at 16.
462. See Mexico Successfully Extradites and Prosecutes Tax Fraudster, 10 INT'L
ENFORCEMENTL. REP. 183 (May 1994).
463. For background on Mexican tax fraud and related crimes, see MxcAN BAR
Ass'N, 3 ELFORO No. 3 (1990).
464. No. 90 CR 1056, 1991 WL 149623 (N.D.Ill. July 12, 1991).
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States and Mexico. On December 24, 1990, Mexico brought an extradition com-
plaint against Demetrio Bolafios Guilldn, arrested on charges of abuse of confi-
dence in violation of Article 382 of the Mexican Criminal Code. The Mexican
Government charged that Bolafios signed a receipt for 950 million pesos from
Alfonso Gaytdn Esquivel as a confidence deposit for safekeeping. Thereafter, he
refused to return the money when requested. Both the accused and the alleged
victim were important political figures. The accused was a former head of the
Mexican Stock Exchange and his uncle was a former President of Mexico. After
ruling in favor of the government on the issues of the statute of limitations and
dual criminality, the court found lack of probable cause as required by Article 3 of
the Treaty. In explaining its decision, the court stated that "the facts presented
here strongly suggest a fabricated claim and fraudulent misuse of the extradition
process."' The dicta presaged some future setbacks in even more important
Mexican extradition requests to the United States.
F. MExmco DEPORTS GARCIA ABREGO TO THE UNITED STATES
On January 15, 1996, Mexico deported Juan Garcia Abrego, one of the world's
most wanted drug kingpins, to the United States in what law enforcement agen-
cies tout as a major victory for criminal cooperation between the two govern-
ments."1 Juan Garcia Abrego, is accused of heading the multimillion-dollar Gulf
cartel drug trafficking enterprise that controls approximately one-third of Mex-
ico's cocaine smuggling. In 1993, a Houston grand jury indicted Garcia Abrego
on charges of running a multimillion-dollar cocaine operation with close ties to
the Cali cartel in Colombia. Agents from the Mexican Attorney General's Office
arrested him on January 13, 1996 at a restaurant in Monterrey, Nuevo Le6n. He
was flown to Houston and taken to the Harris Country jail. The FBI listed him on
its Most Wanted Fugitives List since March 1995.
From his base across the Texas border, Garcia Abrego maintained a large pri-
vate army and used monthly bribes to high-level government officials to conduct
distribution of Colombian cocaine within the United States, operating in markets
from Houston to New York.' Over more than a decade, Garcia Abrego developed
a cocaine smuggling business worth an estimated $10 billion, based in the north-
eastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas. He has been accused of ordering dozens of
killings, including several massacres. The victims include his rivals in the drug
465. In the Matter of the Extradition of Guilldn, No. 90 CR 1056,1991 WL 149623, at
9 (N.D. Ill. July 12, 1991).
466. John Ward Anderson, Alleged Drug ingpin Arrested in fexico, WASH. POsT,
Jan. 16, 1996, at All.
467. Sam Dillon, Mexico Arrests a Top Suspect in Drug Trade, N.Y. TDAms, Jan. 16,
1996, atAl.
468. Id. atA2. In particular, he is accused of masterminding a 1991 slaughter in wiich
nineteen people were killed in the border towm of Matamoros, Mexico. Id. According to
officials, in the spring of 1991, twenty-five persons in Matamoros and Bro,,sville, two
border towns, were killed in a thirty day battle between Garcia Abrego and his rivals. Id.
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trade, as well as several journalists.,69
Bob Weiner, director of public affairs for the White House office of national
drug control policy, cited Abrego's arrest as an important signal that international
cooperation can break the formerly impenetrable shield of the narco-traffickers. 70
Reportedly, Abrego holds United States, as well as Mexican, citizenship. The
Mexican Government claims that he is a foreigner and not a Mexican national. 7
Depending on the credibility of reports, the apparent possession of both United
States and Mexican citizenship was a technicality that proved to be Garcia
Abrego's undoing."n Mexican officials used a provision in the Mexican Constitu-
tion allowing the deportation of foreigners in order to overcome the prohibition
against extraditing its nationals without a trial, thereby allowing Mexico to cir-
cumvent lengthy extradition or deportation hearings.4" His arrest and deportation
may also show the effectiveness and importance of international drug cooperation,
which frequently assumes a priority in United States-Mexico bilateral relations."4
In a well known case against American Express Bank and its bankers, which
brought the largest convictions for money-laundering in United States history
against two bankers, testimony elicited at the 1994 trial supported that Garcia
Abrego spent tens of millions of dollars yearly in bribes to officials to protect his
drug network.4"1 The bank officials were sentenced to jail for accepting some $30
million in deposits for representatives of Garcia Abrego.7 6
During a Texas trial in August 1995, former aides to Garcia Abrego testified
that he "[Garcia Abrego] owned many homes in Monterrey, as well as ranches all
across northern Mexico and twenty prize race horses."4" Francis Pdrez Monroy,
Garcia Abrego's cousin, testified that "[Garcia Abrego] was paying millions in
bribes each month to Mexican officials.4 78 One former associate testified that
Garcia Abrego shipped forty tons of cocaine from Mexico to the United States
during an eight-month period in 1989.41 Circumstantial evidence linked Garcia
Abrego to high-level government payoffs and the 1994 assassinations of Luis
Donaldo Colosio, the PRI's presidential candidate, and Josd Francisco Ruiz Mas-
sieu, the party's secretary general, whose brother directed a drive against the Gulf
cartel. 80
469. Id.
470. Anderson, supra note 463, at Al1.
471. See Dillon, supra note 464, at A2. FBI records reportedly record his birth date as
September 13, 1944 in La Paloma, Texas. Id. Former aides to Garcfa Abrego testified in
court, however, that he insists he was born in Mexico and has no U.S. nationality ties. Id.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. United States v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1996).
477. Dillon, supra note 464, at A2.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. Andrew Reding, Narco-Politics in Mexico, NATION, July 10, 1995, at 50, 51.
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According to the testimony of Thomas Constantine, the administrator of the
DEA, in August before the Senate, Garcia Abrego made his mark by pioneering
deals in which Mexican traffickers take their payment in cocaine from their Co-
lombia suppliers rather than in cash. 8' The receipt of payment in cocaine enabled
Mexican drug traffickers to establish new downinarket links, become more profit-
able, and participate more actively in politics in order to stay in business.
On January 17, 1996, United States Magistrate Frances Stacy presided over a
presentment and bail hearing, ordering Garcia Abrego held without bond until a
February 6 arraignment on the indictment carrying twenty charges.
The arrest and deportation is politically advantageous to President Ernesto
Zedillo, whose government wanted to carry out the operation without assistance
from the United States to demonstrate its ability and willingness to crack-don on
drug trafficking and drug corruptio. 4l It also demonstrates to druglords that they
cannot continue to carry out their lucrative businesses and violence with impunity.
G. THE CONTRERAS CAsE
On September 9, 1992, in the case of Jos6 Cruz Contreras, a United States
Magistrate Judge denied an extradition request from the Mexican Government.
The denial was based on the allowance of recanting testimony and, as a result, the
finding of insufficient evidence of probable cause of extraditability.' The case
represents one of a series of setbacks for Mexican extradition from the United
States.
On January 10, 1989, in Madero, Tamaulipas, Federal Police and the Mexican
Army raided the residence of oil workers' union leader Joaquin Hern ndez
Galicia to execute a "Proceedings of Physical Inspection" (search warrant). They
confiscated approximately eighteen cases of weapons containing about 200 Uzi
submachine guns and about 25,000 rounds of ammunition and arrested over forty
persons, including Henddez Galicia.4 s
Written confessions of eleven of the persons arrested at Hernindez Galicia's
residence identified Contreras as the source of the weapons. These confessions
served not only as the basis for the indictment in Mexico against Contreras, but
481. Id. For background on the role of Garcia Abrego and the Gulf cartel, see U.S. Sen-
ate Holds Hearing on the Drug Trade in Mexico, 11 I rt'L EvToRcm.ir L. REP. 395, 396
(Oct 1995), Reding, supra note 477, at 50; Tim Golden, To Help Keep Mexico Stable,
U.S. Soft-Pedaled Drug War, N.Y. Tiars, July 31, 1995, at Al, A6.
482. See Dillon, supra note 464, at A2; Pierre Thomas, Drug Figure Ordered Held
WithoutBond, WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 1996, atA24.
483. See US.-Mexieo Narcotics Cooperation Resumes Dilemma over Proper Course to
Cooperate, 11 I4r'LENFoRcEhmETL. REP. 432-33 (Nov. 1995) (providing background on
U.S.-Mexico cooperation in narcotics matters).
484. In the Matter of the Extradition of Contreras, 800 F. Supp. 1462 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
485. Id. at 1463.
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also formed the documentary foundation of the Petition for Extradition.8 ' Con-
treras was previously a politician in Mexico and served as mayor of the border
town of Reynosa, Tamaulipas. He became a successful businessman in South
Texas. Galicia's confession states that he procured the help of Contreras in ob-
taining weapons because of the latter's proximity to the border. The confessions
relate that on December 10, 1988, Contreras, a Hidalgo County, Texas law en-
forcement officer, and his associates delivered the contraband weapons to
Galicia's home."' The weapons were fully automatic and were of the type sold by
a Belgian manufacturer exclusively to certain governments. The manufacturer
does not sell them commercially over the open market.
After Contreras' indictment in Mexico on September 25, 1989 for the crimes
of amassing arms and smuggling firearms in violation of Articles 83 and 84 of the
Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives, Mexico requested the extradition of
Contreras. The narrow issue was whether "explanatory evidence" in the form of
recanting testimony could be admitted or whether the court should deem it as
contradictory evidence not admissible in an extradition proceeding. The evidence
had the purpose of challenging the voluntariness of these confessions and at-
tempted to show that they were coerced and subsequently recanted at the first op-
portunity in a judicial hearing. After hearing testimony about the method of ob-
taining the confessions, the court concluded that the original statements were not
given voluntarily. Witnesses alleged their confessions were due to coercion, tor-
ture, and other forms of intimidation. The defendants were not allowed to speak to
their attorney before they recanted their original statements at a hearing before the
Mexican court. As a result, the court concluded that the original statements (e.g.,
confessionals) were untrustworthy and not credible. Hence, the denial of the ex-
tradition."
H. THE Ruiz-MAssmu CASE
Major setbacks for Mexico-United States extradition relations have been the
four unsuccessful efforts by the Mexican Government to extradite Mario Ruiz-
Massieu, followed by the unsuccessful effort of the United States to deport him.
The case was important because of the political importance the Zedillo Admini-
stration accorded to anti-narcotics and other forms of corruption and the reasons
given by the federal magistrates in their decisions, especially some unfortunate
derogatory comments about the Mexican judicial and legal systems."'
Mario Ruiz Massieu is a member of one of Mexico's most influential and po-
litically active families. In recent years he occupied several high-level positions in
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id. at 1465-70.
489. PRocuRADuatA GENERAL DE LA REPOBLICA (MEXICAN A-roRNEY GENERAL OFFIcE),
INFPoR SoBR EL CASO MARIO Ruiz MAssiEu (INFORMATION ABOUT TM CASE OF MAIO
Ruiz MAssmu) 9 (Mexico, Jan. 2, 1996) (on file with the American University Journal of
International Law and Policy).
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the Mexican Government, including Deputy Attorney General in 1993, Under
Secretary for the Department of Government in 1994, and Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral in May 1994. On September 28, 1994, his brother Jos6 Francisco Ruiz Mas-
sieu, Secretary General of the PRI and an outspoken critic of the Mexican political
system, was assassinated. This was only months after the March 1994 assassina-
tion of Luis Donaldo Colosio, then the PRI presidential candidate. Within hours,
Mario Ruiz Massieu, as Deputy Attorney General, initiated an investigation into
his brother's murder. On November 23, 1994, Ruiz Massieu resigned as Deputy
Attorney General and withdrew his membership in the PRL In a dramatic and
widely publicized speech, he announced that his resignation was caused by the
PRI's continuous efforts to fiustrate the investigation of his brother's murder and
its obstruction of the search for the persons ordering former Deputy Muffoz Rocha
to act-persons he alleged to be very high-ranking members of the PRI. In Febru-
ary 1995, Mr. Ruiz Massieu published a book elaborating on the themes of his
resignation address."
Immediately, Mexican authorities alleged that Ruiz Massieu committed the
crimes of intimidation, concealment, and acting "against the administration of
justice," the latter crime analogous to obstruction of justice in the United States,
in connection with the investigation of his brother's assassination. Contempora-
neously, Ruiz Massieu claimed that he and his family received both death and
kidnapping threats. On March 2, 1995, he appeared for an official interrogation
before Mexican authorities concerning the allegations of criminal activity com-
mitted while holding office.
Later, on March 2, 1995, Ruiz Massieu and his family entered the United
States as non-immigrant visitors in Houston, Texas, where they owned a home
since October 1994. On the following day, they boarded a plane en route to Spain.
When the planed stopped at Newark Airport, United States Customs officials ar-
rested Ruiz Massieu pursuant to §5316 of Title 31 of the United States Code on a
charge of reporting only approximately $18,000 of the $44,322 in his possession.
The United States Government did not pursue the charge and subsequently had it
dismissed.
On March 5, 1995, a Mexican court issued an arrest warrant for Mario Ruiz
Massieu, charging him with intimidation, concealment, and acting "against the
administration of justice." The following day, at Mexico's request, the United
States presented a complaint for Ruiz Massieu's provisional arrest and sought his
extradition. On June 9, 1995, a Mexican court consolidated the allegations into a
single charge of acting "against the administration ofjustice."
In the interim, the United States froze and seized, under seal and without no-
tice or explanation, Ruiz Massieu's Houston bank account containing approxi-
mately nine million dollars. On June 15, 1995, the United States Government in-
stituted a civil forfeiture action against the account."'
490. Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681, 687 (D.NJ. 1996) (referring to Massieu's
publication).
491. See Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 687 (citing United States v. Nine Million Forty One
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On June 13, 1995, the first extradition proceeding began before Magistrate
Ronald J. Hedges. Magistrate Judge Hedges previously declined to issue a certifi-
cate of extraditability due to his finding of lack of probable cause, in part because
Mexican authorities procured multiple statements by inflicting torture.
On June 20, 1995, two days before Hedges' initial opinion, Mexico filed its
second request for extradition based on newly filed charges of embezzlement.
These charges focused on the $9,000,000 in the Houston bank account and the
2,500,000 pesos allegedly disbursed without adequate documentation while Mr.
Ruiz Massieu was in office. In an opinion filed September 25, 1995, Magistrate
Judge Hedges again declined to issue a certificate of extraditability because of the
lack of probable cause that the funds had been illegally obtained or disbursed.
Before refiling new extradition request, the United States Government unsuc-
cessfully tried to have the extradition matter reassigned to another magistrate
judge on the basis that the outcome of the extradition would significantly impact
foreign policy implications for the United States. The United States Government,
therefore, wanted to ensure that the legal merits received the most careful and
senior-level consideration possible. Magistrate Judge Hedges' opinion noted that,
if the United States Government thought the matter was of such importance in the
first instance, it would have made an application at the time of the first request.
The implication, according to his opinion, was that refusal to issue a certificate of
extraditability appeared to be the cause for the motion and indicated a misunder-
standing or disdain for the entire magistrate judge system.4"
On August 31, 1995, the Mexican Government refiled its initial request for
extradition based on the charge of acting "against the administration of justice."
Although the government produced nine new statements allegedly incriminating
Mario Ruiz Massieu, Magistrate Judge Hedges on September 13, 1995, again
ruled insufficient probable cause to believe that Mr. Ruiz Massieu committed the
acts alleged, and dismissed the complaint.""
On October 10, 1995, the Mexican Government initiated a fourth extradition
proceeding by refiling its prior extradition application based on the previously re-
jected embezzlement charges. This time, Magistrate Judge Stanley R. Chesler pre-
sided over the hearings on the application. Near the end of the hearings, the gov-
erunent produced evidence that "clearly establishe[d]" that 800,000 of the alleged
2.5 million pesos embezzled were not, in fact, proceeds of the alleged embezzle-
ment. Thereafter, the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jer-
sey withdrew from further representation of the Mexican Government and was
replaced by the United States Department of Justice. Magistrate Judge Chesler is-
sued a lengthy opinion denying the certification of extraditability, stating that "the
government's effort to establish an inference of criminality on the basis of unex-
plained wealth fails because it does not rise to the level where any nexus between
Thousand, Five Hundred Ninety Eight Dollars and Sixty Eight Cents, Docket No. H-95-
3182).
492. In the Matter of the Extradition of Massieu, 897 F. Supp. 176, 180 (D.N.J. 1995).
493. Id. at 688.
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those funds and the funds that Mr. Massieu is alleged to have embezzled has been
established." 4%
On December 22, 1995, immediately after Magistrate Judge Chesler issued his
opinion, the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"), pursuant to a previ-
ously unserved and unannounced detainer dated September 29, 1995, took Mario
Ruiz Massieu into custody and served him with an INS Order to Show Cause and
Notice of Hearing. The notice advised Ruiz Massieu that he was ordered to show
cause as to why he should not be deported because, the Secretary of State made a
determination that, pursuant to Section 241(a)(4)(C) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality AcW" reasonable grounds existed to believe his presence or activities in
the United States would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy conse-
quences for the United States
On January 17, 1996, Mario Ruiz Massieu filed a complaint requesting that the
order of deportation be preliminarily and permanently enjoined and that Section
241(a)(4)(C) of the INA be declared unconstitutional. The complaint contained
three core constitutional claims: (1) the deportation proceeding shows selective
enforcement in retaliation for Mr. Ruiz Massieu's exercise of his First Amend-
ment right to criticize the Mexican political system; (2) the deportation proceed-
ing represents a de facto extradition and is an attempt to overrule, albeit indi-
rectly, four federal court decisions, in violation of the separation of powers; and
(3) Section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the INA is unconstitutionally vague, in violation of
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment The United States Department of
Justice, on behalf of all defendants, responded that Section 241(a)(4)(C)(i) with-
stood constitutional attack both facially and as applied to Mr. Ruiz Massieu. Ad-
ditionally, it argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because: (1)
at issue was a nonjusticiable political question; (2) Mr. Ruiz Massieu had failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies under the INA; and (3) the doctrine of con-
stitutional avoidance counseled against the court reading the ultimate issues pre-
sented in Mr. Ruiz Massieu's complaint On February 28, 1996, United States
District Judge Maryanne Trump Barry held that the court had jurisdiction, Sec-
tion 241(a)(4)(C)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (uNAr)4 " is void for
vagueness, deprived Ruiz Massieu, and other aliens similarly situated, of the due
process right to a meaningful opportunity to be heard, and was an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power.'
On July 29, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit re-
versed the order of declaratory and injunctive relief previously granted by the dis-
trict court against the deportation of Mario Ruiz Massieu." Without reaching the
494. Id. (quoting from the transcript of Dec. 22, 1995 proceedings before Magistrate
Judge Chester).
495. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C).
496. Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 687-88.
497. 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4)(C)(i).
498. Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 689-90.
499. Massieu v. Reno, 91 F.3d416 (3d Cir. 1996).
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merits of the constitutional questions decided by the lower court (e.g., void for
vagueness, violation of procedural due process, and an unconstitutional delegation
of legislative power), the appellate court held that under Section 106(c) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act " the proposed deportee and plaintiff Mario
Ruiz Massieu must exhaust available administrative remedies before initiating a
federal court review of his claims.50
Prior to the latter decision, the five adverse decisions on such an important
case led to disappointment, befuddlement and anger on the part of the Mexican
and United States Governments. The Mexican Government noted two potentially
adverse tactical steps taken by the United States. The decision to try to have the
second extradition request decided by a magistrate judge other than Magistrate
Judge Hedges hardened the latter's resolve and diminished his and perhaps the
entire United States District Court for the District of New Jersey's discretion in
favor of the executive branches." The decision by the Office of the United States
Attorney for the District of New Jersey to decline to represent the Mexican Gov-
ernment further in the proceedings and the replacement by two experienced and
high-level attorneys offended the Government of Mexico."3 This implied that the
most experienced and best personnel should have been assigned to this sensitive
case from the outset.
Most importantly, the Mexican Attorney General's office agonized over the
fact that, even with proof that on the day of his resignation Ruiz Massieu took
800,000 pesos without authorization,"4 the court still found insufficient probable
cause. In addition, the Mexican Attorney General noted that, while the findings of
Magistrates Hedges and Chesler were very different, both ultimately concluded
the issue on insufficient probable cause.5
The United States Government sought to deport Mario Ruiz Massieu, and it is
expected that an immigration judge in Newark, New Jersey would rule by the end
of May or the beginning of June 1997 on the Government's deportation request.,,,
In March 1997, a federal jury allowed the United States Government to seize $7.9
million of a $9 million bank account from Ruiz Massieu after United States
prosecutors said the money linked to drug trafficking activity. 01 It is interesting to
note that one constant factor present in the cases lost by the Mexican Government
is that Jos6 Antonio "Tony" Canales, a United States defense counsel based in
500. 8 U.S.C. § ll05a(c).
501. Massieu, 91 F.3d at421.
502. Procuraduria General de la Repndblica, supra note 486, at 9.
503. Id. at 16.
504. Id. at 14-15.
505. Id. at 17.
506. U.S. Hearing Adjourned for Ex-Mexican Prosecutor, REUTER's WoRa SERV.,
May 14, 1997.
507. Federal Court Ruling Goes Against Ex-Mexico Official Ruiz Massieu; Judgment
Puts Lock on $9 Million Deposited at Houston Bank, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 29, 1997, at
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Houston and former Assistant United States Attorney, represented the relators! 3
VII. BORDER STATE APPROACHES
Informal relations and the circumvention of the extradition treaty characterized
extradition along the Mexican-United States border. Article IX of the 1899 extra-
dition treaty between the United States and Mexico provided that, in cases of
crimes committed in a border State of one country by an accused found in a border
State of the other country, requests for the institution of extradition proceedings
may be made by the chief executive of one State to the chief executive of the
other! ' Diplomatic practice required the issuance of a formal request for extradi-
tion through diplomatic channels even in cases in which proceedings were insti-
tuted under Article IX of the 1899 Convention.'5°
In the United States, the conduct of most criminal investigations by municipal
police, combined with the fact that many criminal offenses still do not fall under
federal jurisdiction, resulted in more involvement by city and state police agencies
throughout the United States in transnational travel and communication than ever
before. This is especially true for city and state police forces located on the bor-
der.'"
Relations along the Mexican-United States border are quite diverse, ranging
from close and long-standing personal relationships overcoming bureaucratic re-
quirements, to bitter antagonism and suspicions often stemming from corrupt and
criminal behavior by the Mexican police.51 2 During the 1970s and 1980s, United
States state and municipal police agencies near the Mexican border regularized
and formalized their cross-border relations, in part by creating specialized liaison
units to handle cross-border matters. ' Moreover, not only border cities instituted
specialized units. In 1984, the Los Angeles Police Department established a For-
eign Prosecution Liaison Unit in response to statistics indicating that approxi-
mately 100 of its 237 murder warrants named suspects of Mexican nationality."'
Cross-border law enforcement cooperation operates on a scale and level of fa-
miliarity unparalleled by transnational law enforcement relationships that occur at
a distance. One factor contributing to the informality of relations between police
on the Mexican-United States border is the jurisdictional and bureaucratic dis-
508. Canales served as counsels for defendants in the Contreras, Ruiz Massieu, and
Garcia Abrego cases. See Rob Walker, Bar Hopper, TnxAs MoNThmY 32 (Oct. 1995)X Mi-
chael Allen, Extradition Failure Raises Mexico's Ire: Ex-Official's Release Is Latest Win
for Texas Lawyer, WALL ST. 3., Mar. 7, 1996, at A16.
509. 1899 Extradition Treaty, supra note 20, at 1824-25, 1 MALmoY at 1184.
510. Whiteman, supra note 224, at 909.
511. NADELmAN, supra note 1, at 177-78.
512. Id. at 178.
513. Id.
514. Id. (citing Daryl F. Gates & Keith E. Ross, Foreign Prosecution Liaison Unit
Helps Apprehend Suspects Across the Border, 57 POLIcE CHa 153-54 (1990)).
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tance between law enforcement agents in border locals and the central govern-
ment. Police in border towns often do not desire to deal with federal authorities
other than those stationed in the vicinity. When investigating a case or seizing a
fugitive entails working the other side of the border, the police officer contacts
counterparts across the border directly. When such contact is perceived as either
unnecessary or potentially problematic, police officials periodically decide to act
on their own to gain custody, notwithstanding any infringements on sovereignty.
Unlike national agents, local police need not worry about accounting for their
cross-border operations to a national headquarters with a keener sense of appro-
priate international behavior than the local or state police chief. '
United States border states also have special liaison units to facilitate either the
extradition or prosecution of Mexican nationals suspected of serious crimes. For
instance, in 1975 the California Attorney General established a Mexican Liaison
Program in the Bureau of Investigation of the California Department of Justice.
The Attorney General authorized special agents of the California Department of
Justice to travel into Mexico to confer with Mexican authorities and establish
guidelines and procedures in accordance with the laws of Mexico to facilitate lo-
cating and prosecuting fugitives in Mexico.'"
When a suspect of Mexican nationality is located in Mexico, the concerned law
enforcement agency in California can contact the Mexican Liaison Unit and re-
quest assistance in filing a foreign prosecution. The district attorney with juris-
diction over the county where the offense was committed must authorize and ap-
prove the filing of the case in Mexico. 17
The requesting police agency submits the completed investigative package to
the unit for review and compliance with Article IV' requirements in Mexico. All
documents must be translated into Spanish. The case is then submitted to the
Mexican Consulate in the area where the crime was committed for legalization of
the English portion of the material. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Mexico
also performs additional legalization. 19
515. Id. at 180-81.
516. See Congressional Hearing on NAF'TA Brings into Focus Mexico-U.S. Extradition
Relations, 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 476-81 (Dec. 1993) [hereinafter NAFTA Hearing]
(discussing the testimony of Enrique Mercado, Special Agent Supervisor, California De-
partment of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, Mexican Liaison Program, on November 9,
1993, before the Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations, U.S. House of Representatives).
517. See id. at 478 (citing the state regulations).
518. Article IV of the Mexican Federal Penal Code provides the Mexican Federal Judi-
ciary System with the legal means to prosecute criminal suspects for crimes committed in a
foreign country. Basic requirements for prosecution are: either the suspect or the victim is
a Mexican citizen; the suspect is located in the Republic; the defendant has not been tried
and convicted or tried and acquitted in the country in which he committed the offense; and
the offense for which the person is charged constitutes an offense in both the foreign coun-
try in which the crime was committed and in the Republic of Mexico. MFX. CONST. art. 4.
519. NAFTA Hearing, supra note 513, at 478.
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When these procedures are completed, the California Mexican Liaison agent
travels to Mexico to present the case to the Mexican Federal prosecutor of the
state where the suspect is located for judicial processing and eventual prosecution.
A prosecution in Mexico bars all future prosecution by California or by another
government (i.e. the United States Government) on these charges. Occasionally
one or more representatives from the requesting agency accompanies the Califor-
nia agents to Mexico to assist in presenting the case to Mexican authorities."
From 1975 until early 1992, the California Department of Justice paid for all
expenses related to foreign prosecution. Thereafter, the requesting agencies as-
sisted in defraying travel, lodging, legal costs, etc. The maximum estimated cost,
if shared with another participating agency, is $600 per agency. The California
Department of Justice also pays salary and overtime for the United States
agents'
Statistics compiled for the period 1981 to September 1993 revealed the fol-
lowing information:
1. Total number of Article IV's filed: 149
2. Number of convictions obtained to date: 29
3. Number of acquittals to date: 4
4. Number of fugitive warrants still outstanding: 116 -2"
Of the 149 cases filed in the Republic of Mexico, approximately 95% (141)
were homicides. The remaining 5% (eight) were for rape, mayhem, vehicular
manslaughter, and attempted murder." '
No statewide data exists as to the number and types of crimes allegedly com-
mitted by Mexican nationals fleeing to Mexico to avoid prosecution, however, an
informal survey obtained from police personnel from the City of Los Angeles and
the City and County of Fresno, California exists. Fresno County reports that each
year a large percentage of robberies and homicides are committed by criminals,
fleeing to Mexico to avoid arrest and prosecution in the United States. Some large
United States metropolitan areas experience problems with Mexican nationals
suspected of committing major crimes and fleeing the jurisdictions. It vas esti-
mated that in the City of Los Angeles approximately five percent of the criminals
sought for violent crimes fled to the Republic of Mexico. Many of the fugitives are
Mexican citizens prosecuted in Mexico for crimes committed in California. Es-
sentially more than ten percent of all violent crimes in the Fresno area can be at-
tributed to such fugitives, many of whom could be prosecuted in Mexico."'
The Mexican Liaison Unit helps to coordinate many conferences and meetings
between Mexican and United States officials. The conferences are intended to ex-
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. Id.
523. Id.
524. Id. at489-79.
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amine ways to strengthen communications among the two countries in the areas
of drug trafficking, auto theft, homicides, and missing persons.5"
With the above-mentioned activities and its limited resources, the Unit is lim-
ited in enforcement activities. The majority of the cases accepted for foreign
prosecution are related to homicides. The addition of new personnel and resources
could enable the Unit to expand and assist in the foreign prosecution of other
crimes of violence, including rape, robbery, kidnapping, gang related activities,
drive-by shootings, child molestations, aggravated assaults, etc. Until now, for-
eign prosecution has rarely been sought unless the crime is associated with a
homicide." Special Agent Mercado of the California Department of Justice be-
lieves that consideration should be given to establishing a Mexican Liaison Task
Force consisting of federal, state, and local officers to pursue foreign and espe-
cially Mexican prosecution matters.5"
Despite the comparatively informal and close working relationship of law
enforcement officials along the border, the sheer number of law enforcement and
arrest/extradition cases sometimes mirrored the problems between the central
governments, including kidnappings. For instance, the Mexican Government fre-
quently complained about kidnappings of its nationals by the Texas Government.
Several months after the Alvarez-Machain case,'5 the Mexican Government filed
a formal protest over the kidnapping of Hdctor Morales and Omar Ayala, resi-
dents of Palau in the Mexican state of Coahuila, wanted for the April 1989 mur-
der of a seventy-nine year old woman stabbed more than thirty times during the
robbery of her home in Beaumont, Texas." In addition, the sheer number of law
enforcement transactions, the frequent amount of meetings and communications
between law enforcement, and the blurring and assimilation of cultural traditions
led to greater acceptance and a higher incidence of informal cooperation between
border enforcement agencies.
VIII. NEW APPROACHES TO THE EXTRADITION OF NATIONALS:
SPECIAL PROCEDURE IN MEXICO TO PROSECUTE NATIONALS
COMMITTING SERIOUS CRIMES ABROAD AND THE INCREASED
EXTRADITION OF NATIONALS
A longstanding source of tension between the United States and Mexico is the
prohibition against extraditing nationals in Article IV of the Mexican Constitu-
tion. As a result, as mentioned in the preceding section, many areas in the United
525. Id. at 478.
526. Id.
527. Id.
528. 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
529. For background on the Mexican Government's protests of kidnappings by Texas
officials, see Bruce Zagaris, Kidnapping of Mexican Citizens, 6 INT'L ENFORCE~m~NT L.
REP. 411 (Nov. 1990) and Mexican Government Protests the Kidnapping by the State of
Texas of its Nations, 6 INT'L ENFoRcmmNTL. REP. 364 (Bruce Zagaris ed., Oct. 1990).
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States along and near the border encountered numerous cases of murder and seri-
ous violent crimes involving suspected Mexican nationals believed to be in Mex-
ico. The problem of the inability to reach Mexican nationals suspected of serious
violent crimes became a cause celebre threatening the fragile coalition for the
ratification of NAFTA in the United States Congress."' For instance, hearings on
the ratification of NAFTA focused on two high profile cases, the cases of Serapio
Zi~iga Rios and Juan Navaro Lerma.sl
A. ThE CASE OF SERAPIO ZOF4GARIos
Serapio Zfifiiga Rios, from Loma Linda, Mexico, was suspected of kidnapping
a four and one-half year old girl from her bed at home, molesting her, and leaving
her hanging in a blanket tied to a tree on September 14, 1992. He was charged
with kidnapping, two counts of child molestation, including rape and sodomy,
burglary, assault with a deadly weapon, and infliction of great bodily injury dur-
ing the commission of the sex crimes. "
Sheriff Cois Byrd, County of Riverside, State of California, testified that an ar-
rest warrant issued for Zi~figa Rios on September 29, 1992, and that the State un-
successfully sought the extradition of Zfifiiga Rios to stand trial for the crimes.
Byrd explained that his office had strong physical evidence corroborating state-
ments taken from the victim leading his office to believe Rios is the prime suspect
in the case. He stated that he knew of no instances where the United States suc-
cessfully extradited wanted persons from Mexico to stand trial. There were ten
other cases of which he was aware that involved arrest warrants for Mexican na-
tionals, most involving murder charges. - 3 According to Byrd, his office pursued
prosecution in Mexico under Article IV shortly before his testimony, but was not
aware of any progress.'
Congressman Clay E. Shaw, Jr. testified that, because of the cumbersome, in-
efficient nature of the extradition process, the extradition papers were not for-
mally submitted to the Mexican Government until June of 1993, nine months af-
ter the crime.s Meanwhile, the victimized family paid thousands of dollars to a
private investigator to locate Rios, found living with his family in Mexico. If an
efficient extradition process existed when the crime occurred, and decent coop-
eration existed from the Mexican Government, Rios would have been brought to
justice by now."6
The girl's mother (identified only as "Susan") testified that tremendous turf
530. See NAFTA Hearing, supra note 513, at 476-77; 139 CoNG. Rc. H7411-01 (1993)
(statement of Rep. Shaw) (providing a detailed account of the incident).
531. See NAFTA Hearing, supra note 513, at 479-81.
532. Id. at 479.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 479-80.
535. Id. at480.
536. Id.
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problems existed among county, state, and federal authorities on the case. Even
after the involvement of members of Congress and the delivery of a letter signed
by forty-eight members of the United States Congress to President Salinas on Oc-
tober 22, 1993, asking for the extradition of Rios, no progress occurred. The lack
of action on an official level with extradition resulted in the family hiring a pri-
vate detective for $25,000 to locate Zfifiiga Rios and monitor him so that he could
be located and arrested once the extradition paperwork was complete. In Novem-
ber 1992, Zfifiiga Rios was located at the home of his parents in Loma Linda,
Mexico where his wife and two daughters reside. He remained in that vicinity un-
til July 1993. The mother was told that for an additional $30,000 Ziga Rios
could be delivered to the United States authorities. For five of those months, she
said, the Mexican authorities knew of the crime and the whereabouts of Zfifiiga
Rios, but chose not to pursue him."7
The mother stated that she could have pursued Article IV prosecution instead
of extradition. The Office of Foreign Prosecution told her, however, that more
than likely this case would not be prosecuted under Article IV because most of
those prosecutions are reserved for murder cases. In addition, the Mexican Gov-
ernment could not use either DNA evidence or the laser photographs of the teeth
marks.5 38
Despite the existence of an arrest warrant, the INS, unaware of the arrest, ap-
proved Zfiiiiga Rios for his permanent residency status.3 When the mother con-
tacted the FBI for assistance in September 1992, the FBI responded that the case
did not fall under its jurisdiction and thus refused involvement. In July 1993,
however, it decided to become involved after encouragement from Congressman
George Brown's office. Thereafter, the FBI filed a federal arrest warrant for
ZOfiiga Rios for fleeing the United States to avoid prosecution."'
The Mexican Government only started to respond due to the involvement of
Congressmen Shaw, Brown, and Calvert and their letters to the Justice Depart-
ment, as well as the pendency of the ratification of NAFTA. Even then, the Mexi-
can Government only seriously responded after the case was brought to the atten-
tion of Mexican President Salinas by then Secretary of State Warren Christopher
and Ambassador Jones.?" On December 17, 1993, the Mexican Government an-
nounced it arrested Zfiiiiga Rios in connection with the above case.- 2
B. THE CASE AGAINST JuAN NAVARRO LERMA
Antonio Manriquez, husband of the murder victim, testified about the difficulty
in bringing to justice Juan Navarro Lerma, also known as Juan Maciel Lerma,
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
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who on February 14, 1993 murdered his wife Ignacia Moreno Manriquez in the
parking lot outside Loma Linda Medical Center in Loma Linda, California.
Ignacia and her son had been treated at the hospital for the flu. Juan Navarro had
been lying in wait to murder her and took Juanito Jr., their four year old child,
with him, only to return him approximately two weeks later. The crime left the
three children, Anabel, eleven, Lucia, eight, and Juanito, Jr., four, orphans.-
In August 1993, Manriquez spoke to Detective Brown, head of the sheriff's of-
flee in San Bernardino. Brown said that he had leads and that Navarro was in
Mexicali, Baja California, Mexico. Manrfquez stated, however, that he was the
one who told Brown of Navarro's location after Manriquez personally visited
Mexicali to ask for help from the authorities there. Brown's answer was that they
needed an arrest warrant in Mexico, but that in so doing, the United States lost its
rights to try him in a United States court.'
Manriquez stated that he asked for assistance from any and all government
agencies that he believed might have some sort of jurisdiction in the case-Con-
gressmen in California and Washington; the INS in Caldxico, California; the
Mexican Consulate in San Bernardino, California; President Clinton; and the
President of Mexico.m-
Manriquez stated that Navarro is a fugitive living in Mexico under the alias of
"Paco". The Mexican authorities cannot apprehend him without orders from the
United States, and for reasons beyond Manriquez' comprehension, the United
States authorities will not send this order.50
C. EFFORTS BY MEXICAN GOVERNMENT TO STRENGTHEN EFFO RTS TO PROSECUTE
MEXIcAN NATIONALS ACCUSED OF VIOLENT CRIMES IN THE UNITED STATES
Coincident with the controversy over the inability to gain custody or prosecute
Mexican nationals suspected of violent crimes in the United States and the threat-
ened blocking of NAFTA's ratification, the Mexican Government improved its
efforts. These efforts to accommodate such prosecutions did not start suddenly in
December 1993.m7 It has been an ongoing process.-" For instance in August 1990,
the Mexican Government agreed on an ex'pedited procedure to charge Mexican
citizens accused of crimes in the United States. After the United States files a copy
of the charges with the Mexican Embassy in the United States, the Mexican Gov-
ernment then prosecutes the case in Mexico. In November 1990, Mexico initiated
the first prosecution under the new procedure."
On December 17, 1993, the Mexican Office of the Attorney General an-
543. Id. at481.
544. Id.
545. Id.
546. Id.
547. Id.
548. Id.
549. For further discussion, see Zagaris, srpra note 526, at 411.
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nounced that agents of the Federal Judicial Police ("FJP") arrested Serapio Zlifliga
Rios on December 15, 1993 in accordance with the arrest warrant issued against
him by the Judge for criminal matters of the Seventh Federal District."' The FJP
detained Zffiga Rios in the Mexican State of Querdtaro for his alleged role in
perpetrating the crimes of rape, sexual abuse, illegal deprivation of freedom, and
bodily injury. The Mexican Office of the Attorney General issued an arrest war-
rant on the basis of Article IV of the Penal Code for the Federal District, requiring
that crimes committed by a Mexican citizen abroad be penalized."
On March 3, 1993, the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico received a re-
quest from the Sheriff of Weld County, Colorado, for the detention and trial in
Mexico of the persons charged with the murder of United States citizens Josd Juan
Lara and his wife Aurelia Durn Lamn. The couple was carrying the payroll for the
agricultural workers employed at the farm managed by Lara, when six Mexican
men allegedly intercepted their car and murdered them. Alberto Matfas Martinez
was arrested in the United States and sentenced to life in prison for his participa-
tion in the crime. The other five suspects fled to Mexican territory. Thereafter,
Mexican authorities started to investigate the events, pursuant to the United States
request. 5
2
On October 19, 1993, a Federal Judge in the Mexican State of Hlidalgo issued a
warrant of arrest against David Zanmudio, Antonio Martinez, and Victor Badillo.
They were captured on November 21, 1993. On the same day Mexican authorities
obtained information leading to the location and arrest of the two other suspects.
On November 25, 1993, Efrain Castillo was arrested and confessed to having
murdered the other suspect, Benigno Cer6n Flores.153
To assist United States prosecutors in ensuring the successful prosecution of
cases in Mexico, the Mexican Attorney General's Office prepared a memorandum
on domestic prosecution and evidentiary rules in Mexico.15 It discusses the re-
quirements to convict a person in Mexico, including the type and kind of evidence
required in the following cases: homicide; rape; drug-related cases; fraud and
breaches of trust; tax crimes; firearms and explosive crimes; and criminal asso-
ciation. The memorandum assists United States prosecutors in determining the
types of evidence a Mexican prosecutor needs to prosecute the crimes covered.
The Mexican Attorney General's Office also prepared an English translation of
the Mexican rules of evidence from its Federal Criminal Prosecurial Law of Evi-
550. Mexico Announces Arrest of Alleged Rapist, 10 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 8, 8
(Jan. 1994) (citing Embassy of Mexico, Mexican Attorney General Attach6's Office, The
Rapist of a Four Year Old Girl, Arrested, MEx. NEWSLETITER, No. 39, Dec. 17, 1993).
551. Id. at 9.
552. Mexico Announces Prosecution of Alleged Murders in Lieu of Extradition to the
US., 9 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 481, 482 (Dec. 1993) (citing Embassy of Mexico, Co-
operation between Mexico and the U.S. Is Resulting in Effective Domestic Prosecution,
MEx. NEWSLETTER, No. 37, Dec. 1, 1993).
553. Id.
554. MIGUEL A. MINDEZ, DOMEsTIc PROSECUrION AND EVIDENCE REQUIRED IN MEXCAN
CRmvfNAL CASES, (Embassy of Mexico to the United States, Nov. 1995).
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dence in these cases.S
The Mexican Office of the Attorney General tried to centralize more of the
oversight of Article IV prosecutions by monitoring such cases. It receives and as-
signs the evidence required to prosecute Article IV cases to the prosecutors in the
field. Monitoring may also enable the Office to identify and help resolve difficul-
ties in problem cases. In addition, monitoring enables the Office to respond to the
inevitable political questions that often flow from the handling of these cases. I'l
Supplementing the memorandum of the Mexican Attorney General's Office,
United States state attorney general's offices and other state law enforcement
agencies on the border prepared their own memoranda and guides on prosecuting
cases in Mexico!"
D. NEW EXTRADITIONS OF MIDaCAN NATIONALS
On April 26, 1996, in a move signifying the start of a new practice departing
from the long-standing practice against extraditing its nationals, the Mexican
Government granted the United States extradition requests for two Mexican na-
tionals, Francisco CAmez Garcia, alias "Frankie," and Aar6n Morel LeBar6n.
3
In the case of Francisco Gamez Garcia, an Arizona state court already found
him guilty of crimes of sexual abuse and sexmd conduct with a minor. Gdmez
Garcia was on provisional release when becoming a fugitive. "
Mexico granted extradition on the basis of the 1978 extradition treaty pre-
venting acts from being punished more than once under the general principle of
criminal law known as non bis in idem. The principle is set forth in the provisions
at Article 23 of the Mexican Constitution and Article 6 of the extradition treaty.
As a result, Ganez Garcia cannot be extradited in Mexico under the provisions of
Article 7 of the Mexican Law on Extradition because of the adjudication of his
case in Arizona."6
G-mez Garcia manifested his willingness to be sent to the United States as
soon as possible to face the charges pending in the Arizona court and decided not
to exercise his right to initiate an amparo against the extradition. As a result, he
555. CHAPTERoFEvmmzcE, C.F.P.P. (1993).
556. Interview by Bruce Zagaris with Mary Troland, Deputy Director, OIA, Crim. Div.,
U.S. Dep't of Just. (Aug. 28, 1996) [hereinafter Troland Interview].
557. Id.
558. For background, see Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Extradites Twro Nationals to the U.S.,
12 NT'L EiFoRcENENr L. REP. 220-21 (June 1996) (citing Secretaria de Relaciones Exte-
riores de M6xico Comunicado (Press Release), B-130, Tlatelolco, D.F., 26 de abril de
1996).
559. See id. (discussing GCmez Garcia's guilty verdict for acts occurring in September
and October 1993, when he sexually abused a minor as a guest in the minor's house , dis-
cussion supra Part VItA
560. Id.
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was delivered to the United States on April 17, 1996.1" The Mexican Government
justified extraditing GAmez Garcia, although a Mexican national, because he had
already been sentenced. 6 '
In the case of Aar6n Morel LeBar6n, Mexico granted extradition under the
treaty in connection with criminal charges pending in United States District Court
in Houston, issuing an arrest warrant in connection with conspiracy to commit
murder and participation in a racketeering and corrupt influenced organization
( ,R I C O ). 3
The allegations are that since 1968, Lebar6n has been a director of a sect
known as the Church of the Primigenial Lamb of God. Among the edicts of the
sect is the murder of any member deciding to abandon the sect. In this connection,
LeBar6n allegedly ordered the murders of Duane K. Chynoweth, Mark Chy-
noweth, Ed Martson and Jenny Chynoweth, an eight year old girl. The homicides
occurred on June 27, 1988 in Houston and Irving, Texas.' "
The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to grant extradition in con-
fortuity with the extradition treaty, taking into consideration the opprobrious na-
ture of the crimes and their extremely grave effects on the fundamental values of
society. In addition, the United States Government classified LeBar6n as a United
States national, based on the United States citizenship of both his father and
mother. The question of the status of LeBar6n's nationality facilitated extradition
by Mexico. '
Mr. Morel LeBar6n did not invoke the right of amparo against the order
granting extradition. Hence, under the provisions of the last paragraph of Article
32 of Mexico's Law on International Extradition, on April 25, 1996, Mexico de-
livered him to the United States.3"
In 1995, the Mexican Government expelled to the United States Juan Chapa
Garcia, a Mexican national indicted in the U.S. for alleged organized crime ac-
tivities concerning illicit narcotics trafficking. 67 The two cases, along with the
decision to hand Garcia Abrego over to the United States, indicate that the Mexi-
can Government is beginning to extradite more frequently and otherwise surren-
der its nationals to the United States.
561. Id.
562. Troland Interview, supra note 553.
563. Zagaris, supra note 555, at 220-21.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id.
567. Troland Interview, supra note 553.
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IX. ANALYSIS AND PROSPECTS FOR STRENGHTENING
EXTRADITION AND OBTAINIG CUSTODY OF ALLEGED
CRIMINALS
In the short and long term, future globalization, free trade, and other factors
guarantee a rise in crossborder criminality and will exert pressure on extradition.
The political pressures for extradition or prosecution of perpetrators of transbor-
der criminality requires analysis and prospects for strengthening extradition and
obtaining custody of alleged criminals.
A. A MEX[CAN PERSPECTiVE
A fundamental problem for the Mexican Attorney General's Office is that
United States extradition law relies heavily on case law, thereby requiring Mexi-
can attorneys to pay attention and constantly update extradition jurisprudence and
case law for the judicial circuit with jurisdiction over a particular extradition re-
quest. In criminal law, the United States uniquely concedes to fugitives the facility
of opposing or appealing definitive resolutions of extradition. Of particular diffi-
culty is the potential that federal extradition decisions, while subordinate to the
United States Constitution and federal laws and treaties, can invalidate a federal
law or treaty if the court finds a decision unconstitutional.!
Another perceived difference is that the United States criminal system allocates
unique and exclusive power to the judicial authority, precluding the executive
branch's ability to alter, modify, or appeal judicial determinations, especially
when a court makes a decision contrary to the existing extradition treaty.!' The
Mexican Attorney General's Office is especially troubled by the difficulties of ful-
filling the provisions of Articles 3 and 13 of the extradition treaty when it requests
extradition:
(a) Article 3 Evidence Required: "Extradition shall be granted only if the evi-
dence be found sufficient, according to the laws of the requested Party, either to
justify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offense of which he has
been accused had been committed in that place or to prove that he is the person
convicted by the courts of the requesting Party."
(b) Article 13.1 Procedure: "The request for extradition shall be processed in
accordance with the legislation of the requested Party."
These provisions give the United States courts complete discretion to evaluate
the evidence that sustains an extradition request and enable them to invade the
sphere of competence of Mexican courts. The requirement practically obligates
Mexican prosecutors not only to know and apply its own national law, but also to
568. Jost Id AcIo RODR GuEZ GARCA, LA EXTRADICI6N EN LAS RELAciONES
BmATERms I.xmco-EsTADos UNmos DE AmicA (ExrADrro* IN BILAr RELATio:s
Mfxtco-U.S.) 3-4 (undated, but prepared in the Mexican Attorney General's Office in
spring 1996).
569. Id. at 5.
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pay attention to and include United States criminal procedure, particularly the re-
quirements of probable cause. The latter requirement is viewed as complex and
elusive.
The verification of probable cause is a requirement whose origin comes from a
constitutional mandate with a superior priority to the treaty. Hence, it is funda-
mental that the prosecutors make formidable arguments to persuade the judge of
its existence. In comparison, the provisions of Title 8 of the Mexican Federal
Code of Criminal Procedures require the Mexican prosecutor to verify the exis-
tence of the body of the crime and presume guilt. To the contrary, in the United
States the verification of probable cause is sustained primarily in case precedents
and not in the criminal procedure code. In summary, the criteria to determine if
the elements for deciding whether evidence sufficient to justify extradition exists
differ between Mexican and United States courts."' The comparatively tougher
extradition standards in the United States require strengthening the training, re-
sources, and ability of attorneys in the Mexican Attorney General's Office, espe-.
cially in United States law, comparative, and international law."'
The Mexican Attorney General's Office believes that, while, upon receipt of an
extradition request, it presents to the court the request and evidence required by
its legal system, the United States Attorney General's Office (Office of Interna-
tional Affairs) only presents the request and accompanying evidence as elaborated
by the Mexican authorities. The United States does not identify and rectify errors
and omissions prior to presenting the extradition petition as its Mexican counter-
parts do pursuant to the provisions of Article 20 of the Mexican International Ex-
tradition Law. The United States thereby violates the principle of international
reciprocity and the requirements of Article 10(2) of the Mexican International
Extradition Law."'
The Mexican Attorney General's Office is also considering hiring American
lawyers specialized in extradition, criminal law, and criminal procedure and con-
sidering the negotiation of a protocol."
B. A UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE
The United States publicly lobbied for a new extradition treaty containing
modernized provisions that reduce the opportunities to refuse extradition requests.
For instance, on July 11, 1996, following a two-day conference of anti-drug offi-
cials, United States drug czar General Barry McCaffrey called for a new extradi-
tion treaty as part of a five-year plan to combat drug trafficking. 74 As suggested
by Enrique Mercado, a special agent in the California Department of Justice's
570. Id. at 5-7.
571. Id. at 8.
572. Id. at 9-10.
573. Id. at 11.
574. Mexico and United States Agree on 5-Year Anti-Drug Plan, 12 IT'L
ENoRcanmEwL. REP. 304-05 (Aug. 1996).
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Mexican Liaison Program, consideration should be given to establishing a Mexi-
can Liaison Task Force consisting of federal, state, and local officers to pursue
foreign and especially Mexican prosecution matters.
Most importantly, from a substantive perspective the United States wmants to re-
vise the provision on extradition of nationals, emulating some of its recently con-
cluded extradition treaties. The United States experience with "domestic prosecu-
tions" demonstrates that they are woefully ineffective and inefficient in practice.
Evidence collected in the United States often cannot be transferred to Mexico for
effective use in trial because rules of evidence differ or other technical, legal, or
procedural differences interfere. Witnesses and victims are often unable or un-
willing to travel to Mexico to participate in judicial proceedings whose language
and procedures they may not understand.
In this regard, Article III of the proposed United States-Bolivia extradition
treaty requires and authorizes the extradition of Bolivian nationals for certain
listed serious offenses, while allowing the Bolivian Government to exercise dis-
cretion in the decision to surrender citizens sought for more minor crimes.' The
list of offenses deemed serious enough to warrant extradition of nationals on a
consistent basis includes murder or manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, sexual of-
fenses involving children, armed robbery, drug trafficking, fraud or counterfeit-
ing, terrorism or organized crime activity, trafficking in archeological treasures,
and other crimes punishable in both countries by at least ten years' imprison-
ment.
6
Countries, other than Bolivia, undertaking to extradite nationals to countries
reciprocating include Italy, Guatemala, Chile, and Uruguay.' Argentina is re-
evaluating its position."
The United States wants to clarify the procedures for "provisional arrest," the
process by which a fugitive in flight can be detained while the documents in sup-
port of extradition are prepared.' The United States wants to supplant the list of
extraditable offenses with an agreement that an offense is extraditable if it is pun-
ishable under the laws of both parties by deprivation of liberty for a minimum pe-
riod of more than one year or by a more severe penalty.' The United States be-
lieves that such a list, as the one included in the treaty with Bolivia, grows
increasingly out of date as time passes.'
575. Extradition Treaty, U.S.-Bol., art. Ill, June 27, 1995, S. TRATY Doc. No. 104-22
(1995). See Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Aff., 104th Cong. 2-3 (1996) (Statement of Mark vI. Richard, Dep.
Ass't Attorney General, U.S. Dep't of Justice) [hereinafter Richard Testimony].
576. See Richard Testimony, supra note 575, at 2-3.
577. See id. at 2.
578. See id. at 2.
579. Id.
580. See id.
581. See Extradition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm Sen. Comm. on Foreign Aff., 104th Cong. 4 (1996) (Statement of Jamison S. Borek,
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The United States also wants to supplant the current provisions on lapse of
time, which state that extradition will not be granted when the prosecution or the
enforcement of the penalty for the offense for which extradition is sought has been
barred by lapse of time according to the law of the requesting or requested state."
Instead, current United States extradition practice is to apply the extradition trea-
ties retroactively;, that is, they apply to offenses committed before and after the
date the treaty enters into force and to cases still pending at the time of its entry
into force."
C. OTHER PERSPECTIVES
A difficult impediment to successful extradition relations is the view by Mexi-
cans that the United States tramples on its sovereignty and violates its law. The
ways to overcome this barrier, while not compromising the need to apprehend and
prosecute fugitives, appear to be: (1) a legally binding commitment by the United
States Government that it respects Mexican sovereignty and does not abduct per-
sons in Mexico; (2) a continued strengthening of the resources and procedures
whereby Mexico submits for prosecution persons wanted for serious crimes in the
United States; (3) consideration of amending its law to extradite certain persons,
including nationals, to the United States; (4) strengthening inter-Parliamentary
and executive branch cooperation between the two governments; and (5) the es-
tablishment and development of a regional crimes organization to assist in re-
solving some of the most difficult and intractable criminal justice problems be-
tween the two governments.
Bilateral enforcement mechanisms between the United States and Mexico are
already useful in identifying and providing a mechanism to resolve controversies
in extradition and strengthen the operation of extradition cases. They also
strengthen the operation of domestic prosecution (e.g. under Article IV of the
Mexican Constitution) and the use of mutual assistance procedures when domestic
prosecution is used.'" Bilateral enforcement mechanisms include, inter alia: peri-
odical meetings between the respective Attorney General Offices to discuss extra-
dition and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLATs"); the state attorneys gen-
eral border conferences held twice a year; high-level inter-agency binational
conferences, in which the Attorneys General and Ministry of Foreign Affairs/State
Department participate; Inter-Parliamentary meetings; and starting in February
1995 an unprecedented series of law enforcement plenaries and a host of working
group meetings stemming from the plenaries." Among the topics regularly dis-
cussed are extradition and related fugitive issues, counternarcotics cooperation,
prisoner transfer, money laundering, arms smuggling, and white collar crime."'
Dep. Legal Advisor, Dep't of State) [hereinafter Borek Testimony].
582. Mexico-U.S. Extradition Treaty, supra note 53, art. 7.
583. See Borek Testimony, supra note 581, at 6-8.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARconcs CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT
1996, 146 (1996).
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To close gaps in the operation of extradition agreements some countries have
shifted in criminal law jurisdiction, focusing on institutions superior to individual
states,"' so that rather than speaking of "international," experts refer to suprana-
tional law and institutions. ' Regionally, in the context of integration, suprana-
tional institutions include the Council of Europeland the institutions of the
European Community, which adopt directives and other instruments concerning
matters such as criminalization of money laundering, customs, and immigration
violations, anti-drug policy proposals, and the development of a European Police
Force ("Europor')?5  Indeed, an ongoing mechanism to help resolve controversies
over extradition and constantly strengthen extradition in the context of overall
criminal and law enforcement cooperation would be a permanent and intensive
regional organization or group that supplements and facilitate cooperation and
could help resolve controversies when they arise. Examples of such groups are the
European Committee on Crime Problems within the Council of Europe and the
Europol within the European Union.
Extradition is only one of several United States-Mexico criminal cooperation
mechanisms. Others include mutual legal assistance, transfer of prisoners and
execution of penal sentences, and various mini-or sectoral-agreements such as co-
operation in drugs, tax, customs, commodities futures regulation, and enforce-
ment In the medium and long-term, the Mexican and United States Govern-
ments should consider constructing a framework to deal comprehensively with not
only extradition, but a wide range of criminal issues."' The most efficient struc-
ture would probably include a regional organization, such as an Americas Com-
mittee on Crime Problems to meet with the Assistant Ministers of Justice to pro-
vide political direction. Their meetings would be on a regular basis to discuss and
take action and cooperate on procedural matters, such as mutual assistance, extra-
dition, and transfer of prisoners, and substantive criminal matters, such as drugs,
money laundering, customs, and a panoply of criminal justice problems?
587. See generally Pra HAY, FEDERALsM Aim SuPRANATiONL Oa azAoNs
(1966); FoRsrL. GRIEvEs, SuP TAiiONsi. O n,,iA ,.NAioNAADnzcrATIoN (1969).
588. For a discussion of the efforts and differences in trying to resolve tra snational
criminal problems on the national level, such as through expansion of extraterritorial juris-
diction, as well as internationally (e.g., improving interstate cooperation) and supramnation-
ally, see PRINCIPLES AD PROCIDURES FOR A Nsw TRANSAT!ONAL Cmau.-, LAW (Albin
Eser & Otto Lagodny eds., 1992).
589. For a discussion of the Council's Committee on Crime Problems, see Scott Carl-
son & Bruce Zagaris, International Cooperation in Criminal Matters: Western Europe's
International Approach to International Crime, 15 NovAL. REv. 551, 554-55 (1991).
590. For a discussion of international criminal cooperation in Western Europe, see id.
591. For a discussion of the issue of harmonization of criminal justice systems in the
context of Western Hemisphere integration, see Ethan Nadelmann, Harmonization of
Criminal Justice Systems, in THE CHALLENGE OF ImGRATioN EuoPsE AIaD Tim A.i uCAS
247-77 (Peter H. Smith ed., 1993).
592. See Bruce Zagaris, Constructing a Hemispheric Initiative Against Transnational
Crime, 19 FORDHI4br'LL.J. 1888, 1898-1902 (1996). For an earlier account and inter-
national organization theory, see Bruce Zagaris & Constantine Papavizas, Using the Or-
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X. CONCLUSION
The two governments, universities and think-tanks with Mexican-United States
studies,"" and international criminal law programs, should stimulate research and
discussion on the above issues. Politicians should start the consultative process as
well, so that political proposals receive consideration by citizens in the two coun-
tries. Shaping the course of relations between the two governments and the West-
em Hemisphere as a whole, will test the ability of law to contribute positively to
the dynamic change that is inevitable in this hemisphere. The sheer number of
extradition cases between the two countries and the political significance of many
of the cases make United States-Mexican extradition relations of immensely im-
portant for the region and even the Western Hemisphere.
The new efforts at integration in the hemisphere, especially the Free Trade
Area of the Americas ("FTAA") movement and the various subregional integra-
tion efforts, including NAFTA, reflect the impact of globalization and the new
regionalism." The goals of regional cooperation changed from those of import
substitution, integration of production, and collective self-reliance to those of so-
lidifying domestic reforms and ensuring future access to the larger North Ameri-
can and global markets to stimulate growth through increased foreign investment,
greater competition, and more rapid diffusion of technology."' The new direction
of existing and proposed integration has an increasing criminal and enforcement
component." 6
The position taken by Jamaica and the other small countries of the Caribbean
suggests the emergence of a subregional integration movement as a basis for col-
lective negotiated access for the Commonwealth Caribbean countries to the larger
North American market, most likely in coordination with the countries of Central
ganization of American States to Control International Narcotics Trafficking and Money
Laundering, 57 REv. INT'L DE DRorr PENAL 119 (1986).
593. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies has provided pri-
vate and public for discussions by the Mexican Attorney General on Mexican-U.S. drug
and criminal cooperation.
594. For a discussion of the nontrade issues of Western Hemisphere integration, see
Robert A. Pastor, NAFTA as the Center of an Integration Process: The Nontrade Issues, in
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE ASSESSING THE IMPACT 176-99 (Nora Lustig et al. eds.,
1992). For a discussion of systematic issues, see Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, NAFTA and
the Rest of the World, in NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE ASSESSING TME IMPACT, supra note
210 at 232-34.
595. W. Andrew Axline, Conclusion: External Forces, State Strategies, and Regional-
ism in the Americas, in FoREIGN POLICY & REOoNALjSM jN THE AMERICAS 199, 208
(Gordon Mace & Jean-Philippe Therien eds., 1996). For background on the economic con-
cepts behind NAFTA, see generally GARY CLYDE HuFBAuER & JEFFREY J. ScHor, NORTH
AMmuCAN FREE TRADE: IssuEs AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1992). For a recent assessment of
the impact of NAFTA, see Sidney Weintraub, NAFTA at THree: A Progress Report
(CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD., 1997).
596. See Axline, supra note 595, at 208.
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America:" To the extent the new regionalism includes criminal cooparation, the
countries in the region will want to conform their laws and policies to this crimi-
nal cooperation.
The role of Mexico in the new regionalism has been enhanced by its initiation
of NAFTA and its key role in NAFTA. The dynamic of Central Americans going
to Mexico over the decades for schooling in a wide variety of disciplines ranging
from the social sciences, arts, and medicine to the military, with Central Ameri-
can officers receiving training in Mexico's War College, reflects the rich conflu-
ence between Central America and North America. "
Nevertheless, traditional relations between Mexico and Central America are
characterized by an attitude of certain mutual ambivalence and certain distrust.
Traditionally, Central American views of Mexico demonstrated certain similari-
ties with the apprehension Mexicans have towards the United States. Mexico's
rich and engaging culture, its social history, and the political stability brought
about-at least until recent years--by the centralized and semi-authoritarian na-
ture of the still PRI-dominated political system attracted the admiration of some
Central American countries. They have seen the postrevolutionary Mexican re-
gime as a model of social change and political order. Central Americans also of-
ten resented their perception of Mexico's sporadic attempts to establish a base of
influence in the region and to take unfair advantage of its Central American
neighbors:s
The most likely short-term scenario for Central American-Mexican-United
States relations is that the key element will be the formation of a North American
economic bloc and the strengthening of conservative positions in Central Amer-
ica, especially in the economic sphere. Hence, Central American-Mexican and
Central American-United States bilateral relations would be modified through a
United States-Mexican-Central American intermediation that would no longer be
triangular,' but linear.
597. Id. For a discussion of issues in the negotiation of a free trade agreement between
the United States and Central America, see Sylvia Saborio, U.S.-Central America Free
Trade, in THE PansE A T PROlisE: Fmn TnADn n THE A RincAs 195-216 (Sylvia
Saborio ed., 1992).
598. Remarks by Adolfo Aguilar Zinser & Gilberto Castafleda, The Future of Mexican-
U.S.-Central American Relations: Final Considerations, THE DFmcuLT Ta. c GE Mizaxco,
CmvTrRA AzmlcA, A THE UrnrD STATES 159, 172 (H. Rodrigo Jaubmrth et al. eds.,
1992) [hereinafter TaE DfIfcuLT TRIAIN\_LE].
599. Axline, supra note 595, at 212-15.
600. The triangular perspective refers to the differences that the three actors (the
United States, Mexico, and Central America) have in their interests and how foreign policy
is reflected in these historical differences. Mexico's policies, behavior, and attitudes to-
ward the region have alvays respected the autonomous decisions of each of the countries
and have been a positive influence in terms of their national goals, even though Central
America has not been Mexico's first priority and Mexico does not have the power or influ-
ence that the United States enjoys in the region. IL Rodrigo Jauberth, Introduction, in THE
DanICULT TRIANcLE, supra note 598, at 5.
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A variation of the scenario consists of a drift toward a certain homogenization
of the foreign and criminal policies of Mexico and the United States, at least as
far as Central America is concerned. Mexico's participation in this regard tends
to become "depoliticized" and assumes an economic bias.' Insofar as criminal
cooperation and policy is concerned, however, the importance of the similarity of
Mexican-Central American legal and cultural systems, especially in criminal
law' and procedure, 3 and the gradual harmonization of Mexican-United States
criminal law, especially insofar as they are covered by NAFTA (e.g. intellectual
property protection,' customs,' 5 and to a lesser extent, the environment*), pro-
vides an opportunity for United States-Mexican leadership and/or intermediation
with respect to Central America and the rest of the hemisphere. Until now, aside
from United States-Mexican and other bilateral relations, the story of criminal
justice harmonization in the Americas is virtually synonymous with United States
efforts to harmonize drug control efforts in the hemisphere. The asymmetrical
nature of criminal justice harmonization in the Americas contrasts greatly with
harmonization in Europe.' Criminal justice officials in Latin America dealt with
other criminal justice matters in an ad hoc manner, but generally displayed little
interest in the sorts of multilateral and intensive bilateral initiatives and institu-
tions found in Europe.'
Clearly, if governments and international organizations want to keep pace with
transnational criminals and the dynamic changes offering new opportunities for
601. THE DIFICULT TRIANoLE, supra note 598, at 164.
602. For discussions of the similarities of the historical influences on the Latin Ameri-
can Codes of Criminal Law, see KARST & RosENN, supra note 173 at 8-418 (citing L.
JIMINEZ DE ASUA, I C6DIGOS PENALES IBEROMERCANOS (INTERAMERiCAN PENAL CODES)
(1946). For a comparison of criminal codes, see Edmund H. Schwenk, Criminal Codqica-
tion and General Principles of Criminal Law in Argentina, Mexico, Chile, and the United
States: A Comparative Study, 4 LAL. REv. 351 (1942).
603. For a discussion of criminal procedure in Latin America, see KARST & ROSENN,
supra note 173, at 56.
604. For background on intellectual property protection in NAFTA, see generally Lori
M. Berg, The North American Free Trade Agreement & Protection of Intellectual Prop-
erty: A Converging View, 5 J. TRANsNAT'L L. & PoL. 99 (1995); Bill F. Kryzda & Shaun F.
Downey, Overview of Recent Changes in Mexican Industrial Property Law and the En-
forcement ofRights by the Relevant Government Authorities, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 99 (1995).
605. Bruce Zagaris & David R. St pp, Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Customs En-
forcement Among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico, 2 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 337, 342-
43 (1992).
606. For background on environmental enforcement cooperation under NAFTA, see
Scott C. Fulton, & Lawrence I Sperling, The Network of Environmental Enforcement and
Compliance Cooperation in North America and the Western Hemisphere, 30 INT'L LAW.
111 (1996).
607. For a discussion of the importance of criminal justice in addressing government
abuses and deprivations of human rights, see generally TRANSMON TO DEMOCRACY IN
LATIN AMERICA: THE RoLE oF THE JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993).
608. Nadelmann, supra note 591, at 270-74.
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crossborder crime, they need to become more dynamic themselves and deal more
comprehensively with international criminal cooperation and crime policy. In this
new enforcement cooperation paradigm, extradition policy should be strength-
ened.
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DIAGRAMS*
EXTRADITION REQUEST TO THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT
EXTRADITION REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES
MEXICAN EXTRADITION PRACTICES
* Julian Joel Romero Garcia, Antlisis Juridico de la Extradici6n en el Derecho Pe-
nal Mexicano (Judicial Analysis of Extradition in Mexico's Penal Law) 75-86 (1994) (un-
published J.D. thesis, Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de M6xico); Suprenma Corte de
Justicia de la Naci6n (Mexican Supreme Court), Manual de Juicio de Amparo (Amparo
Trial Manual) 384-390 (Jan. 1996).
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EXTRADITION REQUEST TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
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